Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

414. Note From Smith to Gray¹

Washington, January 26, 1959

MR. GRAY

Attached are the pertinent papers and a briefing memorandum covering them for use at the meeting of the principals Monday, January 26, at 2 p.m., in Mr. Herter’s office.

It is my understanding that the State Department will not have a paper to discuss, but will use Mr. Herter’s reply to Mr. Killian as the basis of its discussion of how to handle the Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement.

Bromley

Attachment

Memorandum From Smith to Gray

Washington, January 26, 1959

Summarized below are the views of those agencies which have commented on the Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement:

1. State (Mr. Herter)

a. Publish substance of the Report as soon as possible.

b. Also inform Soviets in Geneva in order to overcome suspicion aroused by presentation of seismic data from Hardtack II.

c. Ask AFOAT–1 to make an quantitative analysis of the effect on the capabilities of the Geneva System if the suggested improvements listed in the Report were implemented.

d. Conduct underground explosions, jointly with the Russians or, unilaterally, if they refuse, to learn more about detection of underground expositions.

2. Defense (Mr. McElroy)

a. Accept a treaty covering cessation of only such underground tests identifiable by the Geneva System (20KT) without requiring an unworkable number of on-site investigations.

b. Suspension threshold could be lowered (1) if the USSR accepts in a treaty a detection system better than the Geneva System and (2) when improvements in the system resulting from a vigorous development program are installed and operating.

3. AEC (Mr. McCone)

a. Geneva System is inadequate.

b. Scientists differ as to effect of Panel’s suggested improvements. Further experimentation required to establish the facts.

c. Unless threshold is very high, no system can be relied upon to detect underground tests of a specific yield.

d. U.S. should propose to the Russians now a treaty limited to a suspension of atmospheric tests and a detection system covering such tests.

e. Underground tests should be conducted to obtain information needed to develop a detection system in which all could have confidence.

4. USIA (Mr. George Allen)

a. Do not publish Report now because of possibility of confusing the public.

b. There is insufficient scientific basis for negotiating a cessation of underground tests.

c. Propose to the Russians now a cessation of only above-ground tests. When research is more complete, proceed with system to enforce cessation of all tests.

Attached is a summary of a speech made by Senator Humphrey in the Senate on January 20 (pgs. 5–6 of State Department Summary).

Bromley Smith

Attachment

Memorandum From Killian to Multiple Recipients

Washington, January 19, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR

• The Honorable Christian A. Herter
• The Honorable Donald A. Quarles
• The Honorable John A. McCone
• The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
• The Honorable Gordon Gray
• The Honorable George Allen

I am forwarding for your information the attached comments on the first report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, dated 7 January 1959. As you know, the comments were prepared in response to a request in my letter dated 12 January 1959 transmitting copies of the Panel report. I believe that these comments, together with those I received from you, will provide a useful basis for any future discussion we may have on this report.

Since the report in question must be considered as privileged information, I would suggest that the attached comments be handled on a limited distribution basis.

J.R. Killian, Jr.

Attachment

Letter From Herter to Killian

Washington, January 16, 1959

Dear Jim:

The first Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, transmitted with your memorandum of January 12, is most encouraging. We wish to endorse their continued study of this problem.

It is most important that there be prepared as soon as possible a version of the report suitable for transmission to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva and to the American public. As you know, the Soviets are very suspicious of our motives in tabling the seismic data from Hardtack II. Moreover, world public opinion has tended to view this move by the U.S. as an indication that we are anxious to forestall the successful conclusion of an agreement on nuclear testing. By giving the Soviet delegation these preliminary findings we may be able in some measure to convince them of the sincerity of our concern about the problem of underground detection and of our positive efforts to find solutions.

I understand that the four approaches suggested by the panel are under further study and that the evaluation of their effectiveness expressed in the report is tentative. Pending the results of this study it would be most useful for our tactical planning to have a quantitative analysis of the effect of these four approaches on the capabilities of the Geneva system, as suggested in your memorandum. We therefore urge that AFOAT–1 be requested to undertake such an analysis. It is further urged that any possible research on the applicability of these four techniques be carried out by the appropriate agencies as rapidly as is feasible.

I am aware of the serious concern expressed by many scientists, and reflected in the Panel Report, that the data available from Rainier and Hardtack II constitute a severely limited sample of possible nuclear test conditions. Serious consideration should therefore be given to carrying out further underground explosions, both HE and nuclear, for the purpose of improving our knowledge in this field. Our estimate is that such a program aimed at providing a sounder basis for the detection system to be agreed upon by our negotiators in Geneva would probably be acceptable to international public opinion if we offered to carry it out jointly with the USSR and under international observation. Any Soviet objection that such a proposed program was merely a means for furthering our own weapons development program could be countered by proposing that they supply the nuclear devices for use in underground detonations. Furthermore, I believe the necessity for such a program is sufficiently important that, if the Soviet Union will not agree to participate, the United States should be prepared to proceed alone.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Chris
Under Secretary

Attachment

Memorandum From McElroy to Killian

Washington, January 16, 1959

SUBJECT

• First Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement

In Secretary Quarles’ absence I am replying to your memorandum on the above subject addressed to him on January 12, 1959, in which you requested his comments on the subject of the report. Inasmuch as the report is strictly technical in nature, prepared by recognized experts in the field, I feel it would be somewhat presumptuous on my part to comment on the technical feasibility of the several measures suggested for improving the capabilities of the Geneva System. I agree that an appropriate next step would be the preparation of a quantitative analysis of the effect of these measures and am prepared to have AFOAT–1 make such an analysis if you so desire.

I believe it worthwhile to note that the estimated effectiveness of the several improvements proposed by the panel is based largely on theoretical considerations and may be subject at this to the same faults as the initial estimates of capabilities of the Geneva system. I am concerned as to the possibility that under the pressures generated by the present Geneva negotiations we may be induced to make commitments or to place unjustified reliance on prospective improvements based on inadequate data. Even if the improvements are subsequently determined to be effective to the degree they may now be estimated, they may be found politically or economically impractical to apply. Thus, it seems most important to me that the United States must not accept an inadequate system on the assumption, that future improvements will make it adequate.

It is quite certain that vigorous research in seismology will produce important improvements; however, I believe it would be very unwise to postulate any specific degree of improvement either in time or as to quality as a basis for committing ourselves to an expanded system calling for a definite level of detection and identification. For that reason it is my view that the following principles which have been previously supported by the Department of Defense should govern our negotiations as regards the suspension of underground tests:

(a) The treaty should provide only for the cessation of such underground tests as we believe to be identifiable by the Geneva System (on the order of 20 KT) without requiring an unreasonable or unworkable number of on-site investigations. Obviously, if the USSR can be induced to accept a better system as an element of the treaty, the threshold would be lowered to accord with our best estimate of the system’s capabilities.

(b) The Control Commission should be charged with the conduct of a vigorous development program to improve the system and the suspension threshold should be progressively lowered as the improvements are installed and in operation.

Neil H. McElroy

1. Source: Transmits papers for meeting on seismic improvement. Confidential. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.