348. Letters From Farley to
McCone, Quarles, and Allen Dulles1
Washington, August 7,
1958
Dear Mr. McCone:
[Facsimile Page 1]
At the request of Mr. Herter I am
sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. Policy on nuclear
testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments which we
believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited test
moratorium which is outlined in a memorandum which you recently left
with Secretary Dulles.
Mr. Herter’s office is now seeking a suitable time for an early meeting
to consider the various policy proposals, and how a Presidential
decision on nuclear testing policy can best be obtained.
Sincerely yours,
[Typeset Page 1399]
Washington,
August 7,
1958
Dear Mr. Quarles:
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At the request of Mr. Herter
I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. policy on
nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments
which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited
test moratorium which has been recently proposed by AEC Chairman McCone.
Mr. Herter’s office is now seeking a suitable time for an early
meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a
Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be
obtained.
Sincerely yours,
Washington,
August 7,
1958
Dear Mr. Dulles:
[Facsimile Page 3]
At the request of Mr. Herter
I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. policy on
nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments
which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited
test moratorium which has been recently proposed by AEC Chairman McCone.
Mr. Herter’s office is now seeking a suitable time for an early
meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a
Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be
obtained.
Sincerely yours,
[Typeset Page 1400]
Enclosure
Proposed Revision of NSC Policy
Paper on Disarmament
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5. a. All parties will agree, independently of agreement on other
provisions of section I,
(1) to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement, from
nuclear testing until 36 months thereafter. (The suspension would
not continue beyond a 12-month period unless satisfactory progress
was being made in the installation of the inspection system in (2)
below.)
(2) to cooperate in setting up during the first 24 months, or earlier
if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection
arrangement to monitor tests.
b. The U.S. will announce that it will resume nuclear tests at the
end of 36 months if agreement to an adequately inspected cut-off of
the procution of fissionable materials for weapons purposes has not
been achieved.
c. The U.S. will announce that it will refrain indefinitely from
nuclear tests if the monitoring system referred to in paragraph
5a(2) is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and
if the inspection system for the cut-off has been put into
effect.
d. The U.S. will announce that if tests are resumed, it will give
notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such
tests; provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and conduct such
tests underground.
e. Provision will be made for the continuation, under international
auspices, of any nuclear explosions necessary for the development of
peaceful application of such explosions.
Enclosure
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Proposed Policy on Nuclear Tests
Discussion:
1. We believe that with the Geneva talks approaching a conclusion,
early policy decisions must be taken on the question of nuclear
tests. Dr. Fisk, Ambassador
Thompson and Embassy
London have also expressed this view within the past week. In your
letter to Prime Minister Macmillan on June 13 you indicated that we hoped to
be able to approach the UK shortly
on this matter in the light of information developed in the Geneva
talks; and the UK reminded the
Department last week of its desire to discuss the question with us
upon conclusion
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of those talks. The approach of the United
Nations General Assembly, the release of the United Nations
Radiation Committee [report] scheduled for early August, and the
possibility of the question of tests arising indirectly in
connection with the proposed Special Security Council Session are
additional factors which demand consideration of this question.
2. On July 30 Chairman McCone
handed you a message sent to him by Commissioner Libby and Dr. Edward Teller (TAB B). The message
suggests that to avoid our being forced by public opinion into a
complete test cessation we might propose (1) to limit the offsite
fission fallout per year to one megaton equivalent each year
released by the U.S. and the same amount by the USSR, or alternately (2) to ban
completely offsite fallout and permit underground testing by
everyone.
3. While any measures which notably reduced fallout would lessen
public concern about the health hazards of continued testing, we
believe the AEC proposal is
insufficient from the political standpoint and that it has the
following specific disadvantages:
- (a)
- It would be viewed as a retreat from previous Western
proposals which have called for suspension of tests rather
than test limitations, and would seem an illogical sequel to
the Geneva talks directed toward methods for enforcement of
a possible test suspension.
- (b)
- It would not be accepted and hence would enable the USSR continue to exploit the
testing issue and its own unilateral suspension in
world-wide propaganda and to avoid the question of a
production cut-off by continuing to hide behind the issue of
a test suspension.
- (c)
- By the same token, it would be an easy way for the USSR to avoid the inspection
to which it has otherwise become largely committed as a
result of the Geneva talks.
- (d)
- It would not inhibit the development of nuclear weapons
capabilities by fourth countries, a problem which has been
of
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some concern to the U.S. and one which is of apparently
increasing concern to the USSR as well.
- (e)
- It would not have the effect of a test suspension in
freezing weapons development of the U.S. and USSR at a time when we retain
some important advantages in weapons technology (according
to technical studies prepared by the Science Advisory
Committee).
- (f)
- A limitation of fallout to a fixed amount would, according
to past technical consideration of similar limitation
proposals, be difficult to enforce by inspection.
4. The policy recommendations which you discussed in general terms
with the panel of disarmament advisors and approved for discussion
with other agencies in April, we believe, afford the best basis for
decisions at this time. In summary, the nuclear test proposal we
have discussed with the other agencies and revised in the light of
their comments, is the following: The nuclear provisions of our
present proposals (test suspension and cut-off) would be made
separable from the
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other elements of the package, but testing
would remain limited, as far as the U.S. is concerned, to the
cut-off which would become a condition subsequent. Nuclear tests
would be suspended for three years beginning as of the effective
date of the agreement.2 The
suspension would not continue beyond twelve months unless
satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the
inspection system. The U.S. would declare at the outset that testing
would be resumed if agreement on an adequestly inspected cut-off of
production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes had not
been reached at the end of three years. Conversely, we would
announce that the suspension would be extended for an indefinite
period if agreement is reached on the installation of a control
system to assure that no further fissionable material is proposed
for weapons purposes. The U.S. would announce that, if it became
necessary to resume testing, the U.S. would henceforth test only
underground.
5. This proposal would, we believe, turn to our advantage each of the
factors mentioned in paragraph 3 above which weigh against the
AEC proposal. It would be a
logical follow-up to the Geneva talks, deprive the Soviets of the
propaganda advantages of the testing issue, enable us to begin arms
inspection within the USSR,
inhibit fourth country programs, and could freeze our present
weapons advantage. It would, by removing the test issue, enable us
to place more effective emphasis in the nuclear cut-off as the
condition subsequent. Most important, it would be evidence of United
States willingness to go the “extra mile” to help achieve more
meaningful measures of disarmament and thus go far to counter the
image which is all too prevalent abroad of an overly militaristic
United States.
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6. Attached as TAB A is a proposed revision of the paragraph on
nuclear tests in present NSC policy
which would incorporate the changes recommended above. The other
disarmament policy recommendations discussed in the interim report
to the Cabinet Committee (TAB B) need not, in our view, be decided
until the studies on surprise attack now underway under the
leadership of Dr. Killian
have been completed.
