428. Memorandum From Herter to
Eisenhower1
Washington, February 22,
1959
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SUBJECT
- Reply to Prime Minister Macmillan’s Message of February 20
I enclose a suggested reply to Prime Minister Macmillan’s letter of February
20 to you about our position in the Geneva nuclear test suspension
negotiations.
If you approve the response I propose to pass it to the British Embassy on
Monday morning for transmission to the Prime Minister in Moscow.
Acting Secretary
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Enclosure
Suggested Letter From Eisenhower
February 22, 1959
Dear Harold:
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I agree with the points you make in your message of February 20 about the
importance of the negotiations in Geneva and the advantages which would
come to us from a sound agreement. I agree also that perfect control is
impossible, both in theory and in practice. However, I am firmly
convinced that it would be folly for us now to relax our position in any
way; the Soviets are making no signs of movement toward us on the
crucial issues.
I concur that an agreement with the USSR on nuclear testing will establish a precedent for
controls in other fields. This point concerns me very much. It
reinforces the need to continue to press the USSR for a satisfactory agreement on fundamentals before
moving to other issues. The important points are the way inspection is
organized and the procedures to insure rapid dispatch of inspection
teams. We cannot accept any impediments to dispatch of inspection teams.
We must be careful that the staffing pattern of the control posts is not
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such as
to interfere with the integrity of the collection and transmission of
data. We must be sure that the voting procedures do not legalize
obstruction of the operations of the control system. I am sure that you
will agree with me that on these points we must be absolutely firm.
Our fear about your proposal for setting an annual upper limit on
inspections is that it would get us into negotiations on numbers without
agreement on the basic elements of inspection and control. Further,
there would be ever-increasing pressure on us, once we accepted the
upper limits principle, to go lower and lower until there would no
longer be an acceptable level of deterrence. Therefore, I believe we
should contemplate no proposals of this type until and unless the
important points I have described above are satisfactorily settled.
With warm personal regard,
As ever,
