Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

348. Letters From Farley to McCone, Quarles, and Allen Dulles¹

Washington, August 7, 1958

Dear Mr. McCone:

At the request of Mr. Herter I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. Policy on nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited test moratorium which is outlined in a memorandum which you recently left with Secretary Dulles.

Mr. Herter’s office is now seeking a suitable time for an early meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be obtained.

Sincerely yours,

Philip J. Farley

Washington, August 7, 1958

Dear Mr. Quarles:

At the request of Mr. Herter I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. policy on nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited test moratorium which has been recently proposed by AEC Chairman McCone.

Mr. Herter’s office is now seeking a suitable time for an early meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be obtained.

Sincerely yours,

Philip J. Farley

Washington, August 7, 1958

Dear Mr. Dulles:

At the request of Mr. Herter I am sending herewith a proposed revision of present U.S. policy on nuclear testing, together with a brief explanation of the arguments which we believe make this proposed policy preferable to the limited test moratorium which has been recently proposed by AEC Chairman McCone.

Mr. Herter’s office is now seeking a suitable time for an early meeting to consider the various policy proposals, and how a Presidential decision on nuclear testing policy can best be obtained.

Sincerely yours,

Philip J. Farley

Enclosure

Proposed Revision of NSC Policy Paper on Disarmament

5. a. All parties will agree, independently of agreement on other provisions of section I,

(1) to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement, from nuclear testing until 36 months thereafter. (The suspension would not continue beyond a 12-month period unless satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the inspection system in (2) below.)

(2) to cooperate in setting up during the first 24 months, or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.

b. The U.S. will announce that it will resume nuclear tests at the end of 36 months if agreement to an adequately inspected cut-off of the procution of fissionable materials for weapons purposes has not been achieved.

c. The U.S. will announce that it will refrain indefinitely from nuclear tests if the monitoring system referred to in paragraph 5a(2) is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if the inspection system for the cut-off has been put into effect.

d. The U.S. will announce that if tests are resumed, it will give notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests; provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and conduct such tests underground.

e. Provision will be made for the continuation, under international auspices, of any nuclear explosions necessary for the development of peaceful application of such explosions.

Enclosure

Proposed Policy on Nuclear Tests

Discussion:

1. We believe that with the Geneva talks approaching a conclusion, early policy decisions must be taken on the question of nuclear tests. Dr. Fisk, Ambassador Thompson and Embassy London have also expressed this view within the past week. In your letter to Prime Minister Macmillan on June 13 you indicated that we hoped to be able to approach the UK shortly on this matter in the light of information developed in the Geneva talks; and the UK reminded the Department last week of its desire to discuss the question with us upon conclusion of those talks. The approach of the United Nations General Assembly, the release of the United Nations Radiation Committee [report] scheduled for early August, and the possibility of the question of tests arising indirectly in connection with the proposed Special Security Council Session are additional factors which demand consideration of this question.

2. On July 30 Chairman McCone handed you a message sent to him by Commissioner Libby and Dr. Edward Teller (TAB B). The message suggests that to avoid our being forced by public opinion into a complete test cessation we might propose (1) to limit the offsite fission fallout per year to one megaton equivalent each year released by the U.S. and the same amount by the USSR, or alternately (2) to ban completely offsite fallout and permit underground testing by everyone.

3. While any measures which notably reduced fallout would lessen public concern about the health hazards of continued testing, we believe the AEC proposal is insufficient from the political standpoint and that it has the following specific disadvantages:

(a) It would be viewed as a retreat from previous Western proposals which have called for suspension of tests rather than test limitations, and would seem an illogical sequel to the Geneva talks directed toward methods for enforcement of a possible test suspension.

(b) It would not be accepted and hence would enable the USSR continue to exploit the testing issue and its own unilateral suspension in world-wide propaganda and to avoid the question of a production cut-off by continuing to hide behind the issue of a test suspension.

(c) By the same token, it would be an easy way for the USSR to avoid the inspection to which it has otherwise become largely committed as a result of the Geneva talks.

(d) It would not inhibit the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by fourth countries, a problem which has been of some concern to the U.S. and one which is of apparently increasing concern to the USSR as well.

(e) It would not have the effect of a test suspension in freezing weapons development of the U.S. and USSR at a time when we retain some important advantages in weapons technology (according to technical studies prepared by the Science Advisory Committee).

(f) A limitation of fallout to a fixed amount would, according to past technical consideration of similar limitation proposals, be difficult to enforce by inspection.

4. The policy recommendations which you discussed in general terms with the panel of disarmament advisors and approved for discussion with other agencies in April, we believe, afford the best basis for decisions at this time. In summary, the nuclear test proposal we have discussed with the other agencies and revised in the light of their comments, is the following: The nuclear provisions of our present proposals (test suspension and cut-off) would be made separable from the other elements of the package, but testing would remain limited, as far as the U.S. is concerned, to the cut-off which would become a condition subsequent. Nuclear tests would be suspended for three years beginning as of the effective date of the agreement.² The suspension would not continue beyond twelve months unless satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the inspection system. The U.S. would declare at the outset that testing would be resumed if agreement on an adequestly inspected cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes had not been reached at the end of three years. Conversely, we would announce that the suspension would be extended for an indefinite period if agreement is reached on the installation of a control system to assure that no further fissionable material is proposed for weapons purposes. The U.S. would announce that, if it became necessary to resume testing, the U.S. would henceforth test only underground.

5. This proposal would, we believe, turn to our advantage each of the factors mentioned in paragraph 3 above which weigh against the AEC proposal. It would be a logical follow-up to the Geneva talks, deprive the Soviets of the propaganda advantages of the testing issue, enable us to begin arms inspection within the USSR, inhibit fourth country programs, and could freeze our present weapons advantage. It would, by removing the test issue, enable us to place more effective emphasis in the nuclear cut-off as the condition subsequent. Most important, it would be evidence of United States willingness to go the “extra mile” to help achieve more meaningful measures of disarmament and thus go far to counter the image which is all too prevalent abroad of an overly militaristic United States.

6. Attached as TAB A is a proposed revision of the paragraph on nuclear tests in present NSC policy which would incorporate the changes recommended above. The other disarmament policy recommendations discussed in the interim report to the Cabinet Committee (TAB B) need not, in our view, be decided until the studies on surprise attack now underway under the leadership of Dr. Killian have been completed.

1. Source: Transmits a proposed revision of U.S. nuclear testing policy. Secret. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–758.
2. A three-year period is a minimum for a meaningful inspected agreement since from 18 to 24 months will be required for installing the inspection system. [Footnote is in the original.]