Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

49. Draft Briefing Note for 364th NSC Meeting by Cutler¹

Washington, April 30, 1958

Introduction

1. The Planning Board has devoted much of the last two months to concentrated discussions of the world situation and in annual review of Basic National Security Policy (the current policy statement having been approved by the President last June).

2. Our review took into account major security policy decisions since last June; the Intelligence Community’s February “Estimate of the World Situation”; the Council’s discussion of that Estimate at its March 20 Meeting; and other factors. We were stimulated by informal discussions with General Gruenther, Arthur Burns, Jack McCloy, Karl Bendetson, and Robert Bowie.

3. The result of this reappraisal is the proposed revision before you, NSC 5810. The chief elements of this revised policy are stated in Section A on p. 2–3, (The Outline of U.S. National Strategy), and developed in detail in Section B (Military, Political and Economic Measures, and Domestic Strength and Other Measures). The chief elements are substantially the same as in existing policy, but there is different emphasis upon then.

4. As an orderly procedure, consideration today will be divided into three parts:

First: an introductory summary of the principal factors influencing our review of last year’s statement, and of their reflection in the new statement before you.

Second: focussing attention on two significant paragraphs—one on limited military aggression; and the other on Red China-Formosa. Here will be taken up the oral views of Defense and of the Chiefs.

Third: five economic paragraphs which reflect splits of opinion in the Planning Board. Here will be taken up Mr. Randall’s comments.

Part I

1. Very many factors influenced, and are reflected, in this revision. I have placed the major factors on a single white sheet, which is at your place.

(REVIEW FACTORS)

Major Factors Influencing Review of Basic Policy

First. The realization that both sides are capable of delivering massive nuclear devastation (regardless of which side strikes first) increasingly deters each side from initiating, or taking actions which directly risk, general nuclear war.

Second. During this time of nuclear parity and mutual deterrence: (a) there is growing doubt in the Free World whether the United States will use its massive nuclear capability, except in retaliation to direct attack on the United States or its forces, leading to a growth of neutralism and a weakening of Free World alliances; (b) the USSR will be more bold—especially toward less developed and uncommitted nations—in economic penetration, in political action, and perhaps in probing through means of limited military aggression.

Third. Weakness or instability in less developed or uncommitted nations, and their primary aim for “modernization”, renders them vulnerable to expanding Sino-Soviet political and economic penetration.

Fourth. Changes in top Kremlin personnel do not indicate a deterioration or disintegration in the Soviet regime’s policy or determination to achieve world domination for Communism.

Fifth. A U.S. massive nuclear retaliatory capability, invulnerable and sufficient to deter general nuclear war, and to prevail in such a war if it comes.

Sixth. A U.S. flexible and selective capability (including nuclear) to deter or suppress limited military aggression; realizing that the chances of keeping a conflict limited—whenever major areas or causes are involved—are at best not promising.

Seventh. Advances in Soviet military technology and scientific skill.

Eighth. The false images presented by Communism to the world of U.S. intentions and objectives, and of the USSR as the advocate of “peace and disarmament”.

Ninth. The adverse effect of the U.S. economic recession upon a healthy, expanding U. S, economy, which is essential to the security of the United States and the Free World.

Tenth. The ability of the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their economic strength in support of internal and external policies which seek world domination.

Eleventh. The American people lack appreciation of the extent of the crisis facing the United States.

2. I wish to draw attention to some of the new guidance and new emphasis in the revision before you, which reflects the impart of these factors. Please turn to Page 2, the “Outline of U.S. National Strategy,” where we restate the basic threat (Par. 3), the basic problem (Par. 4), and the nature of U.S. policies to meet them. (Pars. 5 and 6).

(READ)

3. Perhaps the principal new emphasis in this Planning Board revision may be characterized as follows:

a. The U.S. is facing an enduring crisis greater than heretofore recognized, which calls for mobilization of more human and material resources and for better appreciation by the American people of the extent of the crisis. (Pars. 3, 46).

b. If general nuclear war can be deterred, this crisis will involve a long, drawn-out contest for world leadership with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. (Par. 4).

c. During this time of relative nuclear parity, while the U.S. must securely maintain its deterrent power, military aggression will more likely be of a limited nature. Such limited conflicts should be dealt with in ways which will minimize their spreading into general nuclear war.

d. Concurrently, the U.S. must take a more positive initiative by increasing its efforts (1) in peaceful political and economic competition with the Sino-Soviet Bloc for the uncommitted and less-developed areas of the world (Par. 5, 6–a), and (2) in influencing acceptable changes in the Soviet Bloc through expanded exchanges and contacts, liberalized multilateral trade controls, etc. (Par. 35–37).

Part II

1. How I draw attention to two significant paragraphs in the new statement, which repeat and continue in effect the texts of last year’s statement: Par. 14 dealing with limited military aggression, and Par. 41, dealing with Communist China.

2. There was some sentiment in the Planning Board that both paragraphs required amendment. However, the Planning Board did not formally recommend their revision;—in part because there is in existence high-level consideration of limited war strategy and in part because both paragraphs affect most sensitive relations with our allies. Instead, it was left that I, as Chairman, would report orally upon the views shared by some of us on the Planning Board.

3. a. First, as to Par. 14, p. 5, dealing with limited war. For discussion purposes, I have drafted an alternative Par. 14 on the single blue sheet before you. This alternative is based upon the estimate that, in a period of relative nuclear parity and growing unwillingness on the part of both sides to start general war, the USSR may be more bold—not only in political and economic fields—but also in probing (perhaps by proxy) through means of limited military aggression. (NIE Par. 18, p. 4).

b. This alternative would make two major changes in existing policy guidance:

first—that, in this period of relative nuclear parity, limited aggression may not always be confined to less-developed areas;

second—that, this period of relative nuclear parity, it may not be in the U.S. interest to deal with every limited aggression by applying whatever degree of military force necessary to suppress it.

The purpose of the proposed changes is to ensure that the U.S. will have a flexible capability so that it can determine the application of force best serving U.S. interests under the circumstances existing in each case of limited military aggression.

c. I will read the alternative on the blue sheet:

(READ ALTERNATIVE)

May 1/58—R.C.

ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 14

14. a. During a period of relative nuclear parity, it becomes increasingly important—while maintaining our nuclear capability to deter general war—to develop further and to maintain a capability to oppose limited military aggression wherever U.S. security interests are involved.

b. In the case of any such limited military aggression, the United States should decide whether: (1) vital U.S. interests require the defeat of such limited aggression by prompt and resolute application of whatever degree of force is necessary, even at the risk that major Communist counter-action may spread the hostilities into general war, or whether (2) U.S. interests would be served by the application of only the degree of force necessary to achieve objectives of limiting the area and scope of the hostilities and restoring the status quo ante, thereby seeking to minimize the risk that major Communist counter-action would spread the hostilities into general war.

c. Within the total U.S. military forces, therefore, there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (1) to present a deterrent to limited military aggression, and (2) in accordance with b above, to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such limited aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be deemed necessary. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of mal-deployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose limited military aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including an appropriate nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President.

d. The reasoning behind this suggested alternative is:

(1) The present guidance (Par. 14 in the revision before you) does not envisage the possibility of limited aggression in “developed areas” (including the NATO area). For two reasons this guidance seems “unrealistic”, in a period when both sides are coming to realize that general war is so horrible that it must be avoided.

First, in such a period, limited aggression may occur, and have to be dealt with, in any area. For example, the Soviet Union might take steps which seemed to risk general war—even in a place like Berlin—in the belief that the U.S. or its allies would not allow the confrontation, or the military conflict which might ensue, to get out of hand.

Second, while it is obvious that the capability for massive nuclear retaliation remains the deterrent to general war, is that capability sure deterrent to limited military aggression? Both the Free World and the Soviet Union are beginning to doubt whether massive retaliation to punish limited acts of aggression will actually be invoked, because of the devastation which would inevitably result to all concerned.

(2) The present guidance states that the best way to prevent limited military aggression from spreading is the prompt and resolute application of the degree of military force necessary to defeat it. But, in a time of nuclear parity, is this course in every case the best way? Because of the unacceptability of a general nuclear conflict, which might result from application of such a degree of military force, should a different principle be invoked? Whether in limited aggression to crush the enemy, or to seek only to restore stability to the situation, may depend on the circumstances of each case.

Expending the degree of force necessary promptly to defeat limited military aggression may, through resulting action and counteraction, bring on general nuclear war. Despite this risk, some cases may be so vital to U.S. interests that prompt and massive action to defeat limited aggression may have to be taken. But may there not be other cases where U.S. interests would be better served if we did not try to win too much, and thereby provoke hostile counter action and perhaps resultant general war,—if we satisfied ourselves with trying to restore the status quo ante:

(1) MR. McELROY—MR. QUARLES

(2) GENERAL TWINING

(3) General TAYLOR (BURKE & PATE)

(4) GENERAL WHITE

(5) GENERAL TWINING

(6) SECRETARY OF STATE

(7) OTHERS

My suggestion is that the Council might recommend approval of the revised policy statement before you (NSC 5810), including as Par. 14 the existing basic policy regarding limited aggression, without change; pending submission of recommendations by the Department of Defense as to any revision of the military strategy paragraphs of this new basic policy in the light of Council discussion at this meeting and of the joint study on capabilities for limited warfare called for by NSC Action 1881 (due June 1, 1958).

4. a. Now, as to Par. 41 (p. 20), which repeats last year’s guidance dealing with Communist China. This paragraph contains no guidance as to a future attempt by other nations to seat Red China, rather than the Chinese Nationalist Government, in the United Nations.

b. In this connection, the Planning Board considered:

(1) that the General Assembly in 1957 adopted the “moratorium resolution” by a vote of 48 to 27, with 6 abstentions and 1 absent;

(2) the current withdrawing of Chinese Communist troops from Korea;

(3) the indication by Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand that at some time he might have to honor Labor’s pledge to recognize Red China;

(4) the possibility that in 1960 (or perhaps earlier), in U.K. general elections, the victory may go to the Labor Party, which has repeatedly called for the admission of Red China to the UN; and

(5) informal estimates that the U.S. might not be able to hold enough votes to defeat some resulting move in the UN to seat Red China and to turn out the Chinese Nationalist Government as representative of China.

c. Some Planning Board members thought the U.S. should be considering how, while it still enjoys its strong position in the UN, alternative ways of dealing with such a contingency, and of finding a way—so vital to U.S. interests—to preserve the independence of Taiwan despite the loss of her status as representative in the UN of all-China.

d. Whether stated in the policy paper or not, should we now be thinking about how to preserve an independent Taiwan in a future contingency that the U.S. might not be able to rally enough UN votes to prevent the seating of Red China in the UN?

SECRETARY OF STATE

Part III

1. There remain five split views to be resolved, all dealing with foreign economic matters.

2. Mr. Randall (who cannot be here today) has advised that the draft statement is generally satisfactory and consistent with U.S. foreign economic policy, with three exceptions relating to the three following splits:

(1) Page 12, par. 27–d

This paragraph, part of our economic policy towards less-developed nations (especial “one-crop” nations) provides that the U.S., for political reasons, may on “occasion join in multilateral examination of price, production, and demand trends which might help to promote readjustments between supply and demand and reduce price fluctuations. Treasury and Commerce wished to add that the U.S. should not discuss the making of, or participate in, any international commodity agreement. The Planning Board did not agree with this addition.

Mr. Randall has called my attention to the fact that the CFEP on October 11/55 generally disapproved international commodity agreements, and that CFEP policy requires interagency policy level approval before such an agreement may be discussed with a foreign nation. Neither of these points is reflected in par. 27–d. Mr. Randall believes that the whole paragraph should be deleted until present policy in this regard is modified by the CFEP, on motion of a CFEP member.

May I suggest, accordingly, because I agree, that this paragraph should be stricken and its substance referred to the CFEP for action as a matter within its jurisdiction.

(COMMENT:)

(2) Page 13, par. 29–a.

This paragraph deals with the total level U.S. economic assistance world-wide. Treasury and Budget wished to continue the qualifying provision, which appeared in the 1957 policy statement: “Increases in economic development assistance should, to the extent politically and militarily feasible, be offset by decreases in other economic or in military assistance programs.” The Planning Board did not agree with this addition.

Mr. Randall thinks the addition of this provision undesirable, because there may be circumstances where such an offsetting would not be wise. He thinks each problem should be determined individually in the light of all the pertinent considerations.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

DIRECTOR, BUDGET

SECRETARY OF STATE

(3) Page 18, par. 37–c.

This paragraph states the existing U.S. policy for a unilateral embargo on U.S. trade with the Chinese Communist Bloc. The ODM member suggested a liberalization of our embargo policy to conform with multilateral liberalization. The Planning Board did not agree with this suggestion at this time.

Mr. Randall commented that proposals for changes in our economic defense policy should be made first in CFEP. I agree with his position.

MR. GRAY

(4) Page 12, par. 27–e (6).

This paragraph, part of our economic policy towards less-developed nations, provides: “Be prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, participation with other Free World nations in multilateral development projects or funds.” Treasury and Commerce would delete. The Planning Board did not agree with the deletion.

Since the circulation of the policy statement before you, State, Treasury, and Commerce have agreed to a rewording of this paragraph as follows: “Be prepared to study the acceptability of proposals for the establishment of international institutions for development financing.” The agreement on this language stems from a current study by the National Advisory Council on proposals for an affiliate of the IBRD which would help in financing less-developed countries.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

SECRETARY OF STATE

(5) Page 5, par 14.

This is a modification which the ODM member wished to make in the old text of the guidance on limited military aggression: to specify that the “flexible and selective capability” should include “an appropriate conventional capability” as well as a nuclear capability. The Planning Board did not agree with this amendment.

MR. GRAY

3. On Page 3, par. 6–e, I would like to suggest a correction which has recently come up. The present provision is that our policies should be designed—“e. To deter Communist limited military aggression” etc.

I suggest that it is not only Communist limited military aggression that should be deterred and defeated. The Communists may well seek to act by stirring up a neutral or uncommitted nation to aggress. Furthermore, any limited military aggression is dangerous. Therefore, I suggest that this provision should read:

“To deter limited military aggression wherever U.S. security interests are involved,”

Such a revision would conform to the general language on limited military aggression in existing policy.

SECRETARY McELROY

GENERAL TWINING

Attachment

Summary Paper

Washington, April 30, 1958

SUMMARY OF TEXTUAL CHANGES IN DRAFT BASIC POLICY PROPOSED BY CHIEFS OF STAFF OF ARMY, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

Para. 5, second sentence (page 2)

Greater emphasis on those military forces needed to support a U.S. political and economic offensive and to deal with limited Communist aggression.

Para. 6 (page 3)

New subparagraph (6–b) basically alters present strategy by calling for active, intensified pressures on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, including deployment of U.S. forces to back up bold political moves. Purpose of new offensive is to splinter and reduce existing Communist structure.

Para. 8, last sentence (page 4)

Military posture to meet all contingencies is required in order to convince Communist leaders that the U.S. is willing and able to make any aggression unprofitable for them.

Para. 9 (page 4)

Two major changes in military thinking:

1. Use of force is to affect will of enemy, not merely to destroy him.

2. Massive retaliation can no longer insure the security of the Free World. It can only be used as a threat, and in the event of general war, as reprisal.

Para. 10–a (page 4)

Two major changes in the use of nuclear weapons:

1. Main, but not sole reliance on such weapons in general war.

2. Limited war to be fought with or without nuclear weapons.

Para. 13 (page 5)

Major changes are:

1. Sufficient nuclear retaliatory power to reduce Soviet power complex to impotence must be under U.S. control.

2. As nuclear retaliatory power approaches invulnerability, (a) it can be reduced in size, and (b) launched only after due consideration rather than, as now, automatically or hastily to prevent its destruction in the event of surprise attack.

3. No continental defense can prevent large-scale damage to the U.S. in event of general war. Vital areas in U.S. should be defended to the extent that a significant enemy effort is required to destroy them.

Para. 14 (page 5)

Two now introductory sentences to alternate para. 14:

1. Defines limited war as an armed conflict in which U.S. national survival is not at stake. (Explanation of this definition in Appendix A, para. 4–d, states that direct conflict between the U.S. and Soviet forces may be included within the new definition.)

2. Estimates that future armed conflicts will probably be characterized by mutually accepted limitations on objectives, locale, weapons and participants.

Para. 19 (page 7)

New last sentence authorizes limited military assistance to uncommitted nations in sufficient quantities and on terms adequate to prevent such nations from accepting Communist military assistance.

Para. 20, third sentence (page 8)

Estimates that achievement by USSR of relative nuclear parity will result in increasingly provocative actions by the Sino-Soviet Bloc with the corresponding increase in number of difficult decisions to be made by U.S.

1. Source: Basic national security policy, NSC 5810. Top Secret. 14 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.