Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

415. Telegram Supnu 230 From Geneva¹

Geneva, January 27, 1959, 1 p.m.

Supnu 230. Ref Nusup 174. For Herter (S) from Wadsworth.

I fully agree we must concentrate on control issues. I believe our public position on these is excellent. The Brit yesterday took lead in putting forward our ideas on staffing a control organization in a way which showed clearly how effectively this could work in contrast to the Sov position of self-inspection. The Sov delegate was obviously at a loss and floundered for reply. We have started to build our case on workable inspections and should have no trouble in exposing the absurdities of the present Sov position. On the veto also I think we are in a strong spot and can at the proper time further strengthen our position by suggestions of a composition of the control commission which would give some voice to “non-committed” countries.

I am honestly not able to reach a firm conclusion on whether the Soviets will eventually accept the right kind of control organization. Their statements and tactics, particularly since the recess, seem to point the other way, but I am still clinging to the idea that for some reason they want a treaty, perhaps even on respectable terms, and that they may possibly come around to it if our public position is kept strong. Their post-recess tactics may in fact be for any of three purposes: to prepare for a break; to try to bring pressure on West to compromise in order “to save conference”; or to build up to a major “concession” their part.

As far as keeping propaganda advantage goes, and this is essential whether there is eventually to be a treaty or a break, the only hazards I see are the questions of duration and of threshold. The threshold problem need not come up soon, and in any case is not raised by the remainder of our draft treaty. So I will give you my thoughts on this question later. The duration problem is immediate. We have been helped enormously by our dropping of the disarmament link. We can now say quite rightly that duration only hinges on controls. But we still have the weak points, as far as public position goes, of the year-by-year basis and the unilateral right of withdrawal. The Sov line in and outside of the meetings has been to attack these points, particularly the year-by-year, and to demand that we make it clear whether we hold to these positions by tabling a duration article. They have worked to show that delay on our part in tabling an article is a stall and is evidence, together with our introduction of the new data, of our desire to frustrate agreement. They might even have some real suspicion that this is the case.

There are two alternative courses. We can table our presently authorized duration article, along with the other draft articles of our treaty, and get away from the accusations and suspicions of stalling by accepting whatever disadvantages there may be in repeating once again our present position on year-by-year unilateral withdrawal. The other articles give the Soviets no particular issue since the line they have taken on peaceful uses removes this as a major point of argument. Or we can hold up tabling and continue to follow the line which we have been taking for the past three weeks that control issues should be discussed before the question of duration. I believe that it will be easier to keep the focus on controls if we table the article. There is an immediate link back to controls since Tsarapkin has promised the list of items on which the Soviets will want unanimity in the Control Commission (that is, veto) as soon as we table a duration article. And tabling of the article does not rob us of any of the arguments we have been using that the control org should in any case be discussed first. These arguments would be harder to use effectively if we do not table and are open to daily charges of stalling and of obstruction. Too much delay may well cause Tsarapkin to refuse to talk controls.

I have never asked for a change in the duration article which would base the right of withdrawal upon a Commission finding, such as the text which appears in the last para of Nusup 150. I have thought that such an article, which would remove the target of a year-by-year unilateral withdrawal, might be even more difficult in terms of inter-agency feelings and the Congress, than the kind of implicit rather than explicit right of withdrawal which I have supported the UK in asking for. Foster and you are the only ones who can judge whether such a change, to relying on a commission finding, would be either wise or practical. If such a change were possible, it would, I think, make our position on duration publicly unassailable and leave us in a position where the Soviets could not possibly avoid the control issues.

I have not talked of such an article with the Brit because I did not want to raise unnecessary difficulties for you, but they, I am sure, would be delighted. And I should say that whether or not there is any change in the duration article, Ormsby-Gore believes strongly that we should table it immediately since he is [illegible in the original] more convinced than I am that this is the better way to keep the discussions where we want them.

I do not think in considering this last suggestion of a change you should be too much influenced by the possibility that the Soviets might break if we table our present duration clause. There is, of course, always the chance that they might be looking for a pretext and might take this as an opportunity. And in addition to the recent Sov Govt’s statement, the Russians here have been making noises to the Brit and ourselves which are obviously calculated to give us the idea that they may be thinking of winding up the conf. But my personal assessment really is that they probably will not break in the immediate future. My guess is that we will have a few more weeks to go anyway, and I am confident that we can keep the focus on the issues of control.

Villard

1. Source: Urges tabling proposed duration clause of draft nuclear testing cessation treaty. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/1–2759.