429. Telegram Supnu 294 from Geneva1
Supnu 294. Following are US del ideas on how a possible recess might be handled and what might be done after a recess:
1. As outlined in Supnu 293 we believe final days of conference should be focused on veto. We would then envisage statement by Western delegations that failure to achieve agreement on central issues of control, namely, veto, staffing, inspections, demonstrated necessity to recess conference and report to individual governments to see what further measures might be devised to assist agreement on these key issues. Statement could include idea that Soviets had obviously not yet been convinced of reasonableness Western position on control by US and UK delegations; therefore desirable to refer issues to wider international forum in order to secure the judgment of world community. Therefore Western delegations expected their governments would call for meeting of UN Disarmament Commission.
2. Letters from President and UK Prime Minister to Khrushchev could be used to dramatize Soviet intransigence on basic issues. If letters sent before planned recess and did not contain specific reference to stopping conference Soviets would have opening for reply which might make it difficult not further prolong negotiations. On other hand it might not be desirable to have call for recess first made by Presidential letter. Accordingly delegation tends believe letter from President should be sent on heels of rather than before recess.
[Facsimile Page 2]3. In separate message we will outline our ideas on fallback position with regard to tests. In general we think it will be useful if announcement could be made that for some period of time US would forego that kind of tests for which there now exist adequate means of detection without an international control system. This would of course mean atmospheric tests. It would also be helpful if US announced that in addition to underground weapons development tests it was going to undertake underground testing in attempt further to develop knowledge of how effective controls of such tests might best be established and would solicit Soviet cooperation in studies along this line. US could reserve right to test at high altitudes if adequate measures for control this type test not found and agreed. Point elimination of atmospheric tests would remove radioactivity hazard might perhaps not necessarily be made in initial announcement but could of course be used to elicit [Typeset Page 1580] favorable response US position. Question of timing announcement of such a fall-back position requires consideration. On balance delegation believes that it would be better to have such announcement made immediately after recess and probably in Presidential letter. It would then have maximum impact in lessening disappointments occasioned by recess of Geneva negotiations. If announcement were deferred until close of Disarmament Commission meeting we would also be exposed to pressures for various different kinds of schemes and would not have advantage of starting out with own proposal.
4. We do not believe a meeting of Disarmament Commission can be avoided in any event and also think it could serve useful purpose from US point of view. Accordingly believe US and UK should take initiative in calling for Disarmament Commission meeting to consider results of negotiation thus far. Believe it might be difficult to get resolution in Disarmament Commission which clearly states acceptable basis for resumption of negotiations. Accordingly tentatively believe type of resolution should be sought which gives general endorsement importance effective international control and suggests that governments concerned attempt to reach agreed basis [Facsimile Page 3] for further negotiations.
5. We believe some merit in idea appearing to keep negotiations going by some continuing discussion through diplomatic channels. Such discussion might be labelled as devoted to purpose of establishing sound basis for resumption negotiations and in particular for achieving preliminary agreements on basic issue of control adequate to warrant resumption Geneva talks. Call for further negotiations through diplomatic channels might therefore be included in Disarmament Commission resolution.
6. Believe some consideration should be given to utility consideration question resumption of negotiations in proposed Foreign Ministers meeting in German problem. It might be difficult to find good reason for not having discussion this question on the side by three powers concerned at such a meeting if Soviets or members DC proposed such discussion. If it were desired to avoid such discussion at Foreign Minister meeting possibility might be explored having disarmament meeting begin two weeks or so after beginning Foreign Ministers meeting rather than shortly after recess. If on other hand no major objection to discussing question on side at Foreign Ministers meeting this might be used as one response to kind of resolution in Disarmament Commission suggested above.
- Source: U.S. Delegation ideas on handling a recess in nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/2–2359.↩