401. Memorandum From Herter to
Gray1
Washington, December 17,
1958
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Evaluation of Test Suspension Proposal by Senator Gore
In response to your memorandum of November 26, to the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian, there has been prepared by the Interdepartmental
Working Group on Disarmament the enclosed “Evaluation of Test Suspension
Proposal by Senator Gore”. This report has the concurrence of this
Department, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and
Dr. Killian’s office. Chairman McCone has indicated he will transmit the comments of his
agency in a separate memorandum.
/S/ Christian A.
Herter
Acting Secretary
Enclosure
Memorandum From Gray to Multiple Recipients
Washington, November 26,
1958
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MEMORANDUM FOR
- Secretary of State
- Secretary of Defense
- Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- Director of Central Intelligence
- Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology
There is inclosed a copy of a memorandum prepared for the President at
his request, by Senator Albert Gore, which summarizes a suggestion the
Senator made to the President orally with respect to current
negotiations in Geneva on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests.
The President, in requesting Senator Gore’s memorandum, assured him that
his suggestion would be given most careful evaluation. I have been
directed to obtain for the President a coordinated view to be used in
preparing a responsive reply by the President to the Senator.
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In considering the Senator’s suggestion it should be borne in mind that
the proposal would involve a departure from existing U.S. policy with
respect to disarmament, in that it would completely divorce the
cessation of testing of nuclear weapons from other disarmament
measures.
The Senator advanced his suggestion to the President as one way to meet
the situation that would develop were the Soviet Union clearly on the
verge of breaking off the current negotiations in Geneva, rather than as
a substantive proposal to be made during the course of the
negotiations.
The President directs that special note be taken of the fact that the
proposal would permit the continuation of both underground tests and
tests in outer space, while ceasing only atmospheric tests for a stated
period, as for example, three years.
I will be in touch with your respective offices very shortly with a view
to determining a satisfactory and expeditious method of meeting the
President’s requirement.
Gordon
Gray
Special Assistant to the President
Enclosure
Memorandum From Gore to Eisenhower
[Facsimile Page 3]
In the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Tests, two essentials are involved:
(1) the moral and political position of the U.S. and, (2) U.S. military
strength vis-a-vis the Soviets.
The U.S. delegation would seem to be negotiating toward an unattainable
goal. If so, we must face the prospect of a failure of the conference,
for which we would suffer propaganda blame, or an unfavorable
agreement.
The Russians plainly seek to pressure the U.S. and the U.K. into agreeing
to stop all tests for all time without accepting effective inspection.
If they fail in this, they will seek to blame the U.S. for failure of
the conference. Soviet success in either respect would be detrimental to
U.S. interest.
Mounting fears of radioactive contamination of the air is Russia’s most
powerful propaganda weapon against us.
The U.S. can strengthen her moral and political position by seizing the
initiative to stop radioactive contamination of the world’s
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atmosphere.
This can be done without the establishment of the cumbersome, if not
entirely impractical, system of inspection and control proposed by the
experts. Presently installed systems have already demonstrated technical
efficiency in detection of atmospheric detonations.
It is respectfully suggested, therefore, that the President announce the
unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the
earth’s atmosphere for a specific period, say three years, ask similar
action by other nuclear powers and suggest that the Geneva Conference
proceed immediately to negotiate a treaty among the nuclear powers for a
permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests.
Thereafter, the conference can proceed to negotiate for the
discontinuance of other types of nuclear weapon tests—underground, outer
space and sub-oceanic—with an adequate system of inspection and control,
making the necessary exceptions for “threshold” and space tests.
Technicians have advised that it is possible to develop improved
low-yield weapons through underground tests and that it may be possible
to conduct tests beyond the earth’s atmosphere. The argument for
cessation of these types of tests is essentially an argument for
disarmament and can be considered as a part of the whole involved
problem of disarmament.
The course of action herein recommended has the possibility of bringing
three important advantages to the United States: (1) an improvement of
the moral and political position of the U.S. in the world; (2) the
drawing of a clear distinction between the anti-social contamination of
the atmosphere for which the United States is being sorely blamed, on
the one hand, and other types of nuclear weapons tests, on the other;
(3) possibly laying the groundwork for a successful conference at
Geneva, or, at least, mitigating or saving the United States from blame
for its failure.
Since the conference evolved from the President’s pronouncement of August
22, there is no way that the U.S. can be disassociated from either the
success or the failure of the conference. Our prestige and
responsibility are involved.
Moreover, one important forward step toward peace and international
cooperation might lead to others in our time.
