Attached is a copy of a classified memorandum from the General Manager to me
which summarizes the Atomic Energy Commission’s views on a number of issues
which have arisen at Geneva. This includes item 5, page 2, which reflects
the Commission’s views on the Gore Proposal.
Also, I am attaching a copy of a TELEX sent to me from Livermore by
Commissioner Libby and Dr. Teller on July 25, 1958.
You will note that the TELEX sets forth two alternate plans for reducing
weapons test programs by agreement with other nuclear powers. The second of
the two plans parallels the Gore proposal. When these two plans were put
forth by me it was concluded that since the Geneva Technical Conference was
exploring complete suspension, the introduction of the ideas set forth in
the TELEX would not be timely.
The Atomic Energy Commission adheres to the validity of either proposal
contained in the Libby TELEX, but
questions any arrangement of a “unilateral nature”. We suggest that a
suspension be put into effect only by bilateral or multilateral treaty which
provides, among
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other things, positive assurances gained through agreed inspection
procedures that the agreement will be maintained by all parties.
Attachment
Memorandum From AEC General Manager
to McCone
Washington, December 5,
1958
[Facsimile Page 2]
SUBJECT
- Instructions of the Commission Relative to Test Cessation
Issues
1. The following paragraphs summarize my understanding of the Commission
conclusions reached after a series of Commission and staff
deliberations. The information within parentheses is to be used only in
discussions among the principals.
2. Link to Disarmament. The Commission believes
that a decision as to whether or not the linkage with disarmament
progress should be dropped is not a matter of
Commission responsibility. Rather, this is a matter lying within the
purview of the State Department. The Commission would point out,
however, that cessation without a link to disarmament would mean the
continuation of the armament race with an attendant evolutionary
development of weapons which could not be fully effective without
nuclear testing. It would hope that, if the link were not expressed in
an action article of the treaty, the President’s objective in this
regard as contained in his announcement of August 22 would be
incorporated in the treaty preamble. The answer to be made to the
British in regard to this issue is a matter also for State to decide.
Again, however, the Commission would hope that a way could be found to
secure support for incorporation in the preamble.
3. The Period of Suspension. An indefinite period
of suspension in place of the year-to-year provision would be
satisfactory provided:
- (a)
- Suspension is definitely linked to the detection system,
and
- (b)
- Any party to the Treaty can withdraw if the detection system
is not properly installed and satisfactorily operating in the
opinion of the complaining party.
[Facsimile Page 3]
Note: The Commission is concerned about engaging
in a Treaty in a new area of this type without adequate privileges for
reconsideration should basic conditions change. However, this is in the
province of the Department of State.
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4. Tie between the Control System and Cessation.
The Commission believes that the Treaty documentation should establish
the link between control system and cessation and that link should be
definitive, unmistakable, and irrevocable. The Commission would like to
see the specific provisions for the control system and the agreement for
cessation in a single document. Whether it is necessary that it be in
one document or in two lies within the province of the State Department.
The Commission would repeat that, even if in two documents, the link
must be “definitive, unmistakable, and irrevocable.”
5. The Gore Proposal. The Commission is in
agreement that an immediate unilateral proposal as set forth by Senator
Gore would not be desirable. They are in agreement also that, if an
announcement along this line is to be made later, it should not be a
unilateral declaration but a proposed international agreement, and that
the time of making should be at the time of deadlock or breakdown of the
current Geneva discussions. (The Commission believes that we should seek
a multilateral controlled ban on atmospheric tests as an immediate and
practical and enforceable objective. This, as we understand it, is very
similar to Senator Gore’s proposal.)
6. Limitation of Test Cessation to Controllable
Tests. The Commission believes that whatever happens at Geneva
we must not agree to a ban on tests which cannot be controlled. We must
recognize the threshold problem for underground tests and also the outer
space detection problem as both involving thresholds of
detectability.
Analysis of the underground shots in the HARDTACK II series indicates
that the questions of both detectability and identification of
subterranean nuclear explosions are substantially more difficult than
previously assumed on the basis of the RAINIER shot, the only
information available to the Geneva Technical meeting. The increase in
difficulty is of a magnitude such as to raise additional substantial
questions of the practicality of an inspection system which includes
underground shots; the problems of difficulty of staffing; quality of
staffing, cooperation by all nations, expense, etc., are compounded by
the recent data. It may well be,
[Facsimile Page 4]
therefore, that the only
practical detection system at this time is one that is restricted to the
detection and control of atmospheric nuclear explosions only.
7. The Commission is concerned by the fact that prolonged negotiations
during which we continue to suspend all U.S. tests might have the
practical effect of making the test ban permanent with no opportunity of
establishing controls or other necessary conditions.
On November 7, the President said in part, “If there is not shortly a
corresponding renunciation by the Soviet Union, the United States will
be obliged to reconsider its position.” The Soviet Union has not in the
intervening time declared its intention of refraining from further
nuclear tests during the discussions at Geneva. A clear statement of our
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intentions during the reminder of the negotiation period and during the
installation of the control system should be made in the near future.
Alternatively, a terminal date for the negotiation should be
established.
8. The following two earlier points should be raised by the Chairman at
the meeting with the principals:
- (a)
- The advisability of taking this matter out of the staff level
and settling between the principals to prevent leakage.
- (b)
- To alleviate the growing concern that U.K. policies in several
areas differ from those of the U.S., take positive action with
the British to secure an agreed position on the following:
- (1)
- Link to the control system.
- (2)
- Duration (or right to withdraw).
- (3)
- Link (if any) to disarmament.
- (4)
- Geographic areas outside of the boundaries of those
countries currently discussing test cessation, such as
Red China and North Africa.
General Manager
