470. Telegram Tosec 144 to Herter at Geneva1
Tosec 144. For Herter from Dillon: From Acting Secretary. Next following telegram is draft tactics paper for resumption nuclear test negotiations June 8 which was developed by interagency working group and which I have authorized as basis initiating consultations with UK.
Objective proposed tactics is to follow-up probing Soviet position technical aspects and veto requirements for inspection as initiated by Wadsworth just before recess and in particular to resume pressure on Soviets for discussion technical issues identified in conversations you and Lloyd had with Gromyko.
We anticipate Soviets will continue to be unwilling to engage in discussion underground detection and our tactics contemplate exerting pressure by tabling at outset conclusions Berkner Panel studies outer space detection and supporting study documents. To avoid appearance of raising new obstacles to agreement we would table these technical findings to demonstrate value US–UK proposal in present draft Annex I for inspection of all unidentified events of 5 kt and above, and 20 percent of those under 5 kt. This would have advantage of not REPEAT NOT appearing retreat from past treaty proposals and yet supporting our position [Facsimile Page 2] on need for substantial number of inspections and for building some flexibility into treaty in view of uncertainties present knowledge and likelihood improvement in system.
Important consideration in planning introduce technical studies immediately on resumption negotiations is increasing pressure here from Congress and the press for publication studies on underground and outer space testing and detection. Pressure arises from both those alleging State Department hiding information showing detection such tests impractical and those believing studies lead to conclusions simplifying detection problem. Much of substance of studies is coming out in garbled form in view of access of large number panel members as well as key Congressional committees. We believe that introduction into negotiations and subsequent release will give us best chance of putting proper interpretation on results these studies. Still unresolved is question whether concept of “perfect hole” for concealment underground explosions should be tabled and published. While we are reluctant to reveal this concept in view possible usefulness to Soviets, [Typeset Page 1667] only way cope with allegations this concept is proven one which vitiates test suspension agreement may be to reveal all its difficulties and uncertainties.
High altitude study nearing completion and will be passed UK for study as soon as available. At that time will make arrangements for appropriate consultation US and UK scientists in advance of any discussion with Soviets this matter.
Acting
- Source: Negotiating tactics for resumption of nuclear test ban talks. Secret; Limited Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/5–2959.↩