Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

349. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, August 12, 1958, 10 a.m.

1. We discussed the prospective meeting of the General Assembly on the Near East and the President’s prospective participation. It was agreed that we would ask that the President should be the first speaker before credentials and like matters might be raised, and that if this could be arranged, the President would plan to speak at the opening, i.e., 10:30, Wednesday morning. It was agreed that after talking with Lodge I would phone the President. He said he would probably come up late in the day possibly for dinner and spend the night at the Waldorf.

With respect to the speech, it was felt that it was still about three pages too long. It was agreed that CD Jackson would attempt the revision and cutting while going to New York with me and that he would phone the revised text down to Mrs. Whitman. I pointed out the desirability of getting a definitive text in time for translation, duplication and circulation.

2. I noted that Bob Murphy would probably come to New York and report to me there en route to Washington.

3. I spoke of the Quemoy-Matsu situation and of the fact that it might be necessary to give a further warning to the Chicoms about this situation. I said that during the past four years the integration of these two islands into the Formosa-Penghu complex had been such that I doubted whether there could be an amputation without fatal consequences to Formosa itself. The President pointed out that this was not true from a military standpoint, and I indicated my agreement with that but did say that the connection from a political and psychological standpoint had become such that I thought now it would be quite dangerous to sit by while the Chicoms took Quemoy and Matsu. I said that I had the feeling that the Communist bloc might now be pushing all around the perimeter to see whether our resolution was weakened by the Soviet possession of nuclear missiles, but I felt confident that if it appeared that we were standing firm, then they would not take action that would risk precipitating a large-scale war.

The President indicated that I might say something along these lines with reference to Quemoy and Matsu at a press conference.

4. I said that another matter that was urgent was the reaching of a policy decision on nuclear testing. It seemed likely that there would be an agreement at Geneva and that coupled with the United Nations Commission Report made it urgent that we arrive at a new policy. I said that State was working actively with Defense and AEC on this subject and that I thought some split would develop which the President would have to resolve. The President said he was thinking in terms of a total suspension except of underground tests. I said I thought that the Defense Department would not like this because in a confined area some characteristics of the explosion could not be accurately estimated. The President said that he did not think that this should be a reason against limiting the test to underground areas.

I suggested to General Goodpaster that he try to arrange a restricted meeting of those directly interested as soon as I could be back in Washington. The President said he had already asked Goodpaster to plan for this.

5. I said I received his note about George Whitney, that he was a good personal friend of mine and I thought highly of him. I observed however that Mrs. Whitman had indicated his age somewhat exceeded the President’s estimate. I added however that I was not one who believed incapacity automatically came at 73.

John Foster Dulles

1. Source: Need to resolve nuclear testing policy; Quemoy and Matsu; U.N. session on Near East. Top Secret; Personal and Private. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.