412. Letter From McCone to Herter1

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My dear Chris:

I have been thinking a great deal of our talk at the OCB luncheon Wednesday and I am writing you this personal letter so that you will understand my very deep concern over the trend of the Geneva negotiations.

There seems to be complete agreement within scientific circles in this country that the detection system proposed by the technical experts in Geneva is inadequate. However, there is a difference of opinion among reputable and informed scientists as to whether the system can be improved sufficiently by additional, better, and different types of stations and instrumentation so that it can, with assurance, detect and identify nuclear explosions of the proportions indicated in the Geneva technical report. Dr. Teller made a persuasive argument in his testimony before the Joint Committee that the present system can not reliably identify explosions of appreciable size, perhaps not even those as high as 100 kilotons. Furthermore, he explained how nuclear underground explosions could be camouflaged, so that even the 100 kiloton threshold is subject to question. [Typeset Page 1536] You may recall that Dr. Teller has from the beginning warned of the difficulty of identifying underground nuclear explosions.

The improvements suggested by the Committee recently appointed by Dr. Killian unquestionably will improve the capability of the system, but many of these proposed improvements are theoretical and untried. However, the proposed array of unmanned stations to be scattered throughout the world would require periodic and frequent maintenance. Unless this is done by international maintenance teams, the stations could be readily tampered with so that they would be of questionable value.

Another very important point which must always be borne in mind is the fact that the Nevada tests, including HARDTACK II, are not conclusive because they were conducted in only one area and in one geological formation. No one knows what would happen in the way of seismic disturbances, for example, if shots were made in granite formation.

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I feel that the statements made by competent scientists concerning the inadequacy of the proposed detection system have been and will continue to be accepted as valid by many people within the Government, by responsible members of the House and Senate on both sides of the aisle and by a large segment of the American people.

From evidence now submitted I seriously question that the technology of the detection of underground shots is sufficiently advanced for us to enter, at this time, into arrangements with the Soviets barring such explosions. The keystone of such an arrangement must be strong assurance through effective detection, identification and inspection, that all parties to the agreement will live up to its terms, and this criteria cannot be met unless a very high threshold is agreed upon.

This brings me to the second point; namely, the dangers of proceeding much further with our negotiations on the present basis.

I am deeply sympathetic with your expressed desire that we must determine, by pursuing these negotiations, whether the Soviets will accept an inspection system within their own territory which might lead to further penetration of the Iron Curtain. I agree with you that this is an important point.

I further agree with you that a breakdown of negotiations over the issue of adequate inspection would cause criticism of the Soviets by much of the world. I think the Soviets realize this, and I do not think they will let the negotiations break down on this point.

On the other hand, the Soviets may go the limit to accept inspection stations, possibly even to the point of finding some way around the veto issue. Mikoyan indicated as much to Stassen. In going this route, however, they would insist on the inadequate detection system agreed [Typeset Page 1537] to last summer in Geneva. By unexpectedly accepting such a system, the Soviets could place us in the position of either going along with a dangerous agreement or backing away for reasons extremely difficult, if not impossible, to explain to the world.

Our position would then be most awkward. Strong voices would argue convincingly that the system is inadequate and that the criteria of “fool-proof inspection” has not been met. I conclude from the testimony last week on the Hill that almost any agreed threshold would be questioned by the Congress. Certainly, the validity of a 20 kiloton threshold would be vigorously attacked by some very knowledgeable and respected people. I fear, also, that the American public would in time feel they had been misled by our Government.

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I therefore feel, Chris, that we are moving along a very dangerous course in this negotiation. While I do not wish to inject myself into “quarter-backing” the negotiation, I urge in all sincerity that you find a way at this time to alter the course of the negotiations along the lines expressed in our letter to you of December 23, 1958.

To summarize our position, we propose taking the initiative at Geneva with a positive two-phase program. First, we would urge an agreement with the nuclear powers to suspend atmospheric tests and to establish an adequate detection system to insure compliance. Such a system would be relatively simple and inexpensive, and would be dependable because of our very extensive experience over a period of years with this type of detection. Moreover, this step would eliminate the fallout issue.

Second, conduct more underground tests as quickly as possible and in diverse geographical and geological environments to seek solid information on identification and detection of underground nuclear explosions. From this information we could determine whether a system could be designed in which we would have sufficient confidence to negotiate for a complete test cessation.

This program of experimentation could be a joint effort by the parties to the treaty, or could be done by the parties individually with international inspection and with all data developed being shared among the participating nations.

Sincerely yours,

John A. McCone
  1. Source: Urges change in negotiating objectives until more reliable detection system developed. Personal. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Khrushchev Exchange.