Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

347. Memorandum From Killian to Herter¹

Washington, August 6, 1958

I read with great interest your letter of August 5, together with a staff paper proposing a suggested revision of our policy on nuclear testing. As you know, I have also had from John McCone a description of the proposal under consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission for a limited test moratorium.

First of all, let me note that the recommendation that there be a group brought together, as suggested in your staff paper, to discuss the nuclear provisions of U.S. disarmament policy, is desirable. I would raise this point with respect to what your staff paper suggests: Will it not at some point be necessary to have these proposals formally considered by the National Security Council? Should not the procedure be determined by the President?

I do not feel it possible to reach a conclusion on either the test cessation proposals in the State Department staff paper or in the memorandum from the Atomic Energy Commission without first being clear on certain national policy objectives. I think, in other words, that the specific suggestions in regard to test cessation or a limited test agreement must be appraised in the light of national policy.

If our national policy objective is to ease tensions or if this policy calls for freezing the Soviet nuclear capability at its present level or if our objective is to move in the direction of an agreed cessation of production of nuclear materials, then it seems that we would tend in our conclusions about nuclear test cessation to lean in the direction of the State Department’s paper.

If, however, our national policy objectives provide for uninterrupted research and development to achieve every possible military refinement in nuclear weapons, while meeting at least partially the public clamor for reduction of fallout without at the same time stopping tests, then clearly a test moratorium might take the form of that under consideration by the Atomic Energy Commission.

It seems to me, then, that these basic issues must be discussed in order to reach conclusions about a specific form of test moratorium. There are other considerations affecting the selection of a specific plan: One of these is the value to the United States of having an inspection system in operation which would involve a massive penetration of the Iron Curtain and consequent benefits in intelligence and exchange of information. Another such consideration is whether we want to give the Russians further opportunity to renounce their announced test cessation policy.

Without guidance with respect to these matters, I would personally at this stage find it very difficult to take any position with regard to one plan in contrast with the other.

J.R. Killian, Jr.

1. Source: Need for basic policy decision before deciding between test cessation or limitation. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–658.