Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

442. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1959, 5:20–5:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Secretary
• Governor Herter
• Prime Minister Macmillan
• Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

Our conversation was somewhat rambling and some of it purely anecdotal. The following matters of substance, however, were covered.

I remarked rather jocularly that the press seems to be playing the outcome of the Camp David talks as a “triumph” for the Prime Minister. He and the President both said there is no basis in fact for any such inference.

We discussed the next steps in connection with our reply to the Soviet note of March 2. The President attached importance to getting this reply cleared with the other NATO Governments in Paris and delivered and published prior to his press conference on Wednesday; the Prime Minister shared this view as he expected to have to make a statement in Parliament the same day. I said that I thought it not unlikely the French Government would raise some objection, resulting in delay, primarily to demonstrate their independence of the British and Americans.

We discussed the question of composition of prospective meetings with the Soviets, and Mr. Herter recalled that on the question of the German peace treaty, the Soviets had suggested 26 nations be participants. I said, however, that the Soviets had said that if there was an agreement on the full conference that they would then be willing to have a preliminary Four Power conference on this subject, eliminating all other participation in the preliminary meeting.

The President said that over the week end the group had discussed the whole gamut of Soviet probings for weak spots in the free world position. He and the Prime Minister then recounted some of the discussion about the Middle East.

It was the view of Macmillan and Lloyd that Nasser by attempting to array the Arab world against Kassem was forcing him into the hands of the Communists. Actually he was not pro-Communist and had not done anything to intensify his links with Communism during the past few months. The British felt that some one intermediary should be sought who would try to mediate a modus vivendi between Nasser and Kassem, whereby both states would exist within the Arab world, without the UAR attempting to dominate or absorb Iraq. I said Italy would perhaps like to play some such role. Lloyd said the Lebanese were, he thought, making this attempt.

I said I felt it was somewhat ominous that we know nothing about what the Soviets were doing in relation to Iraq and Iran. It seemed to me that it was inevitable that they were doing something and that they had momentous plans, and that our lack of any knowledge should not be taken as proof that nothing was going on, but rather should make us more alert.

On the Geneva test suspension negotiations, the President and the Prime Minister noted that the latter attached importance to finding some way to keep these negotiations going after they resume on April 13. He hoped that they could spin out at least until a Foreign Ministers meeting with the Soviets. The President indicated his readiness to conclude an agreement suspending atmospheric tests; he recounted some of the briefing Dr. Killian had given the group at Camp David. This had led him to conclude that any explosion greater than 10 kilotons could be detected; he thought that it might be possible to get Soviet agreement on unmanned instrument detection stations. The reported Soviet “agreement” to our Duration Article makes it appear possible that the Soviets might make further concessions.

I recalled that we have made provision for effective mobile controls the sine qua non of any agreement.

The Prime Minister noted that our most recent scientific information suggests that there is a risk of disadvantage to us if the Soviets suddenly give in on the veto issue. Nevertheless, he thought that our gain would so outweigh any such disadvantage that we ought to assume the risk. The President said that he thought even an agreement limited to atmospheric tests, and including as few as three or four control posts, would be better than no agreement at all. I said that I thought that while our scientists can advise us on the size, composition and nature of controls, they are not in a position to make the required judgment as to the overall value to us of the establishment of mobile control personnel behind the Iron Curtain.

The President said that while he thought there was a clear understanding on both sides as to the different points of view and matters of agreement, the officials would attempt to work out an agreed statement embodying the conclusions. I remarked it would be at this point that the trouble would begin. Macmillan said that what they had in mind was not so much a substantive paper as a procedural paper to cover who was to do what and where. The President said he planned to get together with Macmillan at 4 o’clock Monday afternoon to clear up any final ambiguities, and that the Prime Minister was leaving at 8:30 Tuesday morning.

I referred briefly to my own plans to return to the hospital for a couple of days and the prospect that I might be discharged on Wednesday.

John Foster Dulles

1. Source: German peace treaty; Egyptian-Iraqi relations; nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Personal and Private. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.