Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

281. Briefing Note for December 20 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 19, 1960

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1; NSC 5802)

1. The Council had before it a draft statement of revised U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 6022) which has been proposed by the NSC Planning Board in accordance with [illegible in the original]. In preparing this proposed policy revision the PB had the benefit of discussion which took place in the Council recently, when consideration was given to a preliminary Discussion Paper in which the PB had identified certain questions relating to basic concepts of Continental Defense.

2. The present statement of Continental Defense Policy (NSC 5802/1) was adopted by the Council and approved by the President in February, 1958. The policy review has taken into account two factors which have a particular bearing on the formulation of policy objectives in the area of Continental Defense: First, is the significantly increasing ballistic missile capability which our Intelligence Estimates attribute to the Soviet Union during the period of the 1950’s; and second, the limited prospects of the United States’ for the development and deployment of an adequate anti-ballistic missile system during the same period.

3. Against this background of an increasing Soviet ballistic missile threat, and the absence of an active defense on our part, some divergent views emerged in the PB with respect to certain elements of the over-all policy. Before taking up these policy issues, perhaps the Council would want to note the following key provisions of the proposed policy on which the PB is in agreement.

a. The policy statement encompasses only those objectives which contribute directly to the defense of the North American Continent and to the protection of that part of our retaliatory capability which is based on the North American Continent.

b. An effective continental defense system is considered to constitute one of the key deterrents to an attack on this country.

c. Intelligence estimates reflect that the period of the 1960’s will represent a transition from a largely bomber threat (now drawing to an end) to threat consisting mainly of Soviet ICBM’s—with the prospect that in a few years the principal threat to the U.S. will be Soviet ICBM’s supplemented by a mix of bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and possibly cruise-type missiles.

d. The achievement of a major Soviet ICBM capability in the early 1960’s will take place during a period in which the U.S. will largely depend on its U.S.-based air retaliatory force. Accordingly, during that period special attention should be given to measures for minimizing the vulnerability of our strategic air retaliatory forces to ICBM attack.

e. Recognition is given to the increasing importance—and difficulty—of acquiring timely strategic warning of Soviet attack on the U.S. The paper also includes recognition of the prospect that with the Soviet acquisition of an operational missile capability, U.S. officials may have to accept intelligence warning judgments based on limited evidence—therefore, the risks which are inherent in certain “high priority” intelligence collection programs must be weighed against the even graver risks inherent in failure to obtain strategic warning.

f. A capability for tactical warning against attacks by aircraft, ballistic and non-ballistic missiles, and by CW and BW agents, is singled out for particular effort—along with a requirement for completing the bomb alarm and fallout reporting systems for SAC bases, and the undertaking of a national attack surveillance system.

g. In restating present policy requirements for an integrated air defense system providing defenses in depth against enemy aircraft and non-ballistic missiles, the proposed revision calls for an improved capability of various elements of the system to act independently should integrated functioning of the system be compromised by ballistic missile attack (the objective being to prevent a “free ride” by the enemy over the U.S. in such an eventuality).

h. The proposed policy, as revised, specifically calls for passive defense measures (in addition to active defense) to protect our retaliatory capability—including such measures as increases in mobility, dispersal, hardening, reduction of reaction time, the capability to mount an air borne alert of SAC bombers, and the protection of command communications centers.

i. Another agreed policy revision points to the need for developing procedures and doctrine which will provide course command and control of our retaliatory and defensive forces within the time dimensions of a surprise missile attack. The objective is to insure the survival of the decision-making machinery and a means of communicating with our retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the air, in case of such an attack—with recognition of the necessity for an effective and flexible response not necessarily dependent upon survival of the seat of government and other command and control centers.

j. In singling out research and development areas of particular importance, there is included the detection, surveillance, identification and destruction of satellites and space vehicles (with a footnote reflecting existing policy to the effect that tests involving destruction shall be made only with the specific approval of the President.) (Par. 17, p. 13).

k. [illegible in the original] of policy regarding plans and facilities to ensure continuity of essential Government functions are subject to future NSC review upon completion of the pending [illegible in the original] by OCDM and the Special Assistant referred to in the footnote to Par. 18, p. 14.

l. In the area of Internal Security, Par. 28 of the proposed policy calls for certified efforts to provide deterrents against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. As revised, the policy no long contemplates the use of active devices on the person and pouches of Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel entering the U.S.—because of the State Department position that Bloc officials might detect radiation eminating from the covert device and claim violation of diplomatic immunity (with possible retaliation against U.S. diplomatic pouches and shipments). Such a detection device is under development and a prototype will be completed by AEC and tested early in 1961. As indicated in the footnote on p. 19, production and use of the device would be for Presidential decision at that time.

m. Port Security Policy, stated in Par. 33 was separately considered by the NSC and previously approved by the President on 6/29/60 (NSC Action [illegible in the original]).

POLICY ISSUES

4. The Council may now wish to turn to these paragraphs of the proposed policy statement which reflect divergent views of a policy nature which emerged in the PB:

Par. 4, p. 2, last sentence: The JCS [illegible in the original] its position on this language which questions the U.S. capability to develop and deploy an adequate anti-ICBM system during the 1960’s, barring technological breakthrough. It appears that this JCS reservation applies equally to subsequent parts of the paper dealing with Relative Emphasis (Par. 7) and Civil Defense (Par. 20). Accordingly, at this point the Council might hear the comments of JCS concerning its reservation, before moving on to a consideration of succeeding “splits” which involve the same JCS position. (CALL ON: JCS, for comment on the bracketed last sentence of Par. 4).

Par. 7, p. [illegible in the original]: At this point in the paper there appears a split on the question of Relative Emphasis which should be applied as between active and passive measures to defend our retaliatory capability and our civilian population (a definition of “active” and “passive” defenses appears in the footnote on p. 2). The issue involved here begins with the agreed statement in Par. 6 that predominant emphasis should continue to be placed on measures (i.e., whether “active” or “passive”) to protect our nuclear retaliatory power. Next appears the Majority view in Par. 7 (left hand column) which begins with a specific reference to the increasing ICBM threat and the present limitations on our active defenses. In Par. 7–a, while recognizing the need for “active” defenses, a particular effort to exploit “passive” measures is called for—and in 7–b, the Majority view extends this principle to a requirement for increased attention to “passive” defense of the U.S. population. The Minority view of Budget and JCS (right hand column) called for a continued balance of “active” and “passive” measures, consistent with the changing nature of the Soviet threat and other factors—with a specific requirement in Par. 7–A for predominant emphasis on “active” defenses, and particular emphasis on both “active” and “passive” measures to protect our nuclear retaliatory power (but at this point the JCS part company with Budget, and the JCS would call for increased attention to “passive” defense of the civilian population). Perhaps the Council would now want to discuss this question, beginning with comment from the Majority and Minority proponents, before discussing a later split on Civil Defense aspects. (CALL ON: Defense—and then Budget and JCS).

Par. 20, p. 15: In this paragraph on Civil Defense, there is in some respects a continuation of the preceding split on Relative Emphasis. There has been circulated to the NSC a related paper on “Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelters.” The pertinence of the OCDM paper will be apparent from an oral summary of it which the OCDM Director is now prepared to give to the Council. (CALL ON: OCDM).

(After the OCDM Presentation): The OCDM presentation on Fallout Shelters appears to sharpen the policy issues involved in the alternative views which are set forth in Pars. 20 and 21 of the Continental Defense paper.

Alternative I, the Majority view (p. 15–16) would identify an effective civil defense as providing a deterrent to enemy attack, and a comprehensive system of fallout shelters is described as a key element of civil defense (JCS objected to the second sentence of Par. 20 in which the questionable prospect for an active defense (against ICBM’s in the 1960’s is stated as a reason for the urgent development of an effective civil defense). CALL ON: Defense and JCS.

Alternative II, the Treasury view, is stated, on p. 16—and the difference of views appears to relate mainly to the brakes which would be put on Federal financing of a shelter program, admittedly desirable though it may be. (CALL ON: Secretary of the Treasury).

Alternative III, (Budget view) on p. 16–A, is a restatement of present Continental Defense policy on Civil Defense (Par. 24 of NSC 5802/1) with a cross reference to existing policy on Fallout Shelter which was stated in NSC 5807/2 (at a time when greater weight was given to the prospects for an adequate active defense against ICBM’s). CALL ON: Budget Director.

Par. 23, p. 17: The split here is on the emphasis which should be placed on the dispersal of the population as a civil defense objective, in relation to the fallout shelter program. (CALL ON: Budget, for comment on the Minority view.)

Par. 25, p. 17: Raises the issue as to whether the future stockpiling of civil defense items should be confined to requirements for initial recovery from attack, or extended to recovery after attack. Treasury-Defense-Budget hold the Minority view that our policy should be limited to stockpiling for the initial post-attack period, and limited to measures involving least disruption to the economy, least cost to the Government, and with maximum private participation, as provided in present policy. (CALL ON: OCDM Director, to speak to the Majority view.)

Par. 24, p. 17: Reflects the Minority view of Treasury and Budget that Federal advice and guidance to industry on recovery from attack should be limited to the initial post-attack period.

Miscellaneous Issues

5. At other points in the paper appear other split views which the Council may wish to consider:

Par. 12–b, p. 9–10: Here the JCS differed with the Majority on the question of whether U.S. efforts to develop an anti-ICBM capability should proceed to a completed system, or whether in the course of that development there should be provision for some operational capability without waiting for the complete system. A comparative study of U.S. and Soviet programs to develop anti-ballistic missile capabilities was reported to the President in October by the Comparative Evaluation Group—with no recommendation for efforts to demonstrate a kill capability prior to completion of the current NIKE ZEUS program, although the psychological advantage of an early demonstration was recognized. (CALL ON: JCS for comment on the language proposed for Par. 12–b).

Par. 19–a. p. 15: Here, Defense-JCS propose deletion of the final clause which would require that the Secretary of Defense consult with the Director of OCDM before locating new fixed retaliatory bases and major administrative headquarters. (CALL ON: Defense and OCDM)

Par. 19–b. p. 15: There is agreement on the requirement for fallout shelter in the construction of new Federal civilian buildings of suitable size. However, as to existing Federal buildings, the majority favor incorporation of fallout shelter in all buildings capable of such incorporation, whereas Treasury-Budget feel that fallout shelter should be incorporated into only those existing buildings which may be selected on a basis of relative criticality. (CALL ON: Treasury and Budget).

1. Source: Continental defense policy. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.