In response to your memorandum of November 26 to the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian, there has been prepared by the Interdepartmental
Working Group on Disarmament the enclosed “Evaluation of Test Suspension
Proposal by Senator Gore”. This report has the concurrence of this
Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and
Dr. Killian’s office. Chairman McCone has indicated he will transmit the comments of his
agency in a separate memorandum.
Enclosure
Report by Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament
[Facsimile Page 2]
EVALUATION OF TEST SUSPENSION PROPOSAL BY
SENATOR GORE
Report by Interdepartmental Working Group
on Disarmament
On November 19, following a call on the President on November 17, Senator
Gore submitted a memorandum to the President outlining a proposal for
U.S. action on suspension of nuclear weapons tests. This proposal calls
for a new U.S. position at the Geneva Conference on the Suspension of
Nuclear Weapons Tests consisting of a Presidential announcement of
“unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the
earth’s atmosphere” for perhaps three years, a call for similar action
by other nuclear powers, and a call for the Geneva Conference to proceed
immediately with negotiation of a treaty for a permanent stoppage of
atmospheric tests.
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Senator Gore’s proposal is based on the stated assumptions that:
- 1.
- Present U.S. goals at the Conference are unattainable.
- 2.
- Nuclear testing to date has caused an “antisocial
contamination of the atmosphere” which has led to world-wide
fear of fall-out which is Russia’s most powerful propaganda
weapon against the United States.
- 3.
- Present detection systems are technically efficient in the
detection of atmospheric detonations.
The Working Group considers that the Gore proposal would not be a sound
position for the United States to take at this time. Although the
assumptions listed above are inaccurate, the proposal has some elements
which may be useful in developing a fall-back position in the event that
the current negotiations fail.
Comment on Assumptions. There is no reason to
believe at this time that U.S. objectives in the Conference are
unattainable. The basic U.S. objective is a two-fold one: to obtain an
agreement for suspension of nuclear tests under effective international
control, or to expose the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept
international control as the basis for failure to reach agreement if
this is the result of the Conference. It is not possible at present to
say that an agreement will not be reached despite current unacceptable
Soviet positions, since serious negotiation has just commenced and the
Soviet Union professes to accept the report of the Geneva Experts on a
control system. We remain confident on the basis of discussion so far
that, if the Conference breaks down, the blame will clearly rest on the
Soviet Union.
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While the Soviet Union has used fear of radioactive fallout as a
propaganda weapon, world-wide concern with nuclear testing is not
confined to this one aspect. The discontinuance of nuclear testing is
seen more and more as an important first step toward disarmament. A
proposal for anything less than stopping all nuclear weapons tests would
evoke an immediate Soviet charge that we were motivated primarily by a
desire to evade a suspension, and would not serve as a basis for
negotiation with the Soviet Union.
The present nuclear test detection system is not adequate for monitoring
atmospheric tests. The Geneva technical conference clearly established
the requirement for stations within the Soviet Union if atmospheric
bursts down to 1 kiloton are to be detected.
The Gore Proposal as a U.S. Position Now. In view
of these considerations it would be undesirable for the United States to
advance the Gore proposals at this time. We would give the Soviet Union
an excuse to escape from showing its true position on acceptance of
international controls and it would be unlikely to have major propaganda
value. It would almost certainly lead to a break in negotiations
advantageous to the Soviet Union and would thus remove such chance as
there is of obtaining international inspection within the Soviet Union.
The USSR would accuse the U.S. of
walking away from the stated positions in mid-negotiation.
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The Gore Proposal as a Fall-Back Position. If the
present negotiations do break down, the United States may well wish to
announce a policy of moderation in future testing. Such self-imposed
moderation may be prudent since, even if the blame for the break lies
with the Soviet Union, increased pressure for a cessation of tests can
be expected to be directed against the U.S. and the Soviet Union alike
and unilateral U.S. action would cut the ground under proposals to this
effect.
Further study must be given to the proper course of action. It is not
clear at present that underground testing will permit satisfactory
diagnostic measurement, including yields, to meet all important future
test requirements. Testing in outer space will present even greater and
more complex diagnostic problems.
