306. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC1
Washington, March 28,
1958
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SUBJECT
- Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement
REFERENCE
The Report on the subject,2 called for by NSC Action No. 1840–c–(2), has been prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc Panel established by the reference NSC Action (consisting of representatives
of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, the Department of
Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence
Agency), and will be presented orally at the National Security Council
meeting on Thursday, April 3, 1958.
Because of the sensitivity of this Report, copies have been circulated
only to those agencies represented on the NSC Ad Hoc Panel and to the Department of State. A copy of
the Report is available, in the office of the Executive Secretary,
NSC, for reference by other regular
participant members of the Council.
James S. Lay,
Jr.
Executive Secretary
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cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
Enclosure
Memorandum From Killian to
Gray
Washington,
March 28,
1958
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SUBJECT
In accordance with Action No. 1840 of the National Security Council,
as approved by the President on January 9, 1958, I submit herewith
“a study to cover the technical factors involved in monitoring a
long-range rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out
for peaceful purposes (such as the launching of scientific
reconnaissance vehicles).” This report has been prepared by an Ad
Hoc Working Group of the President’s Science Advisory Committee and
the Central Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
agreed to the membership of this Working Group and the Department of
Defense did not, itself, nominate additional representatives.
The Ad Hoc Working Group did not consider whether a missile test
prohibition agreement could be enforced by the inspection of missile
production, operational launching sites or the nuclear aspects of
the problem. These questions were felt to be outside of the area of
competence of the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group.
The Ad Hoc Working Group, in preparing this report, limited itself to
the technical factors involved. It excluded from its consideration
any question of policy with respect to whether there should be a
rocket test agreement. In accord with its directive, it also
excluded from its consideration the military implications of a test
suspension on the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
This report is submitted for the consideration of the Council at its
meeting on April 3, 1958.
- /s/
J.R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman
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Attachment
Report Prepared by the NSC Ad Hoc
Working Group
Washington,
March 26,
1958
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REPORT OF THE NSC
AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE MONITORING OF LONG-RANGE ROCKET TEST
AGREEMENT
In response to the action taken by the National Security Council
meeting on January 6, 1958, an ad hoc working group of the
President’s Science Advisory Committee and the Central Intelligence
Agency has undertaken a study of “the technical factors involved in
monitoring a long-range rocket test agreement to assure that it is
carried out for peaceful purposes.”
On the basis of technical presentations and discussions at its
initial meeting on 13 March 1958, the working group arrived at the
conclusions set forth below. For the purpose of this study, the
working group considered “long-range” rockets to include the IRBM, ICBM, and vehicles capable of orbiting satellites for
either military or peaceful purposes. No attempt was made to
establish an exact definition for “peaceful purposes.” However, it
was assumed that rockets for the delivery of nuclear or other
warheads [text not declassified] are not for
“peaceful purposes.”
CONCLUSIONS
1. The remote detection of long-range rockets, which are fired from
any point in the Soviet bloc and which leave the atmosphere, could
be made almost certain by a monitoring system employing an expansion
of the present intelligence detection systems at locations outside
the Soviet bloc and new techniques now under development. [text not declassified]
2. The detection of long-range rockets, which are fired anywhere in
the Soviet bloc from either known or unknown launching sites and
which leave the atmosphere, could be further improved by a
monitoring system which included suitably placed stations [text not declassified] however, such stations
may actually not be required to provide certainty of detection.
3. The above mentioned detection techniques may not be capable of
discriminating in all cases between “long-range” rockets and other
large rockets which leave the atmosphere, such as short-range
military ballistic missiles and certain types of AICBM’s. For this reason the
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remainder
of the conclusions are stated in terms of “large rockets which leave
the atmosphere.” It must be recognized that the definition
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of “long
range” or “large” rockets would have to be very carefully considered
in the preparation of any type of agreement in this field.
4. Although an agreement to exchange advance flight schedule
information on large rockets leaving the atmosphere could be
monitored, it would not be possible to distinguish with any degree
of confidence between a large rocket fired as a part of a military
program and one fired for “peaceful purposes” [text not declassified].
5. In view of the inherent similarity of the technical problems
involved in [text not declassified].
6. Even though inspectors stationed at authorized launching sites
were empowered to undertake an inspection of the assembled rocket
prior to the launching as part of an agreement limiting large rocket
tests to “peaceful purposes,” it would not be possible to assure
that the tests would not contribute most if not all of the essential
data for the development of a military ballistic missile program as
well as operational experience for military personnel.
7. A complete prohibition of the launching of all large rockets
leaving the atmosphere, including those intended for “peaceful use,”
could be fully monitored and would freeze the development of
ballistic missiles and space vehicles near their present status and
would prevent their use for “peaceful purposes.”
8. An agreement, prohibiting all national
large rocket testing and establishing either an international or
joint US-Soviet agency to plan and execute
all rocket firings for “peaceful uses” of space would still provide
the nations participating in the agency with some information
pertinent to military missile development. However, such an
agreement could probably be designed in a manner which would limit
the rate of accumulation of this information to a rather low
level.
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9. Although an agreement which established an international or joint
US-Soviet agency to plan all rocket launchings for “peaceful uses”
of space without prohibiting other national tests would not have
direct effect on the capability of participating nations to develop
military missiles, such an agreement might have desirable features
in developing international cooperation and might contribute to a
reduction of international rivalry in the missile field. [text not declassified] The advantage of such
an agreement would be increased if the rocket launchings were
carried out by the agency.
10. An agreement to prohibit all nationally
conducted large rocket tests would not prevent the USSR from building up an operational
military missile force, if the USSR had already developed an ICBM capability as of the time of such an agreement.
The maintenance and expansion of this capability by the USSR could only be prevented by the
prohibition of the retention or manufacture of ballistic missiles or
nuclear warheads. The panel did not consider whether, in fact, such
a
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missile
prohibition agreement could be enforced by the inspection of missile
production, operational launching sites, and other techniques or the
nuclear aspects of the problem. A military missile force built up
under these conditions, without the opportunity for quality control
tests and military training tests, would deteriorate with time and
cease to the instantly available.
- Robert
F. Bacher
- Lawrence A.
Hyland
- James
W. McRae
- Col. John A.
White
- George
B. Kistiakowsky,
Chairman
