Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

443. Memorandum for the File by McCone¹

Washington, March 23, 1959

Discussion with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd

at Luncheon on March 23, 1959

at British Embassy

After reviewing the March 21st meeting at Camp David on the Geneva Conference, Mr. Lloyd stated he hoped that we would support their proposal for a limited number of on-site inspections as a logical means of solving the impasse on the inspection and veto issue. In answer to a question, Lloyd stated that he felt that 50 inspections per year would be a good number and, in his opinion, about all that the scientists would wish to undertake.

I stated that we did not look with favor on the plan because it would inevitably bring up the issue of the number of inspections with the Soviets unquestionably proposing a very low number, and with our side suggesting a number adequate for reasonable safeguard assurances. I further stated that because of the possibilities of “decoupling effects” together with the general inadequacies of the Geneva system, for reasons explained by Dr. Killian, the number of on-site inspections would necessarily have to be very high to satisfy us. I pointed out that the original Geneva report indicated over one hundred unidentifiable events, later data revised this to about one thousand, and the “decoupling” might raise the figure much higher. Additionally, it seemed to me that an argument over the number of inspections might place us in a bad posture in public opinion.

Lloyd then discussed the possibilities of agreeing to suspension of atmospheric shots only with a very simple and “veto-proof” detection system coupled with a decision to study the underground and high altitude problems for a time, and come to an agreement in these areas when technology is further advanced. I supported this idea stating that I felt Macmillan’s suggestion to me at the conclusion of Saturday’s meeting, that such a proposal might be withheld until the Summit Conference, was an appealing idea. Lloyd said that he had proposed to Macmillan that the Geneva negotiators draft a memorandum setting forth the areas of agreement and the areas of disagreement (the veto being the most important one) and refer the disagreements to the Summit Conference because the Geneva negotiators could not come to agreement. Lloyd left me with the impression he would press for this as a desirable procedure to be followed.

I then asked Lloyd to clarify remarks he made Saturday afternoon concerning the “threshold”. He stated that the British felt that we were negotiating a complete suspension and in doing so recognized the detection system would not be absolute and that tests in the very low yields could not be detected but, nevertheless, they would be suspended under the agreement. Lloyd stated that it was his impression and conviction that if the Soviets on April 13 decide they will accept our proposal then we would be foreclosed from any underground testing for the duration of the treaty. He thought that we could not now bring up the “threshold.” I stated his remarks on Saturday had led me to the conclusion that he felt this way, but that it did not represent our viewpoint as we felt the threshold problem was still to be discussed and concluded.

I think this represents a very important difference of viewpoint between the United States and the British which should be resolved promptly.

1. Source: Discussion with Lloyd on nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5.