The enclosed memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
transmitting the views of the Department of Defense and of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on the subject, is circulated herewith for the
information of the National Security Council in connection with its
discussion of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, April 3, 1958.
cc: The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
Enclosure
Memorandum From Quarles to
Cutler
Washington,
April 1,
1958
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SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments
REFERENCE
- NSC Action No. 1840, 6
January 1958
Pursuant to the above reference designated representatives of the
Department of Defense have participated in the discussions and
findings of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation, established
by the Science Advisory Committee to report on the studies called
for in paragraph 1c(1), (a), (b), and (c). In addition, at the
request of the Panel, the Department of Defense submitted its views
on those aspects of the technical studies related to the military
losses to the U.S. and the USSR
consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future
dates. The Department’s views are contained in the attached
memorandum of March 21, 1958, which also forwarded the views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed to the Secretary of Defense in
the memorandum of March 13, 1958. The Chairman of the Panel now
informs me that the views expressed therein relate, in part, to
matters outside the scope of the technical studies made by the
Panel, and, therefore, that these views have not been considered by
the Panel and will not be appended to the report as originally
contemplated. Accordingly, it is requested that the attached
memorandum be circulated for NSC
consideration in connection with the report to be submitted by the
Ad Hoc Panel of the Science Advisory Committee.
Attachment
Memorandum From Quarles to
the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation
(Kistiakowsky)
Washington,
March 21,
1958
[Facsimile Page 3]
SUBJECT
- The Effects of a Total Suspension or Cessation of Nuclear
Testing
Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1840, 6
January 1958, representatives of the Department of Defense have
participated in the discussions of your Panel concerning the
technical feasibility of monitoring a nuclear weapons tests
suspension and the predicted technological status of the United
States and the USSR with respect
to the development of nuclear weapons, assuming a total suspension
of nuclear tests as of 1 September 1958. Documents prepared by the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency
portraying the predicted position of the United States and the
USSR, respectively, have been
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their views relative to
the military impact of cessation of testing are transmitted
herewith.
The reports of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central
Intelligence Agency are accepted as reasonable and satisfactory
estimates of the technological positions of the United States and
the USSR, with the understanding
that events of the near future may necessitate significant revisions
of these estimates. Broadly stated, the estimates indicate that at
present and also as of the end of 1958, the United States possesses
an advantage in yield versus weight ratios, in flexibility of
applications, in the economy of use of special nuclear materials and
possibly in knowledge of weapons effects of a specialized
nature.
It is reasonable to assume that with the continuation of testing the
gap will be narrowed and that both nations may be expected to attain
the practicable limits of nuclear weapon development as these limits
can be foreseen at this time. It is equally reasonable to assume
that in the absence of testing the gap will likewise be narrowed but
at a slower rate which will be governed by a number of factors over
which the
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United States can exercise little or no control, such as stepped up
espionage, ingenuity in devising partial substitutes for testing,
and the extent to which the Soviets may be willing to accept the
risks of clandestine testing as well as the risks of a lower
probability of achieving desired performance characteristics. The
achievement of technological parity as regards the practicable
limits of nuclear weapons development as now foreseen with and
without continuation of testing appears, therefore, to be a matter
of time differential only, with the United States holding an
advantage for an indeterminate period in either case.
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Concerning developments in the nature of “break-throughs,” that is,
beyond presently foreseen practicable limits, both parties will be
inhibited by a test cessation and the advantage will lie with the
nation which is able to maintain the higher level of effort and
interest in nuclear weapon research and development, the security
with which it guards its findings, and the risk it is willing to
accept in the conduct of clandestine test operations or its attitude
toward the abrogation of treaties.
Relative technological status of nuclear weapons development at the
moment and for the foreseeable future is not an adequate index of
relative military posture. Consequently, an assumption that the
future improvement of weapons designs and the knowledge of weapons
effects to be gained from nuclear testing is more important to the
Soviets than to the United States is untenable. Within the time
available for the submission of the Defense Department’s views on
the subject matter set forth in NSC
1840, it has not been possible to prepare, on the basis of material
submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central
Intelligence Agency a system-by-system comparison which the Panel
has indicated to be desirable in order to appraise the relative
impact of test cessation on the military postures of the Free World
and the Soviet Bloc. With the rapidly changing weapon development
scene it is highly questionable whether such an appraisal would be
valid even for a brief period.
As pointed out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cessation of testing as
of the date under consideration will find a number of important U.S.
research and development programs aborted or drastically limited:
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- (a)
- The study of effects at ultra high altitudes essential to
the design of effective anti-ICBM and other systems involving outer space,
including the warheads, the delivery means, countermeasures
and counter-countermeasures;
- (b)
- Second generations of IRBM’s, ICBM’s and Fleet Ballistic Missiles designed to
drastically reduce overall systems costs and reaction
times;
- (c)
- Economical designs of warheads for highly mobile systems
for the support of battle groups and for air defense;
- (d)
- Clean weapons in the middle and lower range yields;
- (e)
- Weapons which combine absolute nuclear safing with safety
from predetonation.
With respect to Items (a) and (b) above, the facts are:
- (a)
- That the USSR possesses
a recognized long range missile capability and that
following the conclusion of the HARDTACK test program the
United States will still not be fully assured of the design
of an effective anti-ICBM
system to include adequate knowledge of weapon effects at
ultra high altitudes and the essential characteristics of
the nuclear warheads required.
- (b)
- Since the deterrent capability of U.S. long and medium
range missile systems is compromised by the Soviets’ ability
to adopt the initiative, the retaliatory threat of these
systems should be maintained at the highest feasible level
through further warhead development, improved readiness and,
if necessary, by greater dispersion and larger
numbers.
It is the Department’s view that until these two requirements are
adequately and assuredly met through necessary test programs, the
United States should not enter into a test cessation agreement
unless it is a part of a broader agreement which offers very large
compensating advantages.
In considering the inability of the United States to pursue Items
(c), (d) and (e) as listed above, it appears necessary to give
adequate weight
[Facsimile Page 6]
to political, psychological and economic
factors which are certainly not of equal importance to the United
States and the USSR. While broadly
speaking these factors are outside the area of direct military
responsibility, they have a distinct and important bearing on the
total Free World military posture. The problems of world wide
dispersion of nuclear weapons for potential use by and support of
friendly forces and the occupation of foreign bases by U.S. forces
possessing a nuclear weapon capability affect not only quantitative
requirements but also design features maximizing safety in handling
and simplicity of maintenance. On a broader basis, concepts
developed in the interests of political solidarity of the Free World
which would place restrictions or restraints on the use of nuclear
weapons by reason of geographical, psychological or moral
considerations, may require the conduct of nuclear operations under
conditions which the Department of Defense could not meet without
the further developments indicated above. While the Department of
Defense does not necessarily indorse limited war concepts which
would place restraints on the types of nuclear weapons which may be
used and the targets which may be attacked, it is my view that it
would be a serious disadvantage for the United States to enter into
a test cessation agreement which would block it from further
tactical weapon developments of the type indicated by (c) and (d)
above.
As regards the inability or time lag attributed to the Soviets in
achieving a position equivalent to or approaching that of the United
States, it should be obvious that as long as quantitative aspects of
nuclear weapons and both quantitative and qualitative aspects of
other weapons and delivery systems remain uncontrolled, efforts will
be made by both sides to compensate for failures to attain
practicable and desirable objectives in nuclear weapons designs by
improving delivery systems, maintaining larger forces or by other
means. For example: The Soviets’ assumed inability by reason of a
test suspension to achieve an ICBM
warhead of yield equivalent to ours does not deny them the
capability of an equally effective ICBM system through the development of
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larger payload
capacity, improved accuracy of delivery and/or reliance on larger
quantities.
It is in the light of the above considerations that I find myself in
general agreement with the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
in its overall long range effects a test cessation will operate to
the distinct disadvantage of the United States. If such a test
cessation
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is a positive and integral part of more comprehensive measures which
deal with the stabilization and reduction of nuclear weapons
stockpiles, the prevention of surprise attack and the regulation of
armaments and armed forces, the military disadvantage of test
cessation becomes acceptable in the light of these major objectives.
In any case, the United States should not become a party to a test
cessation agreement which would prohibit the conduct of tests of
yields, in environments and under conditions which the agreed and
implemented control system would be unable to monitor satisfactorily
as to detection, identification and responsibility.
Enclosure:
Memo for SecDef frm JCS,
13 Mar 58, w/Appendix
