In response to your memorandum of November 26 to the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian, there has been prepared by
the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament the enclosed
“Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore”. This report
has the concurrence of this Department, the Department of Defense, the
Central Intelligence Agency and Dr. Killian’s office. Chairman McCone has indicated he will transmit
the comments of his agency in a separate memorandum.
Enclosure
Report by Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament
[Facsimile Page 2]
EVALUATION OF TEST SUSPENSION
PROPOSAL BY SENATOR GORE
Report by Interdepartmental Working
Group on Disarmament
On November 19, following a call on the President on November 17,
Senator Gore submitted a memorandum to the President outlining a
proposal for U.S. action on suspension of nuclear weapons tests.
This proposal calls for a new U.S. position at the Geneva Conference
on the Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests consisting of a
Presidential announcement of “unconditional and unilateral cessation
of all nuclear tests in the earth’s atmosphere” for perhaps three
years, a call for similar action by other nuclear powers, and a call
for the Geneva Conference to proceed immediately with negotiation of
a treaty for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.
[Typeset Page 1504]
Senator Gore’s proposal is based on the stated assumptions that:
- 1.
- Present U.S. goals at the Conference are
unattainable.
- 2.
- Nuclear testing to date has caused an “antisocial
contamination of the atmosphere” which has led to world-wide
fear of fall-out which is Russia’s most powerful propaganda
weapon against the United States.
- 3.
- Present detection systems are technically efficient in the
detection of atmospheric detonations.
The Working Group considers that the Gore proposal would not be a
sound position for the United States to take at this time. Although
the assumptions listed above are inaccurate, the proposal has some
elements which may be useful in developing a fall-back position in
the event that the current negotiations fail.
Comment on Assumptions. There is no reason to
believe at this time that U.S. objectives in the Conference are
unattainable. The basic U.S. objective is a two-fold one: to obtain
an agreement for suspension of nuclear tests under effective
international control, or to expose the unwillingness of the Soviet
Union to accept international control as the basis for failure to
reach agreement if this is the result of the Conference. It is not
possible at present to say that an agreement will not be reached
despite current unacceptable Soviet positions, since serious
negotiation has just commenced and the Soviet Union professes to
accept the report of the Geneva Experts on a control system. We
remain confident on the basis of discussion so far that, if the
Conference breaks down, the blame will clearly rest on the Soviet
Union.
[Facsimile Page 3]
While the Soviet Union has used fear of radioactive fallout as a
propaganda weapon, world-wide concern with nuclear testing is not
confined to this one aspect. The discontinuance of nuclear testing
is seen more and more as an important first step toward disarmament.
A proposal for anything less than stopping all nuclear weapons tests
would evoke an immediate Soviet charge that we were motivated
primarily by a desire to evade a suspension, and would not serve as
a basis for negotiation with the Soviet Union.
The present nuclear test detection system is not adequate for
monitoring atmospheric tests. The Geneva technical conference
clearly established the requirement for stations within the Soviet
Union if atmospheric bursts down to 1 kiloton are to be
detected.
The Gore Proposal as a U.S. Position Now. In
view of these considerations it would be undesirable for the United
States to advance the Gore proposals at this time. We would give the
Soviet Union an excuse to escape from showing its true position on
acceptance of international controls and it would be unlikely to
have major propaganda value. It would almost certainly lead to a
break in negotiations advantageous to the Soviet Union and would
thus remove such chance as there is of obtaining international
inspection within the Soviet Union. The USSR would accuse the U.S. of walking away from the
stated positions in mid-negotiation.
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The Gore Proposal as a Fall-Back Position. If
the present negotiations do break down, the United States may well
wish to announce a policy of moderation in future testing. Such
self-imposed moderation may be prudent since, even if the blame for
the break lies with the Soviet Union, increased pressure for a
cessation of tests can be expected to be directed against the U.S.
and the Soviet Union alike and unilateral U.S. action would cut the
ground under proposals to this effect.
Further study must be given to the proper course of action. It is not
clear at present that underground testing will permit satisfactory
diagnostic measurement, including yields, to meet all important
future test requirements. Testing in outer space will present even
greater and more complex diagnostic problems.
