453. Letter From McCone to Herter1
I have noted your letter of March 28 to the President reporting on our meeting of the previous day during which we discussed the Geneva negotiations.
I agree with points 1 and 2 as stated in your letter. With respect to point 3, the final sentence in the paragraph concerns me. This sentence states, “A limited program for underground testing, perhaps under international participation, might be undertaken as part of this effort to see whether the problem of detecting underground tests might be simplified.” While we agree completely with the idea of international participation in a program to prove underground detection methods, we feel that during this period when investigations are being made and improved monitoring systems developed and installed, we must be free to carry out essential weapons tests which are not forbidden by treaty and which do not contribute to atmospheric fallout.
To do otherwise would permit the Soviets unrestricted latitude for weapons development through underground, and possibly higher altitude, testing during a period when we would be deprived by our own injunction of opportunity to advance our own weapons program. [Typeset Page 1634] I thought all in the meeting were agreed on this point. However, the wording of the sentence of your letter as noted above gives me concern that some might feel that the testing during the period of experimentation would be limited to shots made solely and exclusively for the purpose of developing the detection system. Mr. Farley tells me this was not the intent of this sentence in paragraph 3 but, nevertheless, I felt you should be advised of the AEC position which we feel must be maintained by our negotiators because of the very important weapons developments that will accrue to either side from tests during the two or three year period set aside for experimentation and research.
[Facsimile Page 2]Your item 4 at the top of page 2 concerns us. It seems to establish the principle of accepting a very inadequate monitoring system on the theory that, because the system may detect a forbidden explosion, a party to the treaty will be deterred from violation. If you will recall, I said at the meeting, and several others agreed, that it seemed to me it would be a major departure if we were to accept a system having just sufficient capability to act as merely a “deterrent” in lieu of an effective monitoring and inspection system. This idea departs from authoritative statements, all of which have supported the idea that we shall accept the suspension of such tests as can be policed by an effective monitoring system that would have a high probability of proving any violation. If we are now to accept the “deterrent” theory, we are talking about something very different which will call for a change in our public position as well as our representation to Congress.
The Commission feels that such a move would be a serious mistake and we urge that our negotiators in Geneva be instructed not to accept an arrangement based on the theory of “deterrence” rather than adequate policing.
Our notes on the meeting listed as inconclusive discussions covering the following topics: a treaty based upon “an effective inspection system” as compared to one that was deemed to be “an effective deterrent”. — From these notes you can see that we did not feel there was agreement in the meeting on the so-called “deterrent theory”.
We consider these two matters I have discussed above to be of the utmost importance. We recommend, therefore, that your letter to the President of March 28 be supplemented to reflect these points.
Sincerely,
- Source: Believes U.S. should test during interim period; U.S. should not accept a detection system that only deters testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/4–459.↩