The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the
NSC Planning Board in accordance
with NSC Action No. 2151–f–(1), is transmitted herewith for consideration
by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, December
22, 1960.
It is recommended that, if the enclosed statement of policy is adopted,
it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve
it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments
and agencies of the U.S. Government; and direct that the departments and
agencies indicated in the table on “Primary Responsibilities for
Implementation” (with the exception of the Department of State and the
Central Intelligence Agency) report, in a special annex to their
respective annual statue reports, on progress in implementing the
appropriate paragraphs of the approved paper.
The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted and approved, is intended to
supersede NSC 5802/1.
Enclosure
[Facsimile Page 2]
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL
DEFENSE
Table of Contents
- Primary Responsibilities for Implementation
- Introduction
- Objectives
- Major Policy Guidance
- Relative Emphasis
- Time Phasing
- International Collaboration and Coordination
- Warning
- Military Functions
- Active Defense
- Passive Defense
- Response to Attack or Attack Warning
- Alert Status of Air Defense Forces
- Emergency Employment of Military Resources in
Civil Defense
- Research and Development
- Civilian Functions
- Continuity of Essential Wartime Functions of
the Federal Government
- Protection and Dispersal of Federal
Facilities
- Civil Defense
- Internal Security
- Port Security
[Typeset Page 1178]
[Facsimile Page 3]
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
| Paragraph and Subject |
Primary Responsibility |
| 9—International Collaboration and Coordination |
State in Collaboration with Defense |
10—Strategic Warning
All except 2nd, 3rd and 4th
sentences
2nd, 3rd and 4th sentences |
Intelligence agencies under DCI coordination within
existing law and established policy
All appropriate
agencies |
| 11—Tactical Warning |
Defense |
| 12—Active Defense |
Defense |
| 13—Passive Defense |
Defense |
| 14—Response to Attack or Attack warning |
Defense in collaboration with OCDM |
| 15—Alert Status of Air Defense Forces |
Defense |
| 16—Emergency Employment of Military Resources in Civil
Defense |
Defense in collaboration with OCDM |
| 17—Research and Development |
All appropriate agencies |
| 18—Continuity of Government |
OCDM in collaboration
with all participating agencies |
| 19—Protection and Dispersal of Federal Facilities |
OCDM in collaboration
with all participating agencies |
| 20–26—Civil Defense |
OCDM |
| 27–32—Internal Security |
IIC and ICIS coordination |
| 33—Port Security |
Treasury, keeping IIC and ICIS fully informed |
[Facsimile Page 4]
DRAFT STATEMENT of
U.S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL
DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
1. This statement of policy on “Continental Defense” does not
encompass all elements of U.S. or allied strength contributing to
the defense of North America. Only those U.S. policies are included
which are essentially defensive in nature; i.e., which contribute
directly to the defense of the North American Continent and to the
protection of that element of our retaliatory capability based on
the North American Continent.
[Typeset Page 1179]
2. The defense of the United States is an integrated complex of
offensive and defensive elements and of military and non-military
measures. Each of these has its proper role in deterring an attack
or in the defense of the United States should an attack occur. An
effective continental defense system will constitute one of the key
deterrents to an attack on the North American Continent.
3. Current national intelligence estimates indicate that Soviet
delivery systems are changing importantly in character, and imply
the following periods:2
[Facsimile Page 5]
- a.
- The period is drawing to an end when the primary element
in the threat to the United States is manned bombers.
- b.
- The period of the early 1960’s will represent a transition
from a largely bomber threat to one mainly composed of
ICBM’s. In the early
1960’s the estimated Soviet ICBM force will present an extremely dangerous
threat to SAC bomber bases,
unhardened ICBM sites and
command installations.
- c.
- In a few years, therefore, the principal element of the
threat to the United States will be ICBM’s supplemented by BISON
heavy bombers and possibly by some refueled or one-way
medium bombers, by increased numbers of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and possibly by cruise-type
missiles.
4. The changing character of the Soviet threat and our current
assessment of the relative effectiveness of various active and
passive defense measures3 have made it necessary that the United States
re-examine its military and non-military programs for continental
defense. [In particular,
[Facsimile Page 6]
national planning must recognize that, barring
a technological breakthrough, the development and deployment of an
adequate AICBM system during the
1960’s is questionable.]4
OBJECTIVES
5. a. To protect and preserve a retaliatory
capability of such force and certainty as to constitute a strong and
credible deterrent against attack on the North American
Continent.
b. To limit the damage to our civil and
military strength which would occur in the event of attack, in order
to ensure the survival of
[Typeset Page 1180]
the nation and to pursue the ensuing
hostilities to the most favorable possible conclusion.
MAJOR POLICY GUIDANCE
Relative Emphasis
6. Predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to
strengthen and protect our nuclear retaliatory power as a
deterrent.
[Facsimile Page 7]
| MAJORITY |
BUDGET-JCS |
|
7. As long as the manned bomber threat continues to be
of significant proportions, continue measures to
maintain our active defenses against manned aircraft.
However, in view of the increasing reliance of the
USSR on ballistic
missiles for inter-continental attack and the present
limitations of achievable active defense measures the
U.S. should:
a. While pursuing measures to
achieve adequate active defenses, make a particular
effort to exploit passive measures that will afford the
requisite degree
[Facsimile Page 8]
of protection to
our retaliatory power and to relate elements, including
communications and command.
b. Give increased attention to
measures for the passive defense of the U.S.
population.
|
7. Continued reliance will be placed on a balance of
active and passive defense measures consistent with
their contribution to the over-all defense posture of
the United States, the changing nature of the Soviet
threat, and the increasing number of technological
options open to the USSR.
7–A. The United States should place predominant emphasis
on measures to improve our active defenses, as compared
with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense
measures. [Particular emphasis should be accorded those
active and passive defense measures essential to the
protection of the U.S. capability for prompt nuclear
retaliation.]5
|
Time Phasing
8. The time phasing of U.S. “continental defense” measures should
take into account the threat posed by the present nuclear attack
capability of the USSR and by
future improvements in Soviet weapons and delivery capabilities,
particularly the achievement in the early 1960’s of a major ICBM capability. This will be a
period during which the United States will largely depend on its
U.S.-based air retaliatory force. Accordingly, during the early
1960’s special attention should continue to be given to measures for
minimizing the vulnerability of
[Typeset Page 1181]
the strategic air retaliatory
forces to ICBM attack. Effective
continental defense requires that the United States be constantly on
[Facsimile Page 9]
guard
against “technological surprise” and that it continually strive for
technological superiority.
International Collaboration and
Coordination
9. Continental defense requires continued close collaboration with
certain allies. The principle of joint defense of the North American
Continent by the United States and Canada, begun in World War II and
developed progressively in subsequent years, should be fostered. The
highly satisfactory arrangements with Denmark for maintaining
defense installations in Greenland should be continued. Efforts
should also be made to continue, or to create or improve as
necessary, collaboration with other countries concerned with the
defense of this continent.
Warning
10. Strategic. With the Soviet acquisition of
an operational missile capability and the intensification of Soviet
efforts to deny warning information to the United States, it has
become increasingly important, as well as more difficult, to acquire
timely strategic warning of Soviet Bloc attack against the United
States. However, barring an extremely fortuitous break, intelligence
warning can be expected only to point to a period of sharply
heightened risk of hostilities. Therefore, for planning purposes it
cannot be concluded that the United States surely will, or surely
will not, have strategic warning.
[Facsimile Page 10]
Responsible officials must
recognize that they may have to accept intelligence warning
judgments based on limited, evidence. In this situation it is
increasingly important that:
a. The United States have accurate estimates
of (1) Soviet military capabilities, (2) their view of their power
position in current critical or potential critical situations, (3)
their willingness to accept risks, and (4) their progress toward
maximum combat readiness. These assessments will also assist in
determining requirements for strategic warning and in indicating
areas in which new and improved intelligence collection techniques
must be developed.
b. It be recognized that, if any reasonable
degree of success in obtaining adequate strategic warning is to be
achieved, risks are inherent in the execution of high priority
collection programs. These risks should be weighed against what may
be even graver risks inherent in failure to obtain strategic
warning.
c. Vigorous efforts be made to develop
improved techniques for the processing, analysis and evaluation of
possible indications of hostile enemy intentions.
11. Tactical. Every effort should be made to
achieve effective tactical warning of aircraft or missile attack to
assure adequate time for retaliatory forces to take
[Facsimile Page 11]
action, for other military forces including defense
[Typeset Page 1182]
forces to achieve
alert readiness, and for initiation of the implementation of civil
defense, internal security and other non-military measures. To this
end:
a. For warning against attack by aircraft and
non-ballistic missiles:
(1) An effective early warning radar net, including its seaward
extensions, having a capability for very high and very low-level
altitude detection, should continue to be maintained.
(2) Weaknesses in aircraft identification techniques and procedures
should be remedied as quickly as feasible.
b. For warning against attack by ballistic
missiles: Improvement of the capability to provide early
warning of ballistic missile attack should be continued as a matter
of the highest national priority.6
c. For warning of nuclear detonations:
Installation of the currently-programmed bomb alarm and fallout
reporting systems for SAC bases
should be completed; a national attack surveillance system should be
undertaken.
d. For warning against BW and CW
attack: Development of a capability for rapid detection and
identification of BW and CW agents.
[Facsimile Page 12]
Military Functions
12. Active Defense. Active elements of the
continental defense system must contend with a mixed threat
consisting of manned bombers, non-ballistic missiles,
intercontinental, submarine-launched and possibly air-launched
ballistic missiles. To this end:
a. Against aircraft and non-ballistic
missiles: The United States should continue to make
improvements in and to maintain in a high state of readiness, an
integrated air-defense system providing defense in depth and capable
of destroying enemy aircraft and non-ballistic missiles before they
reach vital targets. It is possible that integrated functioning of
the air defense system may be compromised by ballistic missile
attack. To take care of such an eventuality, the capability of the
various weapons elements of the air defense system to act
independently should continue to be improved. In addition to the
primary air defense forces, all other forces that have an air
defense capability and that can be made temporarily available,
should, in the event of attack or the threat of immediate attack, be
made immediately available and employed as required within this
system.
b. Against ballistic missiles: The United
States should continue efforts to develop an effective
[Facsimile Page 13]
capability against ballistic missiles as a matter of highest
national priority7
[Typeset Page 1183]
| MAJORITY |
JCS |
| in an attempt to develop an |
, and to insure some operational |
AICBM capability by the earliest
possible date, both for its own value and to offset the practical
and psychological disadvantages of possible Soviet claims of success
in this field.
c. Against the threat of missiles launched from
ocean areas: The United States should strive to achieve and
maintain an effective and integrated sea surveillance system that
permits detection and tracking of surface ships and submarines
operating within missile-launching range of the North American
Continent; and should improve its related anti-submarine capability.
Until technology permits the deployment of an effective active
defense against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the principal
measures of protection should be provided by the capability to
attack prior to launch, and, in the case of non-ballistic missiles,
by elements of the air defense system.
13. Passive Defense. The United States should
carry out those passive defense measures that will add significantly
[Facsimile Page 14]
to
its ability to protect its retaliatory capability and the survival
of the other essential military elements of its national power,
including with respect to:
a. The retaliatory capability: Measures, such
as increase in mobility, dispersal, hardening, reduction of reaction
time, the capability to mount an airborne alert of SAC bombers, and protection of
essential facilities including command and communications
centers.
b. The air defense forces: Similar measures,
as appropriate, to reduce the vulnerability of air defense
forces.
c. The surviving military forces: Similar
measures, as appropriate, to reduce the vulnerability of our other
defense forces.
14. Response to Attack or Attack Warning. The
United States should develop capabilities, procedures and doctrine
adequate to provide secure command and control of its retaliatory
and defensive forces within the time dimensions of a surprise
ballistic missile attack. It is essential to ensure the survival of
the decision-making machinery and of reliable means of communication
with the surviving retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the
air. The United States must possess an effective and flexible
response that is not necessarily dependent upon the survival of the
seat of government and other vital units of the planned
[Facsimile Page 15]
system
for command and control. At the same time, it is essential to ensure
launch and commitment of the counter-offensive forces in response to
attack or warning of attack with positive safe-guard against
commitment based on equivocal warning or attack information.
15. Alert Status of Air Defense Forces. The
United States should continue to maintain the alert status of its
primary air defense forces, and cooperate in improvement of Canadian
primary air defense forces, so as to provide an immediate reaction
to warning of an enemy attack.
[Typeset Page 1184]
16. Emergency Employment of Military Resources in
Civil Defense. The execution of essential military tasks is
the primary mission of the military forces. Forces not required in
the execution of or capable of executing essential military missions
during and immediately following the initial attack should be
prepared to assist civil authorities in maintaining law and order
and in other essential civilian tasks when civilian capability is
inadequate. Additionally, elements of the retaliatory forces and air
defense forces should be prepared to assist in the civil defense
role when no longer required for their primary role.
[Facsimile Page 16]
Research and Development
17. A vigorous research and development program should be maintained
in order to improve the continental defense system and to counter
improving Soviet technological capabilities for attack. Of
particular importance are the following (without indication of
priority):
a. Early warning capability against enemy
aircraft and missiles, by radar and other techniques; and the rapid
dissemination of such warning.
b. Reliable conversion of warning information
into prompt decisions and responses.
c. Effective defenses against ICBM’s, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, very high- and very low-altitude aircraft attacks, and
aircraft-launched stand-off missiles.
d. Reduction of vulnerability to electronic
countermeasures.
e. Improved anti-submarine capabilities, to
include detection, surveillance, identification and destruction.
f. The detection, surveillance,
identification, and destruction of satellites and space
vehicles.8
g. The rapid detection and identification of
biological warfare agents.
[Facsimile Page 17]
Civilian Functions
18. Continuity of Essential Wartime Functions of
the Federal Government.9 Plans and relocation facilities
needed to ensure the continuity of essential wartime functions of
the Federal Government should be completed and maintained in a state
of operational readiness at the earliest time practicable.
a. Plans should provide a ready and certain
system of attack warning, reaction and decision-making, with
adequate communications and provision for conducting emergency
operations.
[Typeset Page 1185]
b. Emergency Federal relocation facilities
should be equipped as required to permit immediate activation upon
arrival of relocated personnel, and should be continuously staffed
as determined by the President.
19. Protection and Dispersal of Federal
Facilities.10
a. Except as otherwise determined by proper
authority, new Federal facilities and major expansion of existing
Federal facilities, important to national security, should not be
located in target areas. The location of new or expanded military
installations shall be within the sole discretion of the Secretary
of
[Facsimile Page 18]
Defense [, except that he shall consult with the Director, OCDM, with respect to the location of
new fixed retaliatory bases and of major administrative
headquarters.]11
b. Fallout shelter should be incorporated in
the construction of new Federal civilian buildings of suitable size.
Fallout shelter should be incorporated in [all suitable]12 [selected]13 existing Federal
buildings.
* * * * * * * *
ALTERNATIVE 1: MAJORITY
20. Civil Defense. An essential part of a
balanced continental defense posture is an adequate program for the
protection of the civilian population from the effects of a nuclear
attack, and measures to facilitate recovery and rehabilitation after
such attack. [The protection of the population from fallout,
together with the questionable prospects for effective active
defense in the 1960’s against ICBM
attack, makes development of an effective civil defense a matter of
greatly increased urgency.]14 An effective civil
defense is an important element which a possible aggressor would
have to consider in calculating the response of the United States to
any threat to our vital national interests, and as such, would
contribute to over-all deterrent strength.
[Facsimile Page 19]
21. The key element in an effective civil defense program is a
comprehensive system of fallout shelters, since fallout is expected
to be a primary hazard to the civilian population. Blast protection
is a desirable added feature of shelters under certain conditions.
Specific guidance on this subject is contained in a separate NSC policy document.
[Typeset Page 1186]
ALTERNATIVE 2: TREASURY
20. Civil Defense. Adequate protection of the
civilian population would, if it were achievable, both facilitate
survival of the nation in the event of general war and contribute to
the deterrence of war. Means to provide adequate protection are,
however, not now foreseen. Nevertheless, the United States should
constantly strive to improve the degree of protection which could be
afforded the civilian population in the event of nuclear war. In the
light of the limited prospects for effective active defense against
ballistic missile attacks, such efforts must rest on an improved and
strengthened civil defense program. Increased attention, therefore,
should be given to such realistic measures for improving the passive
defense of the U.S. population as would offer some contribution to
the deterrence of general war without prejudicing the implementation
of other measures likely to reduce the risks of war.
21. Fallout shelters constitute the best—although still
inadequate—means presently available for reducing the number of
casualties in the event of nuclear war. The Federal Government
should, therefore, promote construction of such shelters by measures
based firmly upon the following fundamental principles:
[Facsimile Page 20]
a. It should be the obligation of each
property owner to provide protection on his own premises.
b. The role of the Federal Government should
be to provide leadership and example.
c. There should be no elements of compulsion,
penalty, or subsidy in Federal programs.
d. Actions must avoid creating alarm, causing
Congressional and public reaction prejudicial to higher priority
national security programs, presenting the posture of the United
States as that of a nation preoccupied with preparations for war, or
losing the support of our allies.
ALTERNATIVE 3: BUDGET
20. Civil Defense. An essential ingredient of
continental defense is improved and strengthened civil defense which
seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize
damage from nuclear attack and to contribute to deterring such
attack.
21. Measures to carry out the concept of fallout shelter for
protection of the civil population against radiation hazard
represent a key element in an effective civil defense program.
Specific guidance is contained in a separate NSC policy document.
* * * * * * * *
22. In order that Federal, State and local governments may carry out
their essential responsibilities during and after nuclear attack or
other grave emergency, the capability of State and local governments
to
[Facsimile Page 21]
function effectively should be strengthened by Federal assistance in
the form of guidance, direction and resources. Such assistance
should
[Typeset Page 1187]
include pre-attack planning for the full utilization of local
resources and for support by available Federal resources, including
military forces.
| MAJORITY |
BUDGET |
| 23. Civil defense will continue to include local planning
for the emergency dispersal of populations, not as a
substitute for shelter, but as a possible supplement thereto
under certain circumstances. |
23. Civil defense policy for protection of the civilian
population in case of nuclear attack, while continuing to
include local planning for the emergency dispersal of urban
populations on attack warning, incorporates the concept of
fallout shelter. Specific guidance is contained in a
separate NSC policy
document. |
24. Guidance and leadership should be provided to industry essential
to [initial]15 recovery
from nuclear attack in the development of plans and programs
designed to ensure the continuity of essential production and
services.
25. Civilian items essential to survival and [initial]16 recovery from nuclear
attack should be identified, minimum requirements determined,
| MAJORITY |
TREASURY-DEFENSE-BUDGET |
| and measures developed to meet minimum requirements. Where
necessary to this end stockpiling should be
undertaken. |
and industrial inventories located and related to
Government and State stocks. Where total availabilities
[Facsimile Page 22]
appear inadequate, measures should be developed to meet
minimum requirements with the least disruption of the
economy, the least cost to the Government, and maximum
encouragement of private participation. |
[Facsimile Page 23]
26. The United States should continue its present policy of
supporting activities which will:
a. Warn the people of impending attack and
make possible essential communication before, during and after
attack.
b. Give emphasis to the protection (including
dispersal where necessary) of essential civilian survival supplies,
equipment and facilities.
[Typeset Page 1188]
c. Provide for the conduct of research and
development on improved measures for the protection of the
population, including radiological defense, defense against chemical
and biological warfare, mass communications, medical care, and
survival requirements.
d. Provide appropriate and adequate
information to the public of the nature and extent of the dangers
from nuclear attack on the United States now and in the future, and
of the measures being taken or which could be taken to alleviate
them.
Internal Security
27. The Soviet Bloc should be confronted with internal security
measures presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to
covert attack against the United States.
28. The United States should, to the extent practicable, provide
adequate deterrents (a) to clandestine introduction of nuclear
weapons by any means such as submarines, small craft, merchant
vessels, aircraft, illegal entry of persons and things, and
diplomatic channels; and (b) to utilization of such weapons against
vital targets. Efforts should be continued to develop improved
passive devices for the
[Facsimile Page 24]
detection of fissionable material introduced
by such means, and to assure their effective use. Efforts should be
continued to develop a prototype of an active device.17
This policy and the programs to implement it will be kept under
continuing review in accordance with existing arrangements and in
light of all applicable factors, including the growing shift to
ICBM’s in Soviet strategic
attack capabilities against U.S. retaliatory forces.
29. Measures should be taken to protect U.S. aircraft and airports as
appropriate, against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive
activities, and to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the
operations within the continental United States of Soviet Bloc
airlines.
30. Selected industrial and governmental facilities of a highly
critical nature should, as appropriate, be protected against
espionage and clandestine attack by nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and conventional sabotage.
31. Selective counterintelligence coverage should be maintained of
foreign diplomatic and official personnel suspected of engaging in
activities beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic
assignments.
32. Plans for the detention in the event of emergency of persons
potentially dangerous to the United States should be maintained in a
high state of readiness.
[Typeset Page 1189]
[Facsimile Page 25]
Port Security18
33. Measures should be taken (a) to protect U.S. ports and vessels
therein against sabotage, espionage, and other subversive
activities; (b) to supervise and where appropriate deny entry of
vessels; and (c) to provide appropriate safeguards relative to the
presence in U.S. ports of Sino-Soviet Bloc vessels. Insofar as
feasible, having due regard for legal procedures and rights,
subversives should be excluded from vessels and waterfront
facilities.19
