Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

461. Memorandum From Herter to Eisenhower¹

Washington, April 20, 1959

SUBJECT

• Voluntary Temporary Moratorium on Underground and High Altitude Tests

On April 11 you directed that the interested agencies give urgent consideration to Prime Minister Macmillan’s proposal that we offer to accompany a controlled agreement for suspension of atmospheric tests with a temporary moratorium on other nuclear weapons tests provided the Soviet Union did likewise.

This question has been carefully examined with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. We have concluded that proposing an extended uncontrolled moratorium on outer space and underground tests, even if the Soviets agree to negotiate controlled suspension of atmospheric tests, is an undesirable course of action at the present time. Such a proposal would undercut our basic principle of effective control, and would be unlikely to increase Soviet interest in serious negotiations.

Consideration of this question has served to draw attention to the urgent need for decisions on United States nuclear testing policy in the event negotiations are unsuccessful or reach agreement only on controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. We have agreed that studies looking toward such decisions should be initiated promptly and should embrace future requirements for nuclear weapons testing, improvement of methods of detection, fall-out considerations, and factors of cost and practicability involved in testing underground and in outer space. Arrangements for these studies are being worked out by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Acting Secretary

Attachment

Proposal

Washington, April 17, 1959

VOLUNTARY TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON UNDERGROUND AND HIGH ALTITUDE TESTS

PROBLEM

To consider whether it would be in the U.S. interest to offer to accompany a controlled suspension of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests with a voluntary one to two year moratorium on underground and high altitude nuclear weapons tests, provided the Soviet Union does the same.

BACKGROUND

During preparation of the proposal put forward on April 13 at Geneva by the U.S. and U.N. delegations, a possible additional feature was considered. While this additional element was not included in the April 13 proposal, it was agreed that it would be given further urgent study by the U.S. against the possibility that the Soviet reaction to the April 13 proposal might be such as to justify reconsideration of the decision not to include it.

The additional proposal was put forward in the following terms. The Russians will probably be very disinclined to reach any agreement falling short of a complete ban on all tests. They will argue for a complete ban on grounds of general principle and say that anything short of it will be unsatisfactory and unfair. The U.S. and the U.K. might meet this objection by announcing that they would be prepared, provided the Soviets are likewise to refrain for a period from the entry into force of the initial agreement from conducting tests underground and above 50 kilometers. This moratorium would be a voluntary arrangement outside any formal agreement—thus preserving the important principle that the agreement itself should only commit us to steps which we know can be controlled. The U.S.–U.N. hope would be that during this moratorium period scientific advances would [illegible in the original] agreement with the President on a ban extended to cover further explosions. The moratorium should not exclude the possibility of conducting experimental nuclear explosions underground jointly with the Russians or under international control, so obtain necessary data for developing a control system. There is presumably a reasonable prospect that scientific advances will enable us to move further before long. The period of moratorium should thus be either one or two years.

It might of course be argued that during this period of one or two years the U.S. and U.K. would be bound by their voluntary abstention, while the Russians might carry out experiments undetected. Against that, the U.K. suggests, the points can be made first, that we do not know whether the Russians are in fact doing underground tests; and, second, even if we got a comprehensive test suspension it would take well over a year to install the control system, during all of which time the Russians could cheat if they wished to; and third, this risk is inherent in the present moratorium which has been in force since the Geneva conference began. Thus it is suggested that we would not lose very much and we might make a considerable impact upon public opinion.

DISCUSSION:

1. Effect upon public opinion. Such a move would be viewed favorably by that segment of public opinion which welcomes any move toward the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It would provide an effective answer to Soviet charges that we have proposed an atmospheric test ban because we never really intended to stop all tests. On the other hand, it could create the impression that effective international controls are not really necessary and to this extent weaken public support for the U.S. position on controls.

Since the U.S. and U.K. have suspended tests for the time being—without the Soviet Union having felt it necessary to make a similar explicit renunciation—our public posture is not now vulnerable. If challenged as to long range testing plans, the U.S. and U.K. can point out that they are not now testing and that it is up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate its intentions in serious negotiation for an atmospheric test ban rather than for the U.S. and U.K., without any quid pro quo, to answer for the indefinite future.

2. Effect upon negotiations. While such a move might increase the chance of Soviet acceptance of an atmospheric test ban, it would weaken our position seriously in negotiation for a complete test cessation under effective control. Once we were committed to a complete suspension, the pressure would be on us to withhold testing even if there were no progress in negotiations for extending the control system. Yet what the U.S. and U.K. want is to put pressure on the Soviets to extend controls in order to get other tests brought to a halt. This can best be done if the U.S. and U.K. do not reduce their bargaining power voluntarily. Moreover, any appearance of acquiescence in the Soviet view that an agreed suspension of tests can be undertaken without controls would correspondingly weaken our bargaining position in insisting upon such controls.

3. U.S. Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Tests. The U.S. has important needs for further nuclear weapons tests: to improve existing design (particularly in the small warheads field); to develop new or improved designs (particularly in the ballistic and anti-ballistic missile field) to improve the safety of certain designs; and to examine further the phenomena revealed by the Johnson Island and ARGUS firings.

4. Relative ability of the U.S. and USSR to carry out weapons improvement (or [illegible in the original]) tests under the proposed arrangement. If the proposed arrangement was adopted, it would not be possible for the United States to conduct nuclear weapons tests. The USSR might not be inhibited to the same degree and could undertake [illegible in the original] they believed undetectable. It would be difficult for us to carry out nuclear tests for improvement of the detection system (or for peaceful purposes) that would not carry with them the possibility that the Soviets would conduct nuclear weapons tests under these guises.

5. U.S. Congressional and public reaction. Public and Congressional support for moves which might advance the objective of first step agreements toward an inspected test cessation should be weighed against distrust in these quarters of any arrangement with the USSR which does not embody effective controls.

6. Effect on laboratories and developmental programs. In the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense, while the potential of the weapons laboratories has been affected only slightly up to now, it is probable that deterioration will proceed rapidly if the U.S. should commit itself to the proposed further one or two year moratorium. Although current programs which are in advanced stages of development and which are based to large degree on devices already tested will proceed relatively unaffected, it is most probable that a one or two year voluntary suspension of this type will greatly accelerate the trend of scientific personnel away from the long-range weapons development programs. Once these people are dispersed, their reassembly into an effective scientific organization [illegible in the original] virtually impossible in absence of extreme emergency.

It will be extremely difficult for the laboratories to plan new development [illegible in the original] without knowing, at an early date, in what environment, if any, testing would be permitted. A development program without testing is, of course, in itself a most difficult undertaking. The voluntary ban would further delay any decision as to the basis on which weapons development is to proceed. Also, there might be difficulties in securing adequate appropriations for continuation of weapons research or resuming a weapons testing program after a prolonged voluntary suspension.

7. Need for further studies. The following matters relating to the conduct of future nuclear tests should be studied as early as possible so that an early decision on future nuclear testing policy can be reached well in advance of the expiration of the present one-year voluntary withholding of nuclear testing:

a. Requirements for additional nuclear weapons testing.

b. The feasibility and practicability of underground testing including the cost and timing of test programs.

c. The problems of testing in the earth’s atmosphere above the detection limits of the Geneva System including the problems of radioactive fallout and the definition of the upper limits of the atmosphere in relation to the fallout problem.

d. The organization and test program needed to explore the problems of underground test concealment, improvement of seismic detection, and system studies for detection of tests in the upper atmosphere and outer space.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of these factors it is suggested:

1. That proposing an extended uncontrolled moratorium on outer space and underground tests represents an undesirable course of action at the present time, and that the United States should adhere to the policy set forth in the August 29 and November 7 White House announcement concerning a voluntary nuclear test suspicion.

2. That studies relating to future requirements for nuclear testing, the improvement of methods of detection of nuclear tests, the fallout problem, and factors of cost and practicability involved in testing underground and in outer space should be undertaken promptly so that decisions can be reached on future nuclear testing policy as soon as possible and well in advance of the expiration of the present one-year voluntary withholding of nuclear testing.

1. Source: Recommends against Macmillan proposal for moratorium on underground and space nuclear testing. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.