It is recommended that, if the enclosed statement of policy is adopted, it be
submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it;
direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government; and direct that the departments and
agencies indicated in the table on “Primary Responsibilities for
Implementation” (with the exception of the Department of State and the
Central Intelligence Agency) report, in a special annex to their respective
annual statue reports, on progress in implementing the appropriate
paragraphs of the approved paper.
The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted and approved, is intended to
supersede NSC 5802/1.
Enclosure
[Facsimile Page 2]
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL
DEFENSE
Table of Contents
- Primary Responsibilities for Implementation
- Introduction
- Objectives
- Major Policy Guidance
- Relative Emphasis
- Time Phasing
- International Collaboration and Coordination
- Warning
- Military Functions
- Active Defense
- Passive Defense
- Response to Attack or Attack Warning
- Alert Status of Air Defense Forces
- Emergency Employment of Military Resources in
Civil Defense
- Research and Development
- Civilian Functions
- Continuity of Essential Wartime Functions of the
Federal Government
- Protection and Dispersal of Federal
Facilities
- Civil Defense
- Internal Security
- Port Security
[Typeset Page 1178]
[Facsimile Page 3]
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
| Paragraph and Subject |
Primary Responsibility |
| 9—International Collaboration and Coordination |
State in Collaboration with Defense |
10—Strategic Warning
All except 2nd, 3rd and 4th
sentences
2nd, 3rd and 4th sentences |
Intelligence agencies under DCI coordination within existing
law and established policy
All appropriate agencies |
| 11—Tactical Warning |
Defense |
| 12—Active Defense |
Defense |
| 13—Passive Defense |
Defense |
| 14—Response to Attack or Attack warning |
Defense in collaboration with OCDM |
| 15—Alert Status of Air Defense Forces |
Defense |
| 16—Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil
Defense |
Defense in collaboration with OCDM |
| 17—Research and Development |
All appropriate agencies |
| 18—Continuity of Government |
OCDM in collaboration with
all participating agencies |
| 19—Protection and Dispersal of Federal Facilities |
OCDM in collaboration with
all participating agencies |
| 20–26—Civil Defense |
OCDM |
| 27–32—Internal Security |
IIC and ICIS coordination |
| 33—Port Security |
Treasury, keeping IIC and ICIS fully informed |
[Facsimile Page 4]
DRAFT STATEMENT of
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL
DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
1. This statement of policy on “Continental Defense” does not encompass
all elements of U.S. or allied strength contributing to the defense of
North America. Only those U.S. policies are included which are
essentially defensive in nature; i.e., which contribute directly to the
defense of the North American Continent and to the protection of that
element of our retaliatory capability based on the North American
Continent.
[Typeset Page 1179]
2. The defense of the United States is an integrated complex of offensive
and defensive elements and of military and non-military measures. Each
of these has its proper role in deterring an attack or in the defense of
the United States should an attack occur. An effective continental
defense system will constitute one of the key deterrents to an attack on
the North American Continent.
3. Current national intelligence estimates indicate that Soviet delivery
systems are changing importantly in character, and imply the following
periods:2
[Facsimile Page 5]
- a.
- The period is drawing to an end when the primary element in
the threat to the United States is manned bombers.
- b.
- The period of the early 1960’s will represent a transition
from a largely bomber threat to one mainly composed of ICBM’s. In the early 1960’s the
estimated Soviet ICBM force
will present an extremely dangerous threat to SAC bomber bases, unhardened
ICBM sites and command
installations.
- c.
- In a few years, therefore, the principal element of the threat
to the United States will be ICBM’s supplemented by BISON heavy bombers and
possibly by some refueled or one-way medium bombers, by
increased numbers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and
possibly by cruise-type missiles.
4. The changing character of the Soviet threat and our current assessment
of the relative effectiveness of various active and passive defense
measures3 have made it necessary that
the United States re-examine its military and non-military programs for
continental defense. [In particular,
[Facsimile Page 6]
national planning must recognize
that, barring a technological breakthrough, the development and
deployment of an adequate AICBM
system during the 1960’s is questionable.]4
OBJECTIVES
5. a. To protect and preserve a retaliatory
capability of such force and certainty as to constitute a strong and
credible deterrent against attack on the North American Continent.
b. To limit the damage to our civil and military
strength which would occur in the event of attack, in order to ensure
the survival of
[Typeset Page 1180]
the nation and to pursue the ensuing hostilities to the most
favorable possible conclusion.
MAJOR POLICY GUIDANCE
Relative Emphasis
6. Predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to
strengthen and protect our nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent.
[Facsimile Page 7]
| MAJORITY |
BUDGET-JCS |
7. As long as the manned bomber threat continues to be of
significant proportions, continue measures to maintain our
active defenses against manned aircraft. However, in view of
the increasing reliance of the USSR on ballistic missiles for
inter-continental attack and the present limitations of
achievable active defense measures the U.S. should:
a. While pursuing measures to achieve
adequate active defenses, make a particular effort to
exploit passive measures that will afford the requisite
degree
[Facsimile Page 8]
of protection to our retaliatory power
and to relate elements, including communications and
command.
b. Give increased attention to
measures for the passive defense of the U.S.
population. |
7. Continued reliance will be placed on a balance of active
and passive defense measures consistent with their
contribution to the over-all defense posture of the United
States, the changing nature of the Soviet threat, and the
increasing number of technological options open to the
USSR.
7–A. The United States should place predominant emphasis on
measures to improve our active defenses, as compared
with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures.
[Particular emphasis should be accorded those active and
passive defense measures essential to the protection of the
U.S. capability for prompt nuclear retaliation.]5 |
Time Phasing
8. The time phasing of U.S. “continental defense” measures should take
into account the threat posed by the present nuclear attack capability
of the USSR and by future improvements
in Soviet weapons and delivery capabilities, particularly the
achievement in the early 1960’s of a major ICBM capability. This will be a period during which the
United States will largely depend on its U.S.-based air retaliatory
force. Accordingly, during the early 1960’s special attention should
continue to be given to measures for minimizing the vulnerability of
[Typeset Page 1181]
the strategic
air retaliatory forces to ICBM attack.
Effective continental defense requires that the United States be
constantly on
[Facsimile Page 9]
guard against “technological surprise” and that it continually strive
for technological superiority.
International Collaboration and Coordination
9. Continental defense requires continued close collaboration with
certain allies. The principle of joint defense of the North American
Continent by the United States and Canada, begun in World War II and
developed progressively in subsequent years, should be fostered. The
highly satisfactory arrangements with Denmark for maintaining defense
installations in Greenland should be continued. Efforts should also be
made to continue, or to create or improve as necessary, collaboration
with other countries concerned with the defense of this continent.
Warning
10. Strategic. With the Soviet acquisition of an
operational missile capability and the intensification of Soviet efforts
to deny warning information to the United States, it has become
increasingly important, as well as more difficult, to acquire timely
strategic warning of Soviet Bloc attack against the United States.
However, barring an extremely fortuitous break, intelligence warning can
be expected only to point to a period of sharply heightened risk of
hostilities. Therefore, for planning purposes it cannot be concluded
that the United States surely will, or surely will not, have strategic
warning.
[Facsimile Page 10]
Responsible officials must recognize that they may have to accept
intelligence warning judgments based on limited, evidence. In this
situation it is increasingly important that:
a. The United States have accurate estimates of
(1) Soviet military capabilities, (2) their view of their power position
in current critical or potential critical situations, (3) their
willingness to accept risks, and (4) their progress toward maximum
combat readiness. These assessments will also assist in determining
requirements for strategic warning and in indicating areas in which new
and improved intelligence collection techniques must be developed.
b. It be recognized that, if any reasonable degree
of success in obtaining adequate strategic warning is to be achieved,
risks are inherent in the execution of high priority collection
programs. These risks should be weighed against what may be even graver
risks inherent in failure to obtain strategic warning.
c. Vigorous efforts be made to develop improved
techniques for the processing, analysis and evaluation of possible
indications of hostile enemy intentions.
11. Tactical. Every effort should be made to
achieve effective tactical warning of aircraft or missile attack to
assure adequate time for retaliatory forces to take
[Facsimile Page 11]
action, for other
military forces including defense
[Typeset Page 1182]
forces to achieve alert readiness,
and for initiation of the implementation of civil defense, internal
security and other non-military measures. To this end:
a. For warning against attack by aircraft and
non-ballistic missiles:
(1) An effective early warning radar net, including its seaward
extensions, having a capability for very high and very low-level
altitude detection, should continue to be maintained.
(2) Weaknesses in aircraft identification techniques and procedures
should be remedied as quickly as feasible.
b. For warning against attack by ballistic
missiles: Improvement of the capability to provide early
warning of ballistic missile attack should be continued as a matter of
the highest national priority.6
c. For warning of nuclear detonations:
Installation of the currently-programmed bomb alarm and fallout
reporting systems for SAC bases should
be completed; a national attack surveillance system should be
undertaken.
d. For warning against BW and CW attack:
Development of a capability for rapid detection and identification of
BW and CW agents.
[Facsimile Page 12]
Military Functions
12. Active Defense. Active elements of the
continental defense system must contend with a mixed threat consisting
of manned bombers, non-ballistic missiles, intercontinental,
submarine-launched and possibly air-launched ballistic missiles. To this
end:
a. Against aircraft and non-ballistic missiles:
The United States should continue to make improvements in and to
maintain in a high state of readiness, an integrated air-defense system
providing defense in depth and capable of destroying enemy aircraft and
non-ballistic missiles before they reach vital targets. It is possible
that integrated functioning of the air defense system may be compromised
by ballistic missile attack. To take care of such an eventuality, the
capability of the various weapons elements of the air defense system to
act independently should continue to be improved. In addition to the
primary air defense forces, all other forces that have an air defense
capability and that can be made temporarily available, should, in the
event of attack or the threat of immediate attack, be made immediately
available and employed as required within this system.
b. Against ballistic missiles: The United States
should continue efforts to develop an effective
[Facsimile Page 13]
capability against
ballistic missiles as a matter of highest national priority7
[Typeset Page 1183]
| MAJORITY |
JCS |
| in an attempt to develop an |
, and to insure some operational |
AICBM capability by the earliest
possible date, both for its own value and to offset the practical and
psychological disadvantages of possible Soviet claims of success in this
field.
c. Against the threat of missiles launched from ocean
areas: The United States should strive to achieve and maintain
an effective and integrated sea surveillance system that permits
detection and tracking of surface ships and submarines operating within
missile-launching range of the North American Continent; and should
improve its related anti-submarine capability. Until technology permits
the deployment of an effective active defense against submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, the principal measures of protection should be
provided by the capability to attack prior to launch, and, in the case
of non-ballistic missiles, by elements of the air defense system.
13. Passive Defense. The United States should
carry out those passive defense measures that will add significantly
[Facsimile Page 14]
to its
ability to protect its retaliatory capability and the survival of the
other essential military elements of its national power, including with
respect to:
a. The retaliatory capability: Measures, such as
increase in mobility, dispersal, hardening, reduction of reaction time,
the capability to mount an airborne alert of SAC bombers, and protection of essential facilities
including command and communications centers.
b. The air defense forces: Similar measures, as
appropriate, to reduce the vulnerability of air defense forces.
c. The surviving military forces: Similar
measures, as appropriate, to reduce the vulnerability of our other
defense forces.
14. Response to Attack or Attack Warning. The
United States should develop capabilities, procedures and doctrine
adequate to provide secure command and control of its retaliatory and
defensive forces within the time dimensions of a surprise ballistic
missile attack. It is essential to ensure the survival of the
decision-making machinery and of reliable means of communication with
the surviving retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the air. The
United States must possess an effective and flexible response that is
not necessarily dependent upon the survival of the seat of government
and other vital units of the planned
[Facsimile Page 15]
system for command and control.
At the same time, it is essential to ensure launch and commitment of the
counter-offensive forces in response to attack or warning of attack with
positive safe-guard against commitment based on equivocal warning or
attack information.
15. Alert Status of Air Defense Forces. The United
States should continue to maintain the alert status of its primary air
defense forces, and cooperate in improvement of Canadian primary air
defense forces, so as to provide an immediate reaction to warning of an
enemy attack.
[Typeset Page 1184]
16. Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil
Defense. The execution of essential military tasks is the
primary mission of the military forces. Forces not required in the
execution of or capable of executing essential military missions during
and immediately following the initial attack should be prepared to
assist civil authorities in maintaining law and order and in other
essential civilian tasks when civilian capability is inadequate.
Additionally, elements of the retaliatory forces and air defense forces
should be prepared to assist in the civil defense role when no longer
required for their primary role.
[Facsimile Page 16]
Research and Development
17. A vigorous research and development program should be maintained in
order to improve the continental defense system and to counter improving
Soviet technological capabilities for attack. Of particular importance
are the following (without indication of priority):
a. Early warning capability against enemy aircraft
and missiles, by radar and other techniques; and the rapid dissemination
of such warning.
b. Reliable conversion of warning information into
prompt decisions and responses.
c. Effective defenses against ICBM’s, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, very high- and very low-altitude aircraft attacks, and
aircraft-launched stand-off missiles.
d. Reduction of vulnerability to electronic
countermeasures.
e. Improved anti-submarine capabilities, to
include detection, surveillance, identification and destruction.
f. The detection, surveillance, identification,
and destruction of satellites and space vehicles.8
g. The rapid detection and identification of
biological warfare agents.
[Facsimile Page 17]
Civilian Functions
18. Continuity of Essential Wartime Functions of the
Federal Government.9 Plans and relocation facilities needed to ensure
the continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government
should be completed and maintained in a state of operational readiness
at the earliest time practicable.
a. Plans should provide a ready and certain system
of attack warning, reaction and decision-making, with adequate
communications and provision for conducting emergency operations.
[Typeset Page 1185]
b. Emergency Federal relocation facilities should
be equipped as required to permit immediate activation upon arrival of
relocated personnel, and should be continuously staffed as determined by
the President.
19. Protection and Dispersal of Federal
Facilities.10
a. Except as otherwise determined by proper
authority, new Federal facilities and major expansion of existing
Federal facilities, important to national security, should not be
located in target areas. The location of new or expanded military
installations shall be within the sole discretion of the Secretary of
[Facsimile Page 18]
Defense [, except that he shall consult with the Director, OCDM, with respect to the location of new
fixed retaliatory bases and of major administrative headquarters.]11
b. Fallout shelter should be incorporated in the
construction of new Federal civilian buildings of suitable size. Fallout
shelter should be incorporated in [all suitable]12 [selected]13 existing Federal buildings.
* * * * * * * *
ALTERNATIVE 1: MAJORITY
20. Civil Defense. An essential part of a balanced
continental defense posture is an adequate program for the protection of
the civilian population from the effects of a nuclear attack, and
measures to facilitate recovery and rehabilitation after such attack.
[The protection of the population from fallout, together with the
questionable prospects for effective active defense in the 1960’s
against ICBM attack, makes development
of an effective civil defense a matter of greatly increased
urgency.]14 An effective civil defense is an important
element which a possible aggressor would have to consider in calculating
the response of the United States to any threat to our vital national
interests, and as such, would contribute to over-all deterrent
strength.
[Facsimile Page 19]
21. The key element in an effective civil defense program is a
comprehensive system of fallout shelters, since fallout is expected to
be a primary hazard to the civilian population. Blast protection is a
desirable added feature of shelters under certain conditions. Specific
guidance on this subject is contained in a separate NSC policy document.
[Typeset Page 1186]
ALTERNATIVE 2: TREASURY
20. Civil Defense. Adequate protection of the
civilian population would, if it were achievable, both facilitate
survival of the nation in the event of general war and contribute to the
deterrence of war. Means to provide adequate protection are, however,
not now foreseen. Nevertheless, the United States should constantly
strive to improve the degree of protection which could be afforded the
civilian population in the event of nuclear war. In the light of the
limited prospects for effective active defense against ballistic missile
attacks, such efforts must rest on an improved and strengthened civil
defense program. Increased attention, therefore, should be given to such
realistic measures for improving the passive defense of the U.S.
population as would offer some contribution to the deterrence of general
war without prejudicing the implementation of other measures likely to
reduce the risks of war.
21. Fallout shelters constitute the best—although still inadequate—means
presently available for reducing the number of casualties in the event
of nuclear war. The Federal Government should, therefore, promote
construction of such shelters by measures based firmly upon the
following fundamental principles:
[Facsimile Page 20]
a. It should be the obligation of each property
owner to provide protection on his own premises.
b. The role of the Federal Government should be to
provide leadership and example.
c. There should be no elements of compulsion,
penalty, or subsidy in Federal programs.
d. Actions must avoid creating alarm, causing
Congressional and public reaction prejudicial to higher priority
national security programs, presenting the posture of the United States
as that of a nation preoccupied with preparations for war, or losing the
support of our allies.
ALTERNATIVE 3: BUDGET
20. Civil Defense. An essential ingredient of
continental defense is improved and strengthened civil defense which
seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage
from nuclear attack and to contribute to deterring such attack.
21. Measures to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for protection
of the civil population against radiation hazard represent a key element
in an effective civil defense program. Specific guidance is contained in
a separate NSC policy document.
* * * * * * * *
22. In order that Federal, State and local governments may carry out
their essential responsibilities during and after nuclear attack or
other grave emergency, the capability of State and local governments to
[Facsimile Page 21]
function effectively should be strengthened by Federal assistance in the
form of guidance, direction and resources. Such assistance should
[Typeset Page 1187]
include
pre-attack planning for the full utilization of local resources and for
support by available Federal resources, including military forces.
| MAJORITY |
BUDGET |
| 23. Civil defense will continue to include local planning for
the emergency dispersal of populations, not as a substitute for
shelter, but as a possible supplement thereto under certain
circumstances. |
23. Civil defense policy for protection of the civilian
population in case of nuclear attack, while continuing to
include local planning for the emergency dispersal of urban
populations on attack warning, incorporates the concept of
fallout shelter. Specific guidance is contained in a separate
NSC policy document. |
24. Guidance and leadership should be provided to industry essential to
[initial]15 recovery from
nuclear attack in the development of plans and programs designed to
ensure the continuity of essential production and services.
25. Civilian items essential to survival and [initial]16 recovery from nuclear attack
should be identified, minimum requirements determined,
| MAJORITY |
TREASURY-DEFENSE-BUDGET |
| and measures developed to meet minimum requirements. Where
necessary to this end stockpiling should be undertaken. |
and industrial inventories located and related to Government
and State stocks. Where total availabilities
[Facsimile Page 22]
appear
inadequate, measures should be developed to meet minimum
requirements with the least disruption of the economy, the least
cost to the Government, and maximum encouragement of private
participation. |
[Facsimile Page 23]
26. The United States should continue its present policy of supporting
activities which will:
a. Warn the people of impending attack and make
possible essential communication before, during and after attack.
b. Give emphasis to the protection (including
dispersal where necessary) of essential civilian survival supplies,
equipment and facilities.
[Typeset Page 1188]
c. Provide for the conduct of research and
development on improved measures for the protection of the population,
including radiological defense, defense against chemical and biological
warfare, mass communications, medical care, and survival
requirements.
d. Provide appropriate and adequate information to
the public of the nature and extent of the dangers from nuclear attack
on the United States now and in the future, and of the measures being
taken or which could be taken to alleviate them.
Internal Security
27. The Soviet Bloc should be confronted with internal security measures
presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to covert attack
against the United States.
28. The United States should, to the extent practicable, provide adequate
deterrents (a) to clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons by any
means such as submarines, small craft, merchant vessels, aircraft,
illegal entry of persons and things, and diplomatic channels; and (b) to
utilization of such weapons against vital targets. Efforts should be
continued to develop improved passive devices for the
[Facsimile Page 24]
detection of fissionable
material introduced by such means, and to assure their effective use.
Efforts should be continued to develop a prototype of an active
device.17 This policy and the programs to implement it will
be kept under continuing review in accordance with existing arrangements
and in light of all applicable factors, including the growing shift to
ICBM’s in Soviet strategic attack
capabilities against U.S. retaliatory forces.
29. Measures should be taken to protect U.S. aircraft and airports as
appropriate, against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive
activities, and to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the
operations within the continental United States of Soviet Bloc
airlines.
30. Selected industrial and governmental facilities of a highly critical
nature should, as appropriate, be protected against espionage and
clandestine attack by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
conventional sabotage.
31. Selective counterintelligence coverage should be maintained of
foreign diplomatic and official personnel suspected of engaging in
activities beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic assignments.
32. Plans for the detention in the event of emergency of persons
potentially dangerous to the United States should be maintained in a
high state of readiness.
[Typeset Page 1189]
[Facsimile Page 25]
Port Security18
33. Measures should be taken (a) to protect U.S. ports and vessels
therein against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities;
(b) to supervise and where appropriate deny entry of vessels; and (c) to
provide appropriate safeguards relative to the presence in U.S. ports of
Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels. Insofar as feasible, having due regard for
legal procedures and rights, subversives should be excluded from vessels
and waterfront facilities.19
