Attached is a copy of a classified memorandum from the General Manager to
me which summarizes the Atomic Energy Commission’s views on a number of
issues which have arisen at Geneva. This includes item 5, page 2, which
reflects the Commission’s views on the Gore Proposal.
Also, I am attaching a copy of a TELEX sent to me from Livermore by
Commissioner Libby and Dr.
Teller on July 25, 1958.
You will note that the TELEX sets forth two alternate plans for reducing
weapons test programs by agreement with other nuclear powers. The second
of the two plans parallels the Gore proposal. When these two plans were
put forth by me it was concluded that since the Geneva Technical
Conference was exploring complete suspension, the introduction of the
ideas set forth in the TELEX would not be timely.
The Atomic Energy Commission adheres to the validity of either proposal
contained in the Libby TELEX,
but questions any arrangement of a “unilateral nature”. We suggest that
a suspension be put into effect only by bilateral or multilateral treaty
which provides, among
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other things, positive assurances gained through
agreed inspection procedures that the agreement will be maintained by
all parties.
Attachment
Memorandum From AEC General
Manager to McCone
Washington,
December 5,
1958
[Facsimile Page 2]
SUBJECT
- Instructions of the Commission Relative to Test Cessation
Issues
1. The following paragraphs summarize my understanding of the
Commission conclusions reached after a series of Commission and
staff deliberations. The information within parentheses is to be
used only in discussions among the principals.
2. Link to Disarmament. The Commission
believes that a decision as to whether or not the linkage with
disarmament progress should be dropped is not
a matter of Commission responsibility. Rather, this is a matter
lying within the purview of the State Department. The Commission
would point out, however, that cessation without a link to
disarmament would mean the continuation of the armament race with an
attendant evolutionary development of weapons which could not be
fully effective without nuclear testing. It would hope that, if the
link were not expressed in an action article of the treaty, the
President’s objective in this regard as contained in his
announcement of August 22 would be incorporated in the treaty
preamble. The answer to be made to the British in regard to this
issue is a matter also for State to decide. Again, however, the
Commission would hope that a way could be found to secure support
for incorporation in the preamble.
3. The Period of Suspension. An indefinite
period of suspension in place of the year-to-year provision would be
satisfactory provided:
- (a)
- Suspension is definitely linked to the detection system,
and
- (b)
- Any party to the Treaty can withdraw if the detection
system is not properly installed and satisfactorily
operating in the opinion of the complaining party.
[Facsimile Page 3]
Note: The Commission is concerned about
engaging in a Treaty in a new area of this type without adequate
privileges for reconsideration should basic conditions change.
However, this is in the province of the Department of State.
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4. Tie between the Control System and
Cessation. The Commission believes that the Treaty
documentation should establish the link between control system and
cessation and that link should be definitive, unmistakable, and
irrevocable. The Commission would like to see the specific
provisions for the control system and the agreement for cessation in
a single document. Whether it is necessary that it be in one
document or in two lies within the province of the State Department.
The Commission would repeat that, even if in two documents, the link
must be “definitive, unmistakable, and irrevocable.”
5. The Gore Proposal. The Commission is in
agreement that an immediate unilateral proposal as set forth by
Senator Gore would not be desirable. They are in agreement also
that, if an announcement along this line is to be made later, it
should not be a unilateral declaration but a proposed international
agreement, and that the time of making should be at the time of
deadlock or breakdown of the current Geneva discussions. (The
Commission believes that we should seek a multilateral controlled
ban on atmospheric tests as an immediate and practical and
enforceable objective. This, as we understand it, is very similar to
Senator Gore’s proposal.)
6. Limitation of Test Cessation to Controllable
Tests. The Commission believes that whatever happens at
Geneva we must not agree to a ban on tests which cannot be
controlled. We must recognize the threshold problem for underground
tests and also the outer space detection problem as both involving
thresholds of detectability.
Analysis of the underground shots in the HARDTACK II series indicates
that the questions of both detectability and identification of
subterranean nuclear explosions are substantially more difficult
than previously assumed on the basis of the RAINIER shot, the only
information available to the Geneva Technical meeting. The increase
in difficulty is of a magnitude such as to raise additional
substantial questions of the practicality of an inspection system
which includes underground shots; the problems of difficulty of
staffing; quality of staffing, cooperation by all nations, expense,
etc., are compounded by the recent data. It may well be,
[Facsimile Page 4]
therefore, that the only practical detection system at this time is
one that is restricted to the detection and control of atmospheric
nuclear explosions only.
7. The Commission is concerned by the fact that prolonged
negotiations during which we continue to suspend all U.S. tests
might have the practical effect of making the test ban permanent
with no opportunity of establishing controls or other necessary
conditions.
On November 7, the President said in part, “If there is not shortly a
corresponding renunciation by the Soviet Union, the United States
will be obliged to reconsider its position.” The Soviet Union has
not in the intervening time declared its intention of refraining
from further nuclear tests during the discussions at Geneva. A clear
statement of our
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intentions during the reminder of the
negotiation period and during the installation of the control system
should be made in the near future. Alternatively, a terminal date
for the negotiation should be established.
8. The following two earlier points should be raised by the Chairman
at the meeting with the principals:
- (a)
- The advisability of taking this matter out of the staff
level and settling between the principals to prevent
leakage.
- (b)
- To alleviate the growing concern that U.K. policies in
several areas differ from those of the U.S., take positive
action with the British to secure an agreed position on the
following:
- (1)
- Link to the control system.
- (2)
- Duration (or right to withdraw).
- (3)
- Link (if any) to disarmament.
- (4)
- Geographic areas outside of the boundaries of
those countries currently discussing test cessation,
such as Red China and North Africa.
General Manager
