463. Telegram Supnu 383 From Geneva1
Supnu 383. Believe Soviets will probably continue their line of hinting willingness to make compromises as part of the continuing negotiations but without actually making any substantive changes in position. They will claim the possibility of significant progress in the negotiations has been proved by the Soviet shift on staffing and the adoption of a number of articles and that in view of this there is no real reason to consider a shift in direction.
We have been thinking about how best to maneuver the Soviets into more of a yes or no position in next two weeks on the alternatives we have presented. We believe that the best tactic is for us to let the Soviets exhaust the supply of non-controversial articles, most of which apply to either of our alternatives, periodically emphasizing that these are all really peripheral matters. By letting them do this, we commit them more and more to our basic framework. This will inevitably focus attention more sharply on the issues at the heart of our treaty, e.g., voting procedures and on-site inspection. While this process is going on we will begin to fill out the details of our staged alternative, first in a general descriptive statement, and then when the Department’s views on Supnu 365 are received, perhaps by tabling as a single document a treaty draft for the staged approach. We will then have two alternative documents on the table, each of which will include a good number of articles which have been agreed. This will let us play up in more concrete terms the choice we are putting to the Soviets, and just what is involved in each. At this point it will be [Facsimile Page 2] difficult for the Soviets to maintain any [garble] sense of movement in the negotiations, and the real issues to be solved can be spotlighted with little risk of anything else getting in the way.
We believe these tactics in line with those outlined Nusup 307.
With respect to question release modified version Berkner report, the view would depend on how problem of para 4 (f) treated since we would wish avoid situation where Soviets could misinterpret any move for recess as being motivated by desire to break off negotiations and that our revelation further technical difficulties demonstrated true nature our intentions. Would prefer have any specific treatment question new data or theories re decoupling postponed until Soviets accept our proposal for technical discussion.
- Source: Negotiating tactics at nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4–2259.↩