Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

452. Telegram 8816 to London¹

Washington, April 4, 1959, 3:38 p.m.

8816. Following is text of message to Prime Minister Macmillan from President for immediate delivery. Advise date and time of delivery.

QUOTE. April 4, 1959

Dear Harold:

One of the most heartening aspects of our talks here was the accord we found in our strong convictions as to the importance of the negotiations in Geneva for the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests. These talks offer the one early possibility for a first step toward enforceable disarmament and toward control over, the future development and spread of modern means of destruction.

I have been giving further thought to what we might do to revitalize these negotiations. I believe it is important to give a note of hope to the talks. We cannot achieve this merely by resuming interminable wranglings over the veto and the composition of inspection teams. If that is what faces our negotiators then I think there will be increasing discouragement in our own countries and throughout the world.

What we might do is make clear immediately that these important differences in approach need not be a bar to putting into effect promptly the elements of a control system which are not in dispute—control posts and agreed aircraft flights, together with the banning of the atmospheric tests which these elements can adequately monitor. As fast as the political and technical problems of monitoring underground and outer space tests are worked out, an initial agreement would, of course, be broadened to include these also.

What I propose is the very opposite of an ultimatum. We would make clear by our statements and actions that we are prepared and determined to continue negotiating a comprehensive test suspension agreement. We would simply be offering a way to get started promptly in a limited area of agreement, if the Soviets remain adamant on the veto. Indeed, between us, I think that advancing such a reasonable alternative course of action may be the only effective way to test the real Soviet position on the veto.

The Soviets are no doubt considering their own moves. We should act when talks resume on April 13, if we are to retain leadership and to take action to restore a sense of purpose and hope in the negotiations. Our representatives might make carefully prepared statements at the opening session in Geneva on April 13, recapitulating the progress and difficulties in the negotiations, and pointing out the possibility of action to capitalize immediately on the areas of agreement already reached or in prospect.

Simultaneously letters from you and me to Premier Khrushchev, perhaps along the lines of the enclosed draft, might be delivered in Moscow endorsing the approach. In order that our suggestion might not seem to be advanced as a propagandistic gesture, it might be made privately and released publicly only after sufficient time for a Soviet response—unless, of course, a premature leak forces our hand.

These thoughts are being discussed here with Selwyn and your Embassy. Because I believe we have an opportunity to give a new and sounder impulse to these negotiations, I wanted to bring them to your attention directly and to hear your views.

With warm regard

As ever,

Ike

Enclosure

Draft Letter to Khrushchev

DRAFT LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Today the Geneva negotiations for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests are resuming. During the recess I have considered where we stand in these negotiations and what the prospects are for the successful conclusion which I earnestly desire. I have also talked with Prime Minister Macmillan, who reported to me on his frank discussions of this matter with you.

The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We believe that this would be an important step toward reduction of international tensions and would open the way to further agreement on substantial measures of disarmament.

Such an agreement must, however, be subject to fully effective safeguards to insure the security interests of all parties, and we believe that present proposals of the Soviet Union fall short of providing assurance of the type of effective control in which all parties can have confidence. Therefore, no basis for agreement is now in sight.

In my view, these negotiations must not be permitted completely to fail. If indeed the Soviet Union insists on the veto on the fact finding activities of the control system with regard to possible underground detonations, I believe there is a way in which we can hold fast to the progress already made in these negotiations and no longer delay in putting into effect the initial agreements which are within our grasp. Could we not, Mr. Chairman, put the agreement into effect in phases beginning with a prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere? This would require a simplified control system not involving the mobile on-site inspection which has created the major stumbling block in the negotiations so far.

My representative is putting forward this suggestion in Geneva today. I urge your serious consideration of this possible course of action. If you are prepared to change your present position on the veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early discussion of concrete measures for high altitude detection, we can of course proceed promptly to conclude negotiation of a comprehensive agreement for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. If you are not yet ready to go this far, then I propose that we take the first and readily attainable step while the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer space tests are being resolved. If we could agree to such initial implementation of the first phase of a test suspension agreement, our negotiators could continue to explore with new hope the political and technical problems involved in extending the agreement as quickly as possible to cover all nuclear weapons tests. In the meanwhile, the world would have assurance that nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere with their attendant addition to levels of radioactivity had been discontinued, and we would be gaining practical experience and confidence in the operation of an international control system.

I trust that one of these paths to agreement will commend itself to you and permit the resuming negotiations to make at least an initial response to the hopes of mankind. UNQUOTE.

OBSERVE PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Herter
Acting

1. Source: Transmits letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan on nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan.