451. Memorandum From Herter to
Eisenhower1
Washington, April 4,
1959
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations
I am enclosing for your consideration a draft letter to Prime Minister
Macmillan suggesting the
position we should take when the Geneva nuclear test negotiations resume
on April 13th.
This letter proposes that on the day the negotiations resume we state our
willingness, if the Soviets continue to be unready to abandon their
position on the veto over mobile inspection, to agree to put the test
ban into effect in stages. The first step would be a ban on tests in the
earth’s atmosphere under simple controls, and underground and outer
space tests would be suspended also when agreement is reached in these
negotiations or in the control commission on the required control
measures for these tests. At the same time we would reaffirm our
readiness to reach agreement on a full test ban, if the USSR is ready to abandon its position on
the veto and its refusal to consider the relevant technical problems of
underground and outer space test detection.
You have already approved the atmospheric test ban proposal as a fallback
position. The proposed letter sets forth the reasons for which we
believe the proposal should be made on the first day of the
Conference.
If you approve this letter, I will discuss this matter with Selwyn Lloyd on Saturday, April
4th.
Christian A.
Herter
Acting Secretary of State
Enclosure
Draft Letter From Eisenhower and Macmillan to Khrushchev
April 4, 1959
Dear Mr. Chairman:
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Today the Geneva negotiations for the discontinuance of nuclear
weapons tests are resuming. During the recess I have considered
where
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we
stand in these negotiations and what the prospects are for the
successful conclusion which I earnestly desire. I have also talked
with Prime Minister Macmillan, who reported to me on his frank discussions
of this matter with you.
The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the
discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We believe that this would
be an important step toward reduction of international tensions and
would open the way to further agreement on substantial measures of
disarmament.
[Illegible in the original] Such an agreement must, however, be
subject to fully effective safeguards to insure the security
interests of all parties, and we believe that present proposals of
the Soviet Union fall short of providing assurance of the type of
effective control in which all parties can have confidence.
Therefore no basis for agreement is now in sight.
In my view these negotiations must not be permitted completely to
fail. If indeed the Soviet Union insists on the veto on the
fact-finding activities of the control system with regard to
possible underground detonations, I believe that there is a way in
which we can hold fast to the progress already made in these
negotiations and no longer delay in putting into effect the initial
agreements which are within our grasp.
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Could we not, Mr. Chairman,
put the agreement into effect in phases beginning with a prohibition
of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere? This would require a
simplified control system not involving the mobile on-site
inspection which has created the major stumbling block in the
negotiations so far.
My representative is putting forward this suggestion in Geneva today.
I urge your serious consideration of this possible course of action.
If you are prepared to change your present position on the veto, on
procedures for on-site inspection and on early discussion of
concrete measures for high altitude detection, we can of course
proceed promptly to conclude negotiations of a comprehensive
agreement for suspension of nuclear weapons tests. If you are not
yet ready to go this far, then I propose that we take the first and
readily attainable step while the political and technical problems
associated with control of underground and outer space tests are
being resolved. If we could agree to such initial implementation of
the first phase of a test suspension agreement, our negotiators
could continue to explore with new hope the political and technical
problems involved in extending the agreement as quickly as possible
to cover all nuclear weapons tests. In the meanwhile, the world
would have assurance that nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere
with their attendant addition to levels of radio-activity had been
discontinued, and we would be gaining practical experience and
confidence in the operation of an international control system.
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I trust that one of these paths to agreement will commend itself to
you and permit the resuming negotiations to make at least an initial
response to the hopes of mankind.
End message to Mr. K.
Enclosure
Draft Letter From Eisenhower to Macmillan
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Dear Harold:
One of the most heartening aspects of our talks here was the accord
we found in our strong convictions as to the importance of the
negotiations in Geneva for the controlled suspension of nuclear
weapons tests. These talks offer the one early possibility for a
first step toward enforceable disarmament and toward control over
the future development and spread of modern means of
destruction.
I have been giving further thought to what we might do to revitalize
these negotiations. I believe it is important to give a note of hope
to the talks. We cannot achieve this merely by resuming interminable
wranglings over the veto and the composition of inspection teams. If
that is what faces our negotiators, then I think there will be
increasing discouragement in our own countries and throughout the
world.
What we might do is make clear immediately that these important
differences in approach need not be a bar to putting into effect
promptly the elements of a control system which are not in
dispute—control posts and agreed aircraft flights, together with the
banning of the atmospheric tests which these elements can adequately
monitor. As fast as the political and technical problems of
monitoring underground and outer space tests are worked out, an
initial agreement would, of course, be broadened to include these
also.
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What I propose is the very opposite of an ultimatum. We would make
clear by our statements and actions that we are prepared and
determined to continue negotiating a comprehensive test suspension
agreement. We would simply be offering a way to get started promptly
in a limited area of agreement, if the Soviets remain adamant on the
veto. Indeed, between us, I think that advancing such a reasonable
alternative course of action may be the only effective way to test
the real Soviet position on the veto.
The Soviets are no doubt considering their own moves. We should act
when talks resume on April 13th if we are to retain leadership and
to take action to restore a sense of purpose and hope in the
negotiations.
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Our representatives might make carefully
prepared statements at the opening session in Geneva on April 13th,
recapitulating the progress and difficulties in the negotiations,
and pointing out the possibility of action to capitalize immediately
on the areas of agreement already reached or in prospect.
Simultaneously letters from you and me to Premier Khrushchev, perhaps along the
lines of the enclosed draft, might be delivered in Moscow endorsing
the approach. In order that our suggestion might not seem to be
advanced as a propagandistic gesture, it might be made privately and
released publicly only after sufficient time for a Soviet
response—unless, of course, a premature leak forces our hand.
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These thoughts are being discussed here with Selwyn and your Embassy.
Because I believe we have an opportunity to give a new and sounder
impulse to these negotiations, I wanted to bring them to your
attention directly and to hear your views.
With warm regard
As ever,
