401. Memorandum From Herter to
Gray1
Washington, December 17,
1958
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore
In response to your memorandum of November 26, to the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian, there has been prepared by
the Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament the enclosed
“Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore”. This report
has the concurrence of this Department, the Department of Defense, the
Central Intelligence Agency and Dr. Killian’s office. Chairman McCone has indicated he will transmit
the comments of his agency in a separate memorandum.
/S/ Christian A.
Herter
Acting Secretary
Enclosure
Memorandum From Gray to Multiple Recipients
Washington,
November 26,
1958
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MEMORANDUM FOR
- Secretary of State
- Secretary of Defense
- Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- Director of Central Intelligence
- Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology
There is inclosed a copy of a memorandum prepared for the President
at his request, by Senator Albert Gore, which summarizes a
suggestion the Senator made to the President orally with respect to
current negotiations in Geneva on the suspension of nuclear weapons
tests.
The President, in requesting Senator Gore’s memorandum, assured him
that his suggestion would be given most careful evaluation. I have
been directed to obtain for the President a coordinated view to be
used in preparing a responsive reply by the President to the
Senator.
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In considering the Senator’s suggestion it should be borne in mind
that the proposal would involve a departure from existing U.S.
policy with respect to disarmament, in that it would completely
divorce the cessation of testing of nuclear weapons from other
disarmament measures.
The Senator advanced his suggestion to the President as one way to
meet the situation that would develop were the Soviet Union clearly
on the verge of breaking off the current negotiations in Geneva,
rather than as a substantive proposal to be made during the course
of the negotiations.
The President directs that special note be taken of the fact that the
proposal would permit the continuation of both underground tests and
tests in outer space, while ceasing only atmospheric tests for a
stated period, as for example, three years.
I will be in touch with your respective offices very shortly with a
view to determining a satisfactory and expeditious method of meeting
the President’s requirement.
Gordon
Gray
Special Assistant to the President
Enclosure
Memorandum From Gore to Eisenhower
[Facsimile Page 3]
In the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Tests, two essentials are
involved: (1) the moral and political position of the U.S. and, (2)
U.S. military strength vis-a-vis the Soviets.
The U.S. delegation would seem to be negotiating toward an
unattainable goal. If so, we must face the prospect of a failure of
the conference, for which we would suffer propaganda blame, or an
unfavorable agreement.
The Russians plainly seek to pressure the U.S. and the U.K. into
agreeing to stop all tests for all time without accepting effective
inspection. If they fail in this, they will seek to blame the U.S.
for failure of the conference. Soviet success in either respect
would be detrimental to U.S. interest.
Mounting fears of radioactive contamination of the air is Russia’s
most powerful propaganda weapon against us.
The U.S. can strengthen her moral and political position by seizing
the initiative to stop radioactive contamination of the world’s
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atmosphere. This can be done without the establishment of the
cumbersome, if not entirely impractical, system of inspection and
control proposed by the experts. Presently installed systems have
already demonstrated technical efficiency in detection of
atmospheric detonations.
It is respectfully suggested, therefore, that the President announce
the unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in
the earth’s atmosphere for a specific period, say three years, ask
similar action by other nuclear powers and suggest that the Geneva
Conference proceed immediately to negotiate a treaty among the
nuclear powers for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.
Thereafter, the conference can proceed to negotiate for the
discontinuance of other types of nuclear weapon tests—underground,
outer space and sub-oceanic—with an adequate system of inspection
and control, making the necessary exceptions for “threshold” and
space tests. Technicians have advised that it is possible to develop
improved low-yield weapons through underground tests and that it may
be possible to conduct tests beyond the earth’s atmosphere. The
argument for cessation of these types of tests is essentially an
argument for disarmament and can be considered as a part of the
whole involved problem of disarmament.
The course of action herein recommended has the possibility of
bringing three important advantages to the United States: (1) an
improvement of the moral and political position of the U.S. in the
world; (2) the drawing of a clear distinction between the
anti-social contamination of the atmosphere for which the United
States is being sorely blamed, on the one hand, and other types of
nuclear weapons tests, on the other; (3) possibly laying the
groundwork for a successful conference at Geneva, or, at least,
mitigating or saving the United States from blame for its
failure.
Since the conference evolved from the President’s pronouncement of
August 22, there is no way that the U.S. can be disassociated from
either the success or the failure of the conference. Our prestige
and responsibility are involved.
Moreover, one important forward step toward peace and international
cooperation might lead to others in our time.
