462. Telegram Supnu 382 From Geneva1
Supnu 382. For Herter from Wadsworth. Reference: Nusup 307.
I think your message covers very well what we should do in response to various approaches the Russians might take. I personally think that what is most likely is that Russians will not give clear acceptance or rejection of either of alternatives suggestions we have made and that they will not make any major new proposals on basic issues in next few days. So line of action that we will probably have to follow is the one you have laid out in next to last paragraph of your telegram.
[Typeset Page 1655]We may meet Soviet objections to idea of formal recess before Foreign Ministers meeting but I do not think they will press these objections and, in any case, we will be in a strong position just to say that time terms of resumed negotiations should be set by our Foreign Ministers. The fact that no one can accurately foretell how long the Foreign Ministers meeting will last will in itself help us avoid setting a date for re-opening our conference at the time that we recess.
The only point on which I differ, and I think this is a very important point, is on question on how we handle staffing issue. I agree completely that we should try to play down the staffing issue and have it not appear as equal in importance [Facsimile Page 2] to inspection and the veto. But I sincerely believe the only way we can do this, in present situation, is to make a limited movement from our present position. I think all we really have to do is to say that since the Soviets have now agreed that the business of control is really carried out by actual technical staff, and since they have abandoned their previous idea of controllers, we have decided to accept the idea of having a strictly limited number of host country nationals in the control posts. The number should be strictly limited so as to guard against any obstruction of the control function. But the presence of a limited number of host country nationals could be justified on grounds that host country also has an interest in seeing that control posts operate properly.
I would not expect that we would expose ourselves to any detailed negotiations on the staffing issue. And I would not put forward any specific formula on staffing. But I think some movement off our present staffing position is required to give plausibility to our claim that this issue can be resolved and to clearly remove it as one of the decisive issues. If we continue to stand pat on staffing I am afraid any talks at Foreign Minister level will be cluttered up by Soviet challenges on this point. Some slight modification of our previous position will avert the risk of Gromyko emphasizing this issue and thus cutting into efforts you have in mind to focus attention sharply on Soviet intransigence on basic control issues of veto and inspection.
Otherwise I agree that we are in first rate position to put our proposition squarely to the Russians and put on them the onus for any breakdown or lack of progress in negotiations.
As I have said, I think the tactics you have outlined are sound and if I am authorized to make the kind of statement on staffing that I have suggested, I am sure we can handle [Facsimile Page 3] the situation so that you will have a strong and clear position to field when your meet with the other Foreign Ministers.
I am sending a separate message on the details of tactics we would like to follow over the next two weeks.
- Source: Negotiating tactics at nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4–2259.↩