Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

404. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, December 30, 1958

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• • Dept. of State
  • Acting Secretary
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
  • Mr. Farley—S/AE
  • Mr. Kohler—EUR
  • Mr. Spiers—S/AE
  • Mr. Toon—EUR
  • Mr. Baker—S/AE
  • Mr. Morris—S/AE
• • White House
  • Dr. James Killian
  • Dr. James Fisk
  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Mr. Bromley Smith
• • Atomic Energy Comm.
  • Mr. McCone
  • Dr. Kavanagh
  • Dr. English
• • CIA
  • Mr. Amory
• • USIA
  • Mr. Allen
• • Dept. of Defense
  • Mr. Irwin
  • General Byers
  • General Loper

Mr. Herter referred to the first item on the agenda for the meeting (Tab A), noting that the U.K. has again pressed the State Department for a decision on the issue of abandoning a link to disarmament in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. He recalled that this matter had previously been discussed in an Interdepartmental Working Group after receipt of the U.S. Delegation’s recommendation that we revise our position as the U.K. suggested, and that all interested agencies but the Department of Defense had agreed with the Delegation’s recommendation. He noted that the U.K. had wished to make a major public announcement of the proposed change in position. He inquired whether the Department of Defense had considered this question further and whether a unanimous recommendation might be made to the President on the matter. Mr. Irwin said that Secretary McElroy was out of town and he had not been able to discuss the matter with him. However, the joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to the proposed policy shift. General Loper said that he had discussed the question with Mr. Quarles who maintained his previous position that the link should not be dropped. Mr. Herter said that if this position were confirmed, we should arrange for a meeting with the President to present the varying views as soon as possible.

In response to Mr. Irwin’s inquiry regarding the pros and cons of the issue, Ambassador Wadsworth said that our present position left us very vulnerable to Soviet propaganda and provided a screen behind which the Soviets could always retreat when they wished to evade coming to grips with the issue of control. On the one hand we are seeking to write precise control provisions into the treaty and on the other insisting on the vaguest sort of expression of relationship with disarmament, where it was impossible for us to be specific in response to Soviet probing as to just what we mean. The Delegation felt that there was no real way to fit generalized provisions about disarmament progress into a treaty dealing with another specific issue, test cessation, which we claim is not a disarmament measure. Also our best chance of keeping the British firm on controls is to meet them on the disarmament link point, which they consider academic in nature, and untenable before public opinion.

Mr. McCone said that the Atomic Energy Commission viewed this question as one lying within the responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense. His personal view was that we should not attempt to write the criteria of disarmament progress into an article of the treaty, in view of our inability to be specific, but that some mention should be made of disarmament, as an objective rather than as a condition, in a preamble to the treaty. Lack of disarmament progress should not constitute a reason for dissolving the treaty. He felt that the preamble in the Soviet draft, which dealt only with nuclear disarmament, provided a good entry for similar preamble extended to cover other disarmament aspects in our own draft. Dr. Killian said that he agreed with the position taken by Mr. McCone. Mr. Irwin said that he would discuss this matter with the Secretary of Defense and let Mr. Herter know as soon as possible whether Defense was prepared to change its position.

Mr. Herter raised the question whether, if the proposed change in position is made, it should be made with great public fanfare as the British seemed to prefer. Ambassador Wadsworth, Mr. Allen, and Mr. Irwin agreed that the concession should be made as routinely as possible in the course of negotiations and with a minimum of hue and cry which could be taken to imply that the President’s August 22 position was wrong. Mr. Farley noted that one of our major objectives in the current negotiations was to gain Soviet agreement to an effective control system. Our change in position could be justified on the grounds that Soviet acceptance of the controls sought constitutes a most important step forward which in itself makes future progress in disarmament more possible. Thus it is not a case of our previous position being wrong but simply a recognition that the objective of disarmament progress could in reality best be served by conclusion of an agreement on nuclear tests with firm control provisions. There will be adequate protection for U.S. interest, since it would be possible to withdraw from the treaty if the Soviets obstruct operation of the control system.

General Loper asked whether it would not be possible to postpone a decision on the link until a later stage, since it would not be necessary to discuss the duration article until near the end of the negotiations. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he had been giving the question of general tactics in the negotiations further thought over the holidays and felt that our best procedure now would be to move ahead and table all of the remaining articles of our draft treaty, seeking agreement on as many of these as possible, and by-passing for the time-being some of the more difficult issues such as the question of unanimity. We are presently vulnerable to Soviet charges that we have not given a clear idea of the total scope of the treaty we propose. Furthermore, it would be to our advantage to be free to come back at will to some of these difficult issues, such as that of the “veto”, at a later stage since these were the issues on which any breakoff would be favorable to the U.S. Mr. Herter agreed that the U.S. would be in a far better public relations position if a breakoff in the negotiations occurred on the question of controls than it would if the break were to be on the matter of relationship to disarmament. Mr. Irwin said that if the decision were made to break the link, the Department of Defense would prefer to see this policy change played in a low key and with a view to making the most of it as a bargaining counter in the negotiations.

Passing to the second item of the agenda, Mr. Herter asked Dr. Killian to explain the nature and implications of the new data relating to detection and identification of underground tests obtained in the HARDTACK II test series of October 1958. Dr. Killian presented the preliminary report attached as Tab B.

Dr. Fisk, in response to a question from Mr. Irwin explained that the new data were considerably more reliable than the Rainier data on which the Experts’ Report had been based and which involved only one underground test. However, there is still a large element of uncertainty, and further testing might produce data which could change present calculations either upward or downward. The Rainier data was not presented last summer in a way which would preclude us from reopening the question of underground detection on the basis of the new data. It was agreed that the new data was such that it required the U.S. to reopen the question.

Mr. McCone referred to the letter of December 23 transmitting AEC views on the new data (Tab C) and asked whether the new data indicated that a larger number of smaller underground shots would not be detected than previously thought. Dr. Fisk replied that the number would be somewhat larger than before, but noted that the HARDTACK II data does not indicate much change in detectability of underground nuclear explosions. The significant change in capability relates to identification.

Mr. Herter said that from present accounts the Soviet Delegation seems to consider the Geneva Report as definitive and asked Ambassador Wadsworth how he would expect them to react to a reopening of the underground question. Ambassador Wadsworth said he thought that they would initially be suspicious of our motives, but that if approached in the proper manner probably accept our data as accurate. An appropriate approach might be to request an informal meeting on Monday, January 5, at which a U.S. scientist could explain the new data and provide the Soviet Delegation with a summary of our findings. He could then propose that the Conference set up a group of experts to deal with this new information, concurrently with the political negotiations.

Mr. McCone expressed concern that this information, which is already known to some newspaper people, might appear publicly prior to its presentation to the Soviet Delegation. Mr. Gray added that not only do we have to worry about the newsmen who are aware of the HARDTACK II data but also we must consider our obligation to the U.S. public who consider the Geneva Report as an authoritative treatment of the question of detecting nuclear tests. Dr. Killian said he felt an announcement should be made very soon, that any statement should be drafted with great care, should be concurred in by the agencies concerned, and should be drawn so as not to damage our negotiating position. Mr. Herter said he felt that the information should not be released publicly prior to its presentation to the Soviet Delegation and that to do so would cast doubt upon our motivations.

Mr. McCone said he felt we should be guided by the advice of the negotiators and take the calculated risk that an approach to the Soviet Delegation on Monday would be possible before the story appears in the American press. He stated that even though there would be considerable concern in several quarters, including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, if this information had leaked to the press before it had been made available officially, for the sake of good faith with the Soviets it would be well to take this calculated risk of delaying an announcement of the HARDTACK II data until after an approach to the Soviets on Monday.

It was agreed that (1) Ambassador Wadsworth would seek an informal meeting with the Soviet Delegation on Monday at which Dr. Romney of AFOAT–1 would present the HARDTACK II data. Ambassador Wadsworth would then suggest that the Conference establish a working group of experts in this field to consider the implications of the new data; (2) on Tuesday an announcement would be made in this country setting forth the results of the observations of the HARDTACK II explosions as facts without setting forth any particular conclusions, pointing out that the U.S. Delegation is prepared to discuss the data which supplements the limited data available to the Conference of Experts last summer and also indicating that this data may make it possible to improve upon the capability of the system designed this past summer.

Dr. Killian indicated that he will establish a technical committee here in Washington to study the implications of the HARDTACK II data more carefully. This committee would consist of several senior seismologists, geophysicists and others familiar with the phenomena associated with underground explosions and would also consider alternate seismic techniques for discriminating between earthquakes and nuclear explosions and possibilities for improving the instrumentation of such installations. The Group approved the following terms of reference proposed by Dr. Killian:

“The Panel should determine whether it would be possible within the present state of seismic technology to improve the capabilities of the system recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts to detect and identify seismic events as either earthquakes or explosions without increasing the number of manned control posts in the system. The Panel’s investigation should include, but need not be limited to, the following:

(a) improvement or augmentation of equipment at control posts in the agreed Geneva system; (b) augmentation of the system with a more closely spaced grid of small, completely automatic seismic detectors; and (c) utilization of criteria other than the first motion of the P wave to identify events as earthquakes (or as explosions).

“The Panel should also recommend a research and test program to evaluate any specific proposals advanced to improve the system as well as to advance the state of the art in this field. The Panel should indicate the extent to which nuclear tests would be required in this test program.”

Mr. Herter asked how airtight a control system was necessary. Mr. Irwin replied that we would be fairly well protected by a method of random inspection under which the Soviets would not know when a particular event would be inspected. Mr. McCone asked whether the new data would cause any difficulties with Annex 1 which is based on the Report of the Conference of Experts. Mr. Keeny replied that Annex 1 on the control system as drafted should cause no difficulties, since there is provision for inspection of all unidentified events above 5 KT regardless of number and 20% of those below this figure. In fact, he thought that when it became apparent to the Soviet Delegation that the number of unidentified events would rise considerably from the figure anticipated in the Geneva Report, they would probably be quite willing to carefully examine possibilities of reducing this number of potential inspections by various techniques including perhaps establishment of a threshold.

In response to a question by Mr. Herter as to our tactics should the Soviets reject the new data and maintain the continuing validity of the Experts’ Report, Mr. Farley said we could then stand fast on the requirements of inspection. He felt, however, that the Soviet politicians would be quick to realize that the implications of the new data would have to be considered now, rather than after they had signed a treaty committing themselves to a large number of inspections.

Mr. Herter noted that since we are committed to monitoring underground tests, we seem to be faced with the necessity of either an increased number of inspections of unidentified events, establishment of a threshold or improvements in instrument techniques or number of control posts. Ambassador Wadsworth said the Soviets would surely answer any suggestion for a threshold with heavy propaganda that this showed the U.S. had never been sincere about wanting to stop nuclear tests. Dr. Killian, however, suggested that the Soviets themselves might find a higher threshold advantageous. General Loper said that Secretary Quarles felt a threshold might be the best solution to the problem.

Mr. McCone said he wished to express the concern of the AEC about the effect on our testing program of overly prolonged negotiations which involve de facto suspension without an agreement. He urged that thought be given to alternatives and to what action we might take should the Soviets resume testing.

Tab A

Agenda

It is suggested that the meeting scheduled for December 30 consider three items in connection with the Geneva nuclear test negotiations:

1. The link with disarmament.

The U.S. Delegation and the U.K. have both strongly urged that the element of the President’s August 22 statement tying continuation of test suspension to disarmament progress be abandoned. This question has been considered in the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament, and representatives of all interested agencies other than the Department of Defense have indicated no objection to the recommendations of the U.S. Delegation.

Suggested action: that the Department of State prepare a memorandum to the President seeking his approval of the abandonment of the disarmament link.

2. Implications of new data on detection and identification of underground tests.

A working group of seismologists convened by AFOAT–1 has reviewed the seismic data obtained during HARDTACK II and has concluded that the problem of detecting and identifying underground explosions is more difficult than is indicated in the Geneva Conference of Experts Report. Although based on admittedly inadequate data, the Working Group concludes that “statements by the Geneva Conference of Experts concerning the detection and identification of earthquakes equivalent to 5 KT apply more nearly to about 20 KT.”

Suggested action: that Dr. Killian undertake to review the Geneva system to study possible modifications to improve system capability, and the Department of State, coordinating with other agencies, prepare instructions to the Delegation to propose a technical working group of the USSR, U.S. and U.K. to review this data with a view to recommending modifications on the system and a program of joint U.S.–U.K.–USSR underground tests to provide further data under varying conditions on this problem.

3. Fallback Positions.

The U.S. should develop a plan which could serve as an alternative proposal to a complete breakdown in the Geneva talks. We should consider proposing in this event an immediate end to atmospheric tests with the simple inspection system this would require, and charging the control organ created by such agreement to undertake research and study with a view to developing a system which would allow the end of high altitude and underground tests as well. Whereas this would not be a negotiable proposition at this time, a proposal cast in these terms might be accepted by the USSR if the only clear alternative is complete breakdown.

Suggested action: as a basis for further consideration of this problem, the Department of Defense’s AFOAT–1 should be asked to design a minimum inspection system to monitor an agreement to end all atmospheric tests.

Tab B

Report Prepared by the President’s Science Advisory Committee

Washington, undated

POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS IN THE PRESENT U.S. POSITION AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR TESTS

Alternatives Which Need to be Considered as a Result of Test Results Obtained in October on Underground Nuclear Tests

New Data and Implications

The new seismic data resulting from the Hardtack II series of tests (October 1958) alter the quantitative conclusions relating to underground tests reached by the “Geneva Conference of Experts.” While the qualitative basis for seeking the initial technical agreements and for continuing in the present Geneva negotiations appear to be unchanged, detection and identification will be more difficult than had been expected.

The new observations are the following:

1. The maximum amplitude of the seimic signal is approximately 60% of that expected, based on the Rainier data.

2. The “First Motion” of the seismic signal, relative to the seismic signal, is smaller than anticipated (at distances greater than 2,000 KM).

3. The new data are more reliable, being based on observation at more stations and greater distances.

As a result of the new data:

1. The range of detection is decreased for explosions of a given yield.

2. Identification of earthquakes by the method of “First Motion” is less reliable than previously estimated. This result implies a requirement for a considerably larger number of inspections.

Alternatives to be Considered

Since there is clear agreement among informed scientists that significant modifications are necessary in that section of the report of the Geneva Conference of Experts which deals with underground tests, it is important to examine the possible modifications in U.S. policy which these changes in the estimated capabilities of the system will necessitate. The alternatives presented below are all based on the premises that the United Stated will continue to be firm in insisting on the necessity of proper controls of any test agreement and that we will continue to seek agreement with the Soviets on some form of test discontinuance or limitation.

Alternative No. 1—Discontinue all tests in the atmosphere. The AEC has stated this position in the following way:

“(1) to adhere rigidly to the principle that control of any test cessation agreement is essential and that only those tests which are detectable and identifiable are to be prohibited by treaty. Under no conditions shall the relaxation of the requirements of the control system antecede policy changes regarding the scope of the tests being suspended.

“(2) Negotiate as a first step, beginning at the appropriate time after the resumption of negotiations, a treaty for the cessation of atmospheric tests.

“(3) To postpone for later negotiation a treaty applying to underground and outer space tests after further investigation of the technical problems involved in their detection. The U.S. should be willing to discuss these problems to the extent desired by Russia during current negotiations.

“(4) To propose meanwhile international cooperation (with the Control Commission if established) in this investigation to the extent of conducting for the Commission necessary experiments and in making available to the Commission or other appropriate authority the results of national nuclear experiments whose results bear upon the detection and identification problems at issue.

“(5) To preserve the right to develop non-military applications of nuclear explosives.”

This position would initially eliminate the problem of detecting underground tests (as well as tests at great distances from the earth) by permitting such tests. This would answer the worldwide concern about fallout hazard. However, unless subsequent phases were carried out, it would fail to accomplish the other objectives of a test suspension since by itself it would probably, in the long run, have little effect on weapon development and would not require a control system that would have any significant impact on the Soviet Bloc.

Alternative No. 2—Modify “Geneva” System to Improve Capabilities.

It would be possible to modify the “Geneva” System in a manner which would substantially improve the capabilities of the system. This might be accomplished if one of more of the following steps were adopted:

1. Increase the number of seismographs at each control post in the Geneva System (e.g. An increase in seismographs from 10 to 100 might improve the signal to noise ratio for detection by a factor of 3).

2. Halve the seismic grid spacing by adding unmanned, seismic-only stations using the same number of seismographs as in the main control posts.

3. Augment the agreed-upon grid of manned control posts with a much closer spaced grid (e.g., 100–150 KM) of small, unmanned seismographs which would telemeter information.

4. Increase the number of inspections.

5. Develop other presently promising techniques to identify earthquakes and to discriminate between explosions and earthquakes.

A carefully-engineered modification of the present system, including some combination of the above concepts, could restore or even better the effectiveness of the system proposed at Geneva.

Alternative No. 3—More Effective Use of Inspection in “Geneva” System.

It would be possible to provide at least some level of deterrence down to 1 KT or below with the present “Geneva” system by a more effective use of onsite inspections. This might be accomplished by employing some variation of one or more of the following procedures:

a) Establish a graduated, decreasing scale for the percentage of unidentified events which would be inspected on a random basis in different yield ranges (e.g., 100% over 20 KT; 25% 20–10 KT; 10% 10–5 KT; 2% 5–1 KT; 1/2% less than 1 KT.)

b) Establish weighted inspection procedure focused on the nuclear powers and possibly their principal allies (e.g., in areas outside the nuclear powers and possibly their principal allies reduce the percentage of events inspected by a factor of 4 and undertake no inspections on a routine basis below 5 KT).

c) Increase the number of inspections substantially over the number previously contemplated by simplifying the inspection procedure and only undertaking exhaustive examinations when an initial survey indicated the possibility of suspicious activity.

This position has the advantage of not requiring the reopening of any of the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts; however, it clearly involves a greater risk that the Soviet Union might attempt clandestine tests than either Alternative No. 1 or No. 2. The extent to which such a system would in fact deter tests is a complex judgment which cannot be made on technical grounds alone.

Alternative No. 4—Permit Underground Testing Below a “Threshold”.

The present “Geneva” system as well as the modification of it suggested in Alternative No. 2 and No. 3 can clearly provide much more secure control of nuclear testing if underground tests are permitted below a “threshold” yield. This procedure would minimize the intangible factor of deterrence upon which a complete prohibition must ultimately rest. There is no unique “threshold” yield to associate with any of these systems. The level of the threshold might vary between 1 and 20 KT and would be set by the objects sought in negotiating an agreement and the amount of risk deemed “acceptable”. A 20 KT threshold would involve relatively little risk of violation but also would permit substantial weapon development and would provide little basis for inspection. A 5 KT threshold would involve greater risk of violation, assuming it was not subject to 100 percent inspection; however, it would permit less weapon development, probably would exclude “n”th power tests, and would provide the basis for extensive inspection. A 1 KT threshold would involve substantially greater risk since clearly only a small fraction of events in 1 to 5 KT range could be inspected; however, such a threshold would permit only limited weapon development in areas probably primarily of interest to U.S., would almost certainly exclude “n”th power tests, and would provide the basis for very extensive inspection.

Alternative No. 5—No Restrictions on Nuclear Tests.

A policy decision to avoid any agreement which would prohibit nuclear testing in any form would permit unrestricted weapon development and would accomplish none of the objectives of a test suspension. It would avoid the risk, considered substantial by some, that underground testing will in fact prove inadequate both for large yields and for diagnostic measurements at all yields.

Tab C

Letter From Vance to Herter

Washington, December 23, 1958

My dear Mr. Under Secretary:

The seismological results from the underground nuclear weapons tests conducted in Nevada during October show that the conclusions of the Conference of Experts on the possibility of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions require re-examination.

In fact, early analysis of these data show that the detection capability of the system for underground explosions probably is much less than was thought to be the case last summer. Therefore, the United States position on controlled test cessation may require reshaping to fit the new facts and the consideration of this possibility is urgent since the treaty Articles and Annex I already tabled by the Western delegations may need serious revision.

Therefore, the Atomic Energy Commission concludes that in the light of:

(1) the seriously limited capability of the control system proposed by the Conference of Experts based on present knowledge as applied to underground and very high altitude nuclear explosions;

(2) the adequacy of the Conference of Experts’ proposals for control of atmospheric testing;

(3) the fact that radioactive fallout is caused principally by atmospheric tests—the only type readily controllable at this time;

it should propose to you that the revised U.S. position should be:

(1) to adhere rigidly to the principle that control of any test cessation agreement is essential and that only those tests which are detectable and identifiable are to be prohibited by treaty. Under no conditions shall the relaxation of the requirements of the control system antecede policy changes regarding the scope of the tests being suspended.

(2) Negotiate as a first step, beginning at the appropriate time after the resumption of negotiations, a treaty for the cessation of atmospheric tests.

(3) To postpone for later negotiation a treaty applying to underground and outer space tests after further investigation of the technical problems involved in their detection. The U.S. should be willing to discuss these problems to the extent desired by Russia during current negotiations.

(4) To propose meanwhile international cooperation (with the Control Commission if established) in this investigation to the extent of conducting for the Commission necessary experiments and in making available to the Commission or other appropriate authority the results of national nuclear experiments whose results bear upon the detection and identification problems at issue.

(5) To preserve the right to develop non-military applications of nuclear explosives.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ H. S. Vance
Acting Chairman

1. Source: U.S. position in nuclear test suspension talks; Hardtack II data. Secret. 13 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/12–3058.