451. Memorandum From Herter to
Eisenhower1
Washington, April 4,
1959
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations
I am enclosing for your consideration a draft letter to Prime Minister
Macmillan suggesting the position
we should take when the Geneva nuclear test negotiations resume on April
13th.
This letter proposes that on the day the negotiations resume we state our
willingness, if the Soviets continue to be unready to abandon their position
on the veto over mobile inspection, to agree to put the test ban into effect
in stages. The first step would be a ban on tests in the earth’s atmosphere
under simple controls, and underground and outer space tests would be
suspended also when agreement is reached in these negotiations or in the
control commission on the required control measures for these tests. At the
same time we would reaffirm our readiness to reach agreement on a full test
ban, if the USSR is ready to abandon its
position on the veto and its refusal to consider the relevant technical
problems of underground and outer space test detection.
You have already approved the atmospheric test ban proposal as a fallback
position. The proposed letter sets forth the reasons for which we believe
the proposal should be made on the first day of the Conference.
If you approve this letter, I will discuss this matter with Selwyn Lloyd on Saturday, April 4th.
Christian A.
Herter
Acting Secretary of State
Enclosure
Draft Letter From Eisenhower and Macmillan to Khrushchev
April 4, 1959
Dear Mr. Chairman:
[Facsimile Page 2]
Today the Geneva negotiations for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons
tests are resuming. During the recess I have considered where
[Typeset Page 1628]
we stand in
these negotiations and what the prospects are for the successful
conclusion which I earnestly desire. I have also talked with Prime
Minister Macmillan, who reported
to me on his frank discussions of this matter with you.
The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the
discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We believe that this would be
an important step toward reduction of international tensions and would
open the way to further agreement on substantial measures of
disarmament.
[Illegible in the original] Such an agreement must, however, be subject
to fully effective safeguards to insure the security interests of all
parties, and we believe that present proposals of the Soviet Union fall
short of providing assurance of the type of effective control in which
all parties can have confidence. Therefore no basis for agreement is now
in sight.
In my view these negotiations must not be permitted completely to fail.
If indeed the Soviet Union insists on the veto on the fact-finding
activities of the control system with regard to possible underground
detonations, I believe that there is a way in which we can hold fast to
the progress already made in these negotiations and no longer delay in
putting into effect the initial agreements which are within our grasp.
[Facsimile Page 3]
Could we
not, Mr. Chairman, put the agreement into effect in phases beginning
with a prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere? This
would require a simplified control system not involving the mobile
on-site inspection which has created the major stumbling block in the
negotiations so far.
My representative is putting forward this suggestion in Geneva today. I
urge your serious consideration of this possible course of action. If
you are prepared to change your present position on the veto, on
procedures for on-site inspection and on early discussion of concrete
measures for high altitude detection, we can of course proceed promptly
to conclude negotiations of a comprehensive agreement for suspension of
nuclear weapons tests. If you are not yet ready to go this far, then I
propose that we take the first and readily attainable step while the
political and technical problems associated with control of underground
and outer space tests are being resolved. If we could agree to such
initial implementation of the first phase of a test suspension
agreement, our negotiators could continue to explore with new hope the
political and technical problems involved in extending the agreement as
quickly as possible to cover all nuclear weapons tests. In the
meanwhile, the world would have assurance that nuclear weapons tests in
the atmosphere with their attendant addition to levels of radio-activity
had been discontinued, and we would be gaining practical experience and
confidence in the operation of an international control system.
[Typeset Page 1629]
[Facsimile Page 4]
I trust that one of these paths to agreement will commend itself to you
and permit the resuming negotiations to make at least an initial
response to the hopes of mankind.
End message to Mr. K.
Enclosure
Draft Letter From Eisenhower to Macmillan
[Facsimile Page 5]
Dear Harold:
One of the most heartening aspects of our talks here was the accord we
found in our strong convictions as to the importance of the negotiations
in Geneva for the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests. These
talks offer the one early possibility for a first step toward
enforceable disarmament and toward control over the future development
and spread of modern means of destruction.
I have been giving further thought to what we might do to revitalize
these negotiations. I believe it is important to give a note of hope to
the talks. We cannot achieve this merely by resuming interminable
wranglings over the veto and the composition of inspection teams. If
that is what faces our negotiators, then I think there will be
increasing discouragement in our own countries and throughout the
world.
What we might do is make clear immediately that these important
differences in approach need not be a bar to putting into effect
promptly the elements of a control system which are not in
dispute—control posts and agreed aircraft flights, together with the
banning of the atmospheric tests which these elements can adequately
monitor. As fast as the political and technical problems of monitoring
underground and outer space tests are worked out, an initial agreement
would, of course, be broadened to include these also.
[Facsimile Page 6]
What I propose is the very opposite of an ultimatum. We would make clear
by our statements and actions that we are prepared and determined to
continue negotiating a comprehensive test suspension agreement. We would
simply be offering a way to get started promptly in a limited area of
agreement, if the Soviets remain adamant on the veto. Indeed, between
us, I think that advancing such a reasonable alternative course of
action may be the only effective way to test the real Soviet position on
the veto.
The Soviets are no doubt considering their own moves. We should act when
talks resume on April 13th if we are to retain leadership and to take
action to restore a sense of purpose and hope in the negotiations.
[Typeset Page 1630]
Our
representatives might make carefully prepared statements at the opening
session in Geneva on April 13th, recapitulating the progress and
difficulties in the negotiations, and pointing out the possibility of
action to capitalize immediately on the areas of agreement already
reached or in prospect.
Simultaneously letters from you and me to Premier Khrushchev, perhaps along the lines of
the enclosed draft, might be delivered in Moscow endorsing the approach.
In order that our suggestion might not seem to be advanced as a
propagandistic gesture, it might be made privately and released publicly
only after sufficient time for a Soviet response—unless, of course, a
premature leak forces our hand.
[Facsimile Page 7]
These thoughts are being discussed here with Selwyn and your Embassy.
Because I believe we have an opportunity to give a new and sounder
impulse to these negotiations, I wanted to bring them to your attention
directly and to hear your views.
With warm regard
As ever,
