411. Letter From Herter to Killian1
The first Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, transmitted with your memorandum of January 12, is most encouraging. We wish to endorse their continued study of this problem.
It is most important that there be prepared as soon as possible a version of the report suitable for transmission to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva and to the American public. As you know, the Soviets are very suspicious of our motives in tabling the seismic data from Hardtack II. Moreover, world public opinion has tended to view this move by the U.S. as an indication that we are anxious to forestall the successful conclusion of an agreement on nuclear testing. By giving the Soviet delegation these preliminary findings we may be able in some measure to convince them of the sincerity of our concern about the problem of underground detection and of our positive efforts to find solutions.
I understand that the four approaches suggested by the panel are under further study and that the evaluation of their effectiveness expressed in the report is tentative. Pending the results of this study it would be most useful for our tactical planning to have a quantitative analysis of the effect of these four approaches on the capabilities of the Geneva system, as suggested in your memorandum. We therefore urge that AFOAT–1 be requested to undertake such an analysis. It is further urged that any possible research on the applicability of these four techniques be carried out by the appropriate agencies as rapidly as is feasible.
I am aware of the serious concern expressed by many scientists, and reflected in the Panel Report, that the data available from Rainier and Hardtack II constitute a severely limited sample of possible nuclear test conditions. Serious consideration should [Facsimile Page 2] therefore be given to carrying out further underground explosions, both HE and nuclear, for the purpose of improving our knowledge in this field. Our estimate is that such a program aimed at providing a sounder basis for the detection system to be agreed upon by our negotiators in Geneva would probably be acceptable to international public opinion if we offered to carry it out jointly with the USSR and under international observation. Any [Typeset Page 1535] Soviet objection that such a proposed program was merely a means for furthering our own weapons development program could be countered by proposing that they supply the nuclear devices for use in underground detonations. Furthermore, I believe the necessity for such a program is sufficiently important that, if the Soviet Union will not agree to participate, the United States should be prepared to proceed alone.
With warmest personal regards,
Most sincerely,
Under Secretary
- Source: Urges version of seismic improvement report be prepared to present to the Soviet Union, further testing be conducted. Confidential. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Nuclear Test Suspension, Seismic Data.↩