413. Letter From Herter to Killian1
As you know the draft technical annex tabled by our delegation in Geneva on 16 December left open the question of what techniques would be included for the detection of high altitude explosions. Our delegation suggested to the Russians that a technical working group consider the problem of high altitude detection in view of the fact that the conference of experts last summer did not recommend any specific techniques for inclusion in the control system. Our delegation has asked for instructions on how this problem should be handled in the negotiations.
It appears to us that there are two possible approaches to this problem:
- 1.
- We could press for inclusion now of specific provisions for detecting high altitude explosions based on such knowledge as we have at present. Responsibility for recommended changes or improvements in the system could be vested in the control commission in the light of further information and experience.
- 2.
- We could omit any specific high altitude detection system from the treaty but give the control commission responsibility for developing such a system within a given period of time. In this event the right of withdrawal would have to be protected if the commission were unable to agree on an appropriate high altitude detection system.
The Department of Defense has advised us that they do not favor incorporating provisions for high altitude detection at the present time, and thus apparently would prefer the second alternative. The Soviet [Facsimile Page 2] delegation in Geneva has generally taken the position that the control commission should bear responsibility for the development of changes in or additions to the system and that for the present we should proceed on the basis of the Experts’ report. In order to prepare for a governmental decision on which course to take I would like to request that you convene a suitable panel of experts to consider this question in the light of the relevant technical factors. I believe it would be useful if such a group, in the course of their considerations, could look into the feasibility of conducting usefully instrumented outer space nuclear tests, both on the part of the Soviet Union and ourselves, within the next two four-year periods, the firmness of the information presently available on which to base a high altitude detection system, and the possible implications for [Typeset Page 1539] United States security of a decision to omit specific provisions for high altitude detection from a nuclear test ban agreement for an initial period.
With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,
Under Secretary
- Source: Proposes panel of experts to examine detection of high altitude tests. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1–2359.↩