306. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC1
Washington, March 28,
1958
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement
REFERENCE
The Report on the subject,2 called for by NSC Action No. 1840–c–(2), has been
prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc Panel
established by the reference NSC Action
(consisting of representatives of the President’s Science Advisory
Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
Central Intelligence Agency), and will be presented orally at the National
Security Council meeting on Thursday, April 3, 1958.
Because of the sensitivity of this Report, copies have been circulated only
to those agencies represented on the NSC Ad
Hoc Panel and to the Department of State. A copy of the Report is available,
in the office of the Executive Secretary, NSC, for reference by other regular participant members of the
Council.
James S. Lay,
Jr.
Executive Secretary
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cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
Enclosure
Memorandum From Killian to
Gray
Washington, March 28,
1958
[Facsimile Page 2]
SUBJECT
In accordance with Action No. 1840 of the National Security Council, as
approved by the President on January 9, 1958, I submit herewith “a study
to cover the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range
rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out for peaceful
purposes (such as the launching of scientific reconnaissance vehicles).”
This report has been prepared by an Ad Hoc Working Group of the
President’s Science Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence
Agency. The Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed to the membership of this
Working Group and the Department of Defense did not, itself, nominate
additional representatives.
The Ad Hoc Working Group did not consider whether a missile test
prohibition agreement could be enforced by the inspection of missile
production, operational launching sites or the nuclear aspects of the
problem. These questions were felt to be outside of the area of
competence of the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group.
The Ad Hoc Working Group, in preparing this report, limited itself to the
technical factors involved. It excluded from its consideration any
question of policy with respect to whether there should be a rocket test
agreement. In accord with its directive, it also excluded from its
consideration the military implications of a test suspension on the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R.
This report is submitted for the consideration of the Council at its
meeting on April 3, 1958.
- /s/ J.R.
Killian, Jr.
Chairman
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Attachment
Report Prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc
Working Group
Washington, March 26,
1958
[Facsimile Page 3]
REPORT OF THE NSC AD
HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE MONITORING OF LONG-RANGE ROCKET TEST
AGREEMENT
In response to the action taken by the National Security Council meeting
on January 6, 1958, an ad hoc working group of the President’s Science
Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency has undertaken a
study of “the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range
rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out for peaceful
purposes.”
On the basis of technical presentations and discussions at its initial
meeting on 13 March 1958, the working group arrived at the conclusions
set forth below. For the purpose of this study, the working group
considered “long-range” rockets to include the IRBM, ICBM, and vehicles
capable of orbiting satellites for either military or peaceful purposes.
No attempt was made to establish an exact definition for “peaceful
purposes.” However, it was assumed that rockets for the delivery of
nuclear or other warheads [text not declassified]
are not for “peaceful purposes.”
CONCLUSIONS
1. The remote detection of long-range rockets, which are fired from any
point in the Soviet bloc and which leave the atmosphere, could be made
almost certain by a monitoring system employing an expansion of the
present intelligence detection systems at locations outside the Soviet
bloc and new techniques now under development. [text
not declassified]
2. The detection of long-range rockets, which are fired anywhere in the
Soviet bloc from either known or unknown launching sites and which leave
the atmosphere, could be further improved by a monitoring system which
included suitably placed stations [text not
declassified] however, such stations may actually not be
required to provide certainty of detection.
3. The above mentioned detection techniques may not be capable of
discriminating in all cases between “long-range” rockets and other large
rockets which leave the atmosphere, such as short-range military
ballistic missiles and certain types of AICBM’s. For this reason the
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remainder of the conclusions are
stated in terms of “large rockets which leave the atmosphere.” It must
be recognized that the definition
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of “long range” or “large” rockets
would have to be very carefully considered in the preparation of any
type of agreement in this field.
4. Although an agreement to exchange advance flight schedule information
on large rockets leaving the atmosphere could be monitored, it would not
be possible to distinguish with any degree of confidence between a large
rocket fired as a part of a military program and one fired for “peaceful
purposes” [text not declassified].
5. In view of the inherent similarity of the technical problems involved
in [text not declassified].
6. Even though inspectors stationed at authorized launching sites were
empowered to undertake an inspection of the assembled rocket prior to
the launching as part of an agreement limiting large rocket tests to
“peaceful purposes,” it would not be possible to assure that the tests
would not contribute most if not all of the essential data for the
development of a military ballistic missile program as well as
operational experience for military personnel.
7. A complete prohibition of the launching of all large rockets leaving
the atmosphere, including those intended for “peaceful use,” could be
fully monitored and would freeze the development of ballistic missiles
and space vehicles near their present status and would prevent their use
for “peaceful purposes.”
8. An agreement, prohibiting all national large
rocket testing and establishing either an international or joint
US-Soviet agency to plan and execute all rocket
firings for “peaceful uses” of space would still provide the nations
participating in the agency with some information pertinent to military
missile development. However, such an agreement could probably be
designed in a manner which would limit the rate of accumulation of this
information to a rather low level.
[Facsimile Page 5]
9. Although an agreement which established an international or joint
US-Soviet agency to plan all rocket launchings for “peaceful uses” of
space without prohibiting other national tests would not have direct
effect on the capability of participating nations to develop military
missiles, such an agreement might have desirable features in developing
international cooperation and might contribute to a reduction of
international rivalry in the missile field. [text not
declassified] The advantage of such an agreement would be
increased if the rocket launchings were carried out by the agency.
10. An agreement to prohibit all nationally
conducted large rocket tests would not prevent the USSR from building up an operational
military missile force, if the USSR
had already developed an ICBM
capability as of the time of such an agreement. The maintenance and
expansion of this capability by the USSR could only be prevented by the prohibition of the
retention or manufacture of ballistic missiles or nuclear warheads. The
panel did not consider whether, in fact, such a
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missile prohibition agreement
could be enforced by the inspection of missile production, operational
launching sites, and other techniques or the nuclear aspects of the
problem. A military missile force built up under these conditions,
without the opportunity for quality control tests and military training
tests, would deteriorate with time and cease to the instantly
available.
- Robert F.
Bacher
- Lawrence A.
Hyland
- James W.
McRae
- Col. John A.
White
- George B.
Kistiakowsky,
Chairman
