Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

471. Telegram Tosec 145 to Herter at Geneva¹

Washington, May 29, 1959, 8:57 p.m.

Draft Tactics Paper for Nuclear Test Negotiations

Upon resumption nuclear test negotiations June 8 Department believes USDEL should pursue tactics along following lines, incorporating substance of following in comprehensive opening statement in order maintain control debate.

(1) USDEL should establish continuity by recalling Wadsworth statement May 8. Should continue place focus on questions needing solution if effective control to be achieved continuing tactics along lines outlined NUSUP 337 in defining issues and eliciting SOV response to questions bearing on technical and organizational elements effective control.

(2) In this connection delegation should welcome Soviet readiness to discuss high altitude detection and should propose establishment technical working group this subject to convene Geneva June 15. US will suggest Term of Reference for this study. Make clear that we consider this to be only one of the three technical areas essential to clarify the problems associated with the establishment of effective control system and our willingness to discuss high altitude problem should not be interpreted as abandonment efforts to explore other technical aspects control system identified by Lloyd and Secretary. Objectives of technical discussion should be to recommend specific instrumentation and spacing requirements for ground based elements of high altitude detection and identification system for tests above 50 kilometers to be installed in control posts established in first phase and to make recommendations as specifically as possible re satellite detection system to be developed and installed at later date. USDEL may undertake to provide names of US panel members in advance of meeting and should propose report to conference within one week of date group convened.

(3) USDEL should indicate disappointment that Soviet delegation has thus far been unwilling enter into technical discussion on assessment of capabilities for detection and identification seismic events and recommendations of methods for improving these capabilities. Should express hope that upon clarification US–UK proposals as to purpose and task such group SOVDEL will reconsider its position.

(4) USDEL should state that US has, as indicated January 5, continued its studies of implications of new seismic data for control provisions to be incorporated in treaty. US scientists have considered in light of all pertinent data concerning the capability of detection and identification system (1) certain improvements to detection and identification system that might be achieved within range of existing technology, (2) potential of further improvement through program of seismic research and (3) question of decoupling as it relates to capabilities for detection and identification of underground tests. USDEL should table for consideration revised declassified version Berkner Report of Panel on Seismic improvement together with annex on concealment. Should also table detailed studies covering major possibilities for improvements and possibilities for advancement of science of seismology in fields directly related to detection problem. Should point out that contrary to SOV charges study of these reports and recommendations will demonstrate their constructive purpose. They do not recommend additional control posts; implementation of these recommendations would increase the capacity of the system to identify seismic events and in this respect serve to limit the number of inspections required for effective control. If these recommendations for improved instrumentation are considered and agreed in light of latest technical data, it would not be necessary to reach any precisely agreed reassessment of capabilities of system as such. This unnecessary in light US formula for determining number of on-site inspections contained Annex I which takes into account changing capabilities of system. Because formula is based on percentage relationship to unidentified events, it is self-adjusting according to number such events that develop in practice. USDEL should renew proposal technical consideration capabilities for detection and identification seismic events and recommendation of methods for improving these capabilities. Should point out US in such talks would answer any inquiries from other Dels re data submitted and would expect receive and consider any comparable data furnished by other Dels as background for recommendations. Purpose of talks would be reach agreed recommendations for improvements in instrumentation initial system. Effect of these improvements would clearly be in interest all parties concerned since they would serve to limit need for on-site inspection.

(5) The question of recommendations for specific technical criteria which must be satisfied by data from control system before an inspection can be undertaken, USDEL should table working paper outlining US ideas of criteria that would be used in connection formula set forth US Annex I. Should state if USSR finds ideas expressed in working paper acceptable we see no necessity for technical working group. If not, however, would propose discuss and seek resolve any differences in technical working group.

(6) USDEL should point out technical data present both uncertainties as to detection capabilities that remain to be resolved and potentialities for significant improvement in the system. Uncertainties and potentialities point equally to fact that program of research and development and provisions for results of such development to the incorporated in system are of real importance. In this connection US welcomes statements of SOVDEL indicating willingness consider results of future scientific research in Control Commission. US will further elaborate views this question in subsequent meetings.

(7) Referring to US undertaking to consider carefully SOV proposal for quota inspections USDEL should state that while such consideration cannot be carried very far until clarification received on questions posed earlier meetings USDEL observes, however, that US–UK proposal in Annex I wherein number inspections governed by number unidentified events deals far more realistically with existing uncertainties and potentialities for improvement than does Soviet proposal. US–UK formula is self-adjusting on basis experience, provides clear incentive for improvement of detection capabilities. Because of self-adjusting feature which percentage basis affords results of program of joint research and experimentation such as US proposal April 13 would be readily reflected in reduced level of inspections, which would not be case in quota approach.

(8) USDel should indicate that as a part of its review of questions before conference it has prepared revisions of draft Articles VI and IX which will be tabled in short time. Redrafts attempt define more clearly relationship between Commission and administrator, involve new wording re staffing which takes into account US position stated May 8 and contain clearer definition role of Commission and Administrator with respect to research, review and improvement of System.

(9) USDel should again refer to questions raised in meeting of May 8 and recall President Eisenhower�s letter of May 5 in which he indicated that if Soviet position had not in fact changed on basic issues he would urge renewed consideration phased approach beginning with agreement discontinue atmospheric tests.

(NOTE: Above draft tactics paper furnished for background information USDEL here in event initiation consultations with UK here leads to questions from Lloyd or others on UKDEL.)

Dillon
Acting

1. Source: Transmits draft tactics paper for nuclear test ban negotiations. Secret; Limited Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5–2959.