Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

441. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 17, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter
• General Goodpaster

The President said there seems to be growing evidence that testing is having bad physiological effects. He referred to recent articles about contamination by strontium 90. He is coming to the conclusion that our position should be that we will not test in the atmosphere. We will leave the underground and outer space tests out of any treaty. His thinking was that we should go for a system which both sides agree would work. To do so we would have to agree that small weapons could be tested under ground and in outer space. In his mind the biggest gain to be derived from such an agreement is the establishment of a system that could operate without veto, on a basis in which both sides could have confidence.

The President said he thought the scientists will in due time come to the position that the large-scale use of nuclear weapons in the northern hemisphere is an impossible solution to military problems. He thinks we must come to a test ban not as extensive as initially planned. Governor Herter said we are studying many combinations. He thought that perhaps we should take out of the treaty any coverage of the underground tests and refer that matter to the United Nations, simply agreeing to atmospheric testing. He thought, however, the Soviets would disagree to this proposal since they are more interested in sweeping pronunciamentos than in tightly designed systems. The President said if we don’t try to get an agreement that gives the right of inspection, we really have nothing.

The President next asked as to the status of the Surprise Attack negotiations. Mr. Herter said that he felt that some further studies should be made on the basis of which the negotiations could then go forward. Defense, however, is resisting this proposal at least to the extent that they do not wish studies made by the same group that was in Geneva, but rather by the established agencies. The President asked Mr. Herter for a memorandum on this matter.

The President next suggested that Mr. Herter ask Ambassador Caccia what the British want to take up while they are at Camp David, and Mr. Herter said he would do so. The President pointed out that we can bring additional people up by helicopter while the meetings are going on, but that he felt that the large staffs should be held in Washington.

In concluding, the President said that what would be of value in our negotiations with the Russians is to get anything on which the two sides will agree to in which each has the right to inspect and satisfy itself regarding the performance of the other, even if it is a tiny thing like withdrawal from a twenty-mile zone. If either side has a complaint, it could then bring the matter right out into the open.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Nuclear testing suspension talks, surprise attack negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on March 20.