Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

279. Annex to JCS comments, JCSM–553–60 (print Document 130)¹

JCSM–553–60

Washington, December 9, 1960

ANNEX

SPECIFIC JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF VIEWS ON POSSIBLE DEFICIENCIES IN THE U.S. POSTURE FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS (C)

1. a. Airlift and sealift studies prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1959 included the following:

(1) Airlift Requirements and Capabilities under Mobilization and Wartime Conditions (FY 1960–1963).

(2) U.S. Ocean Shipping Requirements and Availability. These studies, based on actual plans and prepared annually, are coordinated within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Services. They provide the basis for joint guidance on transportation planning matters.

b. The above studies used resumption of hostilities in Korea coincident with six months of mobilization as its criterion for limited war capabilities and requirements.

(1) In the airlift study, it was concluded that Military Air Transport Service (MATS) capability for limited war, assuming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is activated, is adequate for passenger and cargo requirements except for shortages during the first 20 days. Approximately three-fourths of the cargo deficit in this period can be overcome by temporary transfer of capability from the Atlantic area.

(a) Since the airlift study was completed additional passenger capability has been allocated to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to meet the passenger deficits as indicated by this study.

(b) The cargo capability situation also has been improved since the study by additional Civil Reserve Air Fleet allocations.

(2) The conclusion of the sealift study was that, although there are some shortages of cargo and passenger ships in the first 60 days of a limited war, sealift is adequate. Shortages in cargo ships could be made up from available foreign flag shipping. Passenger ship shortages could be eliminated by “hot bunking” and use of friendly Allied passenger ships.

(3) No airlift or sealift studies have been completed at this time regarding Southeast Asia. New studies on subjects tabulated in paragraph 1 a (1) and (2) above, dealing specifically with Southeast Asia, are scheduled for completion by May 1961. The effect of the logistic limitations of this area on U.S. transportation capabilities will be considered in these studies.

2. Military Logistics Base plans (Mobilization Base Plans) are formulated by the Military Departments in accordance with the general guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense. The latest guidance is the Secretary of Defense memorandum of 15 March 1960, subject, “Guidance for the Development of FY 61/62 Logistics Programs,” which provides for acquisition objectives, production base planning objectives, and materiel retention policies, for both limited and general war planning in the Department of Defense. There has been insufficient time to implement fully this guidance. It is expected that if funding permits implementation of this guidance, our capability to support limited war situations, without degrading our general war readiness posture, should be improved in the near future. However, current budgetary limitations will not enable the Military Departments to meet in all categories the supply and equipment objectives of the logistic guidance. The status of Service mobilization base planning and programs is summarized below:

a. Army. Detailed mobilization plans and programs to support current limited and general war plans are in advanced state of preparation. Major deficiencies, as they relate to limited war operations, are:

(1) Strength, both active and reserve, dependent upon the scope and nature of the conflict.

(2) Planning for the support of limited war is based on the Limited War Plan for the Resumption of Hostilities in Korea. However, its current status of implementation would result in degrading the general war posture in the event a limited war is quickly followed by a general war.

(3) While Army forces are equipped with sufficient materiel to support U.S. forces in limited war operations envisaged in the current time frame, only about one-half would be of the preferred model and the balance would be of an older less effective but acceptable model. Recent allocation of funds will reduce this deficiency to some degree from a qualitative point of view in the time frame under consideration.

b. Navy

(1) The Navy logistics mobilization planning objective is to provide the materiel support to the forces needed to prosecute a limited war with an accompanying selective build-up of forces, while at all times maintaining an adequate general war posture. Planned acquisition requirements to meet this objective are:

(a) Meet the peacetime force materiel requirement.

(b) Complete equipping of selected reserve forces.

(c) Attain a level of war readiness reserve stock not to exceed 180 days combat support for general war for Marine Corps forces deployed overseas. For all other Naval forces, the general war objective will not exceed 90 days combat support.

(d) Attain an additional level of war readiness reserve stock of those items necessary to sustain in limited war for 180 days designated Naval forces, plus a maximum of 180 days training support for the other Naval forces.

(2) Budgetary limitations have precluded reaching these logistic readiness goals. The most important shortage is modern conventional weapons and ammunition, such as ASW torpedoes, electronic equipment (sonar, radar and ECM), and guided missiles.

c. Air Force. U.S. Air Force wartime planning and programming documents, upon which emergency war plans are formulated, presently reflect the force and war readiness materiel requirements for limited war activity as well as for general war. In order to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved contingency plans of the unified commands in consonance with Secretary of Defense memorandum, dated 15 March 1960, the Air Force has segmented the total package authorized for limited war actions and has distributed them on a global basis. Detailed Air Force plans provide for world-wide base prestockage rather than the portrayal of the force and attendant war readiness materiel assets in one location or area to meet limited war threats. The separation of War Readiness Materiel (WRM) for general and limited war will enable the commander to identify readily those items of WRM which are specifically designated for limited war and prevent degradation of general war assets. Additionally, the Air Force has revised its policy on WRM to provide for prestocking and prepositioning materiel in support of approved contingency plans. The concept provides for locating the materiel at or near the point of planned usage.

d. Marine Corps. Mobilization planning is current through the FY 1961 period. These plans provide guidance under conditions of cold, limited or general war, and reflect actual Marine Corps capabilities including provision for assembly of resources available. Mobilization plans are designed to permit incrementally phased activations of units in the event partial mobilization is required. Current actions to improve mobilization capabilities include a reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve to support more accurately specific mobilization requirements.

3. The general statue of war reserves by Service, is:

a. Army

(1) The status of war reserves, based on the guidance for the development of FY 61/62 Logistics Program, is being computed and analyzed at this time. Therefore, the following information on the general status of war reserves is a qualified estimate, based on available data.

(2) Procurement Equipment Missiles Army (PEMA).

(a) Total assets available for initial issue and war reserves represent a little less than two-thirds of the objectives authorized by the FY 61/62 guidance. Since sufficient assets are not available, the provision of adequate support for a limited war would necessitate the withdrawal of equipment required to meet initial equipment requirements for the balance of the forces authorized by the guidance.

(b) Assuming a six months limited war, up to 24 months would be required after the initiation of procurement to reconstitute that portion of the inventory which would be consumed during the six months period.

(3) Minor secondary items and repair parts.

(a) Mobilization reserve assets and planned acquisition through Fiscal Year 1962 will meet approximately 60 per cent of the requirement.

(b) If mobilization reserves were depleted by a limited war of six months duration, the time required to replace stocks after the initiation of procurement would vary from 6 to 15 months depending on the item.

b. Navy. Navy Mobilization Reserve Stocks (MRS) are stored in CONUS and in reasonably protected sites overseas in locations so as best to support the forces in being and the forces to be mobilized. MRS is maintained, rotated, and modernized to the extent practicable under current financial limitations. The time required to reconstitute the various categories of materiel included in the MRS will vary from three months for certain standard consumables up to 36 months for major electronic equipment.

c. Air Force

(1) The War Readiness Materiel (WRM) requirements for limited war are based on plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Air Force supporting plans call for prepositioning such materiel at or near the point of planned usage. Based on the approved strategic concepts reflected in the War Objectives and Basic National Security Policies present stocks are deemed adequate to permit immediate reaction to anticipated (current plans) limited war situations. However, should these concepts change, Air Force WRM requirements would reflect this change. The lack of Base Rights agreements in certain areas of Southeast Asia and the Middle East preclude full implementation of the prepositioning policy. In such case, the required materiel is prepositioned at the nearest United States controlled base. The lack of Base Rights thus causes not only a mal-location of materiel, but also places an additive requirement on transportation resources.

(2) Those WRM assets consumed during war operations will be replaced from materiel in transit; in depots stocks; from stocks in long-supply; diversions from activities with lower priority missions (except that the General War posture will not be degraded); and by expedited deliveries from production and repair facilities.

d. Marine Corps

Sufficient materiel, including repairable unserviceable as well as serviceable assets, is on hand to meet 52% of the M-Day materiel requirement. Time required to reconstitute materiel reserves is estimated to be 18 to 24 months for major items, 10 to 12 months for ammunition, and 9 to 12 months for minor items. This estimate assumes immediate unrestricted availability of funds, and disregards possible delay due to simultaneous maximum demand on industry by all Services. Actions being taken to assume maximum utilization of reserve stocks include regular rotation to obviate deterioration; continuous maintenance in a high degree of readiness of mount-out and resupply stocks; and selective prepositioning of supplies both in WesPac and NELM for contingency requirements.

4. The logistic limitations in Southeast Asia, stemming from the lack of development of communications, port and terminal facilities and transportation means, would severely affect U.S. and friendly indigenous military operations. Furthermore, the existing logistic support facilities are extremely vulnerable to disruption and are inadequate to support sustained operations of U.S. and Allied forces. These limitations would probably affect enemy operations to a lesser degree.

5. Thus, lack of surface LOC’s, adequacy of terminal facilities in the area, and the status of strategic communications in Southeast Asia, are recognized as factors which would influence the nature of the operations and the type force to be employed. Military operations for Southeast Asia take into account the geophysical limitations of the area. These limitations establish the modus operandi of military operations. Any improvement in facilities would cause changes to plans to utilize the improvements. The lack of facilities is a limitation to be considered in planning.

6. In addition, there are inadequate logistical units in the indigenous forces of Southeast Asia for the support of their own combat forces. Current contingency plans for Southeast Asia include requirements for U.S. logistical units for the support of indigenous combat forces. This limitation in the indigenous force structure is recognized and, as the logistical capability of indigenous forces improves, the contingency plans are revised accordingly.

7. The solution to the problems which pertain to operations in Southeast Asia is not to devote more of our current military assistance to the development of logistic, communication, and support facilities designed specifically for U.S. use. This would have an adverse impact, both political and military, on the host country. Rather, the primary objective of our military assistance program should be the improvement of indigenous capabilities with the eventual goal of adequately trained and equipped indigenous forces which are essential for the conduct of operations in Southeast Asia. In addition, one of the major objectives of the Military Assistance Program is to provide the host country with a capability to resist Communist aggression by defending its borders and maintaining internal security. Therefore, any program designed specifically for the development of U.S. capabilities to operate in Southeast Asia should be in addition to the existing programs for direct military assistance to the countries of the area.

8. At the time the Limited War Study was being prepared and subsequent thereto, certain actions were being taken to facilitate operations in Southeast Asia. These include:

a. Increased and reoriented military assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia.

b. Deployment of additional Army forces to the Far East, e.g., an airborne battle group and additional Army logistical support forces to Okinawa.

c. CINCPAC Operation Plan for Southeast Asia refined and approved.

d. Additional Marine elements afloat with Seventh Fleet.

e. Continued development of planning and coordination by SEATO forces.

f. Action by Air Force to establish a limited stockpile of conventional munitions in Thailand.

g. Assignment of a third aircraft carrier to the Seventh Fleet on a continuing basis.

h. Increased number of attack aircraft deployed in aircraft carriers with the Seventh Fleet.

i. Programmed modernization of the Airlift Force. ($33,000,000 is programmed for the development of the so-called SOR aircraft (long-range jet powered cargo aircraft). For interim modernization $83,900,000 has been apportioned during FY 1961 for the procurement of 16 C–130E aircraft. The FY 1962 program plans procurement of an additional 34 C–130E aircraft, making a total of 50 such aircraft. Consideration is being given to the procurement of 50 of the C–135 type aircraft.)

j. Strategic mobility exercise scheduled for early 1961. (Airlift one Army battle group and deploy Composite Air Strike Force from Continental United States to Far East.)

k. Periodic deployment of Composite Air Strike Force for training purposes.

l. The Department of Defense has officially supported the Department of Commerce in its actions to maintain the National Defense Reserve Fleet at the best practicable degree of modernity and in sufficient strength to fulfill civilian and military requirements in national emergencies.

m. Action by the Army to establish the DA Forward Depot, Pacific, on Okinawa.

9. Actions being taken or that could be taken with regard to obtaining required transit and base rights in Southeast Asia, improving strategic and tactical communications in Southeast Asia, and the improvement of capabilities to conduct over-the-beach supply operations are as follows:

a. Transit and Base Rights in Southeast Asia.

(1) Requirements exist for the following facilities for dispersal, staging and recovery of aircraft and prepositioning and prestockage of materiels and supplies as required to support CINCPAC plans.

(a) Vietnam

Tan Son Nhut, Saigon

Tourane

Cap St. Jacques

Nha Trang

Bien Hoa

(b) Laos

Vietiane

Seno

(c) Thailand

Bangkok/Don Muang

Korat Nakhou Ratchasima

Takhl

Chiang Mai

Ubon

Udorn

(NOTE: Current interpretation of the restrictions imposed by the terms of the Geneva Convention have thus far prevented any use of facilities in Laos and Vietnam. Rights have been obtained for limited prestocking in Thailand.)

(2) Transit rights for overflight and for use of bases for peacetime training exercises are obtained on an individual basis.

(3) CINCPAC contingency planning for the area assumes that existing bases, facilities and services will be made available when and as required.

b. Strategic and Tactical Communications.

(1) Existing Strategic Communications. Communications to and from Vietiane, Saigon, and Bangkok are provided by the Army Strategic Communications (STARCOM) Station at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, which interconnects into the world-wide communications system of the Department of Defense. There is, in addition, a communications circuit between Bangkok and Saigon. The Southeast Asian terminals of all these circuits have limited capacity and utilize air-transportable equipment. A high capacity circuit links the British communication system at Singapore with the Naval Communication System in the Philippines. In addition, the Naval communication facility at San Miguel, Philippines, provides a circuit to inter-connect Naval units afloat with the world-wide communications network.

(2) Planned Expansion of Southeast Asian Strategic Communications. During fiscal years 1962–64, the high-frequency circuits which link Clark Air Force Base with the countries of Southeast Asia will be expanded to provide additional reliability and an increased traffic handling capability. This will be accomplished by the utilization of fixed-station types of equipment in place of transportable equipment. The fixed-stations will have increased power and transmitters with a greater circuit capacity. To provide for communications westward from Southeast Asia, the Department of Defense has under consideration a request for an Asian Gateway Communications Station in Karachi which, if authorized, will furnish high capacity communications between Karachi and Bangkok. Within the Southeast Asian countries, an expanded communications circuit is planned between Bangkok and Saigon.

(3) Contingency Communications. West of Hawaii, air-transportable equipments which may be used on point-to-point communications circuits are located at Clark Air Force Base, in Okinawa and Japan, and in Seoul. These equipments represent a reasonable additional communications capability to augment existing circuits into Southeast Asia and will be supplemented by improved air-transportable equipments which are under procurement for delivery during the current fiscal year. It should be understood, however, that the technical teams which are necessary for the operation and maintenance of supplementary communications must, except on a very limited basis, be provided from the continental United States.

(4) Tactical Communications. The U.S. Military Services do not maintain in being tactical communications systems in Southeast Asia. Each Service provides tactical communications for the control and direction of Service forces within an area of tactical operations. These tactical systems consist of transportable communications equipments which are deployed into an area by tactical forces. Coordination for joint operations is the responsibility of the area commander. Tactical communications systems are, therefore, organic to military units, connect into strategic networks, and are not required prior to the movement of military forces.

(5) Actions which could be taken to improve Strategic Communications.

(a) Existing strategic communications connecting into Southeast Asia, together with planned improvements, will provide a minimal capability for limited war operations. Fixed communications systems are dependent upon high frequency circuits designed essentially for teletype operation with only a comparatively few voice circuits available.

(b) If it should be decided to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia, communications planning will have to be revised to reflect operational requirements. The specific nature of such programs will depend upon the concept of operations, the magnitude of forces employed, and the location of controlling and supporting headquarters. Communications for such purposes are not available in the existing system nor contemplated in scheduled improvements. Basically, communications would have to be expanded to include the provision of voice and data transmission between elements of the combat forces and high quality circuits capable of direct extension to command centers in the United States. Included would be measures for increasing the capacity and improving the reliability of the fixed strategic communications system, and for providing extensions from strategic networks into contiguous areas by the use of transportable tactical equipment.

(c) Over-the-Beach Supply Operations.

(1) Army

(a) These operations, which are an important part of the resupply capability of U.S. Army Forces, are periodically tested and improved through the conduct of realistic exercises, and the development and adjustment of doctrine based on lessons learned. One of the most recent exercises was conducted in total darkness with complete success at Fort Story, Virginia, on 17, 18 and 19 October 1960. Another exercise (NODEX–25) was conducted on the coast of France 26–28 October 1960.

(b) Present plans call for a partial shift from landing craft to amphibians as equipment becomes available. For example, four (4) platoons equipped with Barge, Amphibious Resupply Cargo (BARC), will be in operation in CONUS and the Far East (Okinawa) by the end of FY 61, an increase of two over present strength. Also, existing equipment in amphibious truck companies, consisting at present of WW II DUKWs, will be placed in the future with the Lighter, Amphibious Resupply Cargo (LARC–5) thus, greatly increasing the capability of these units.

(c) The present capability to support combat forces in Southeast Asia by over-the-beach resupply operations, if required, is deemed adequate for the forces to be deployed to this area under existing limited war plans.

(2) Navy

(a) The Navy has, under continuous study and development, programs and projects to improve logistic support of landing forces in amphibious operations which include evaluation of various over-the-beach supply support systems. Each system is analyzed with respect to inter-relationship and combined productivity of packaging, materials handling and transportation procedures and techniques. These studies result in continued improvement in the hardware utilized and techniques employed in over-the-beach supply support operations for amphibious assault.

(b) Private research contractors, the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory and the U.S. Army Transportation Corps are principal contributors to the Navy Program. Some items now in the evaluation stage are:

i. Landing Craft Retriever (LCR), a vehicle for unloading LC’s in one operation, with up to 70 tons cargo lift capability. Tests to date show promise in achieving a through-the-beach capability vice over-the-beach.

ii. Hi-line system of cables from an LST to the beach gives the capability of underway pallet loads from LST’s stranded off the beach direct to a truck.

iii. Causeway extensions for unstable beaches (“rush role”).

iv. Hose reels for buoyant fuel systems.

v. Transfer line barges.

vi. Deep-water fording kits for tractors used in the surf zone.

vii. 600 GPM ship-to-shore fuel systems.

viii. Inflatable causeways.

ix. Ship-to-shore heavy duty cargo systems.

x. Booster stations for ship-to-shore fuel systems.

xi. Helicopter aerial delivery systems.

xii. Improved high-speed tracked amphibians.

Items recently placed in fleet use are:

i. 21-foot wide end-to-end connected pontoon causeway (replacing 14-foot wide lapped units).

ii. 300 GPM bottom laid ship-to-shore fuel system.

iii. Hi-speed shore party crane.

iv. Controlled pontoon launching from LST’s.

v. 100-ton advanced base crane.

11. Subsequent to the preparation of the Limited War Study, a decision was made with regard to use of funds to improve our readiness posture. This funding action will improve our capability to conduct limited military operations. Authorization was granted to increase Army modernization, increase amphibious assault capabilities, provide for additional aircraft carriers on station with the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, and increase air alert status. Subsequent budgetary action may not permit continuation of all of these readiness measures.

1. Source: “Specific Joint Chiefs of Staff Views on Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations.” Top Secret. 25 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs.