Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

278. Memorandum From Boggs to Holders of NSC 6013¹

Washington, December 7, 1960

The enclosed Part 1 (The Military Program) is transmitted herewith for insertion in NSC 6013.

Part 1 has been given a special limited distribution, and access to it should be on a strict need-to-know basis.

Marion W. Boggs
Deputy Executive Secretary

Enclosure

Department of Defense Report to NSC

NSC 6013

Washington, December 10, 1960

STATUS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PROGRAMS

THE MILITARY PROGRAM

CONTENTS

BASIC REPORT

MILITARY FORCES

• I Objectives of the Military Program
• II Evaluation of our Actual and Potential Capabilities
  • A. Nuclear Retaliatory Capability
    • Continental Defense Programs (Covered in Section III)
  • B. Highly Mobile and Deployed Ready Forces
    • Summary Comparisons of Major Forces (Charts & Tables)
  • C. Cold War Contribution
• III Continental Defense Programs

SELECTED MILITARY PROGRAMS

• IV Military Logistics Base
• V Manpower
• VI Military Research and Development
• VII Installations (including Base Rights Agreements)
• VIII Areas of Special Interest
• IX Cost of the Military Program
• APPENDIX—Statistical Data Supplement

NSC 6013, Part 1, THE MILITARY PROGRAM

I. OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY PROGRAM.

The basic national objective of the United States is to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. The basic military threat to fulfillment of this objective stems from an aggressive and deeply hostile International Communism directed by the USSR and/or Communist China, and backed by growing military strength in both nuclear and non-nuclear fields. All elements of the U.S. national power must be resolutely directed toward meeting this communist challenge.

The primary objectives of the U.S. military programs, in support of the basic national objective and in light of the primary threat, are:

To develop and maintain forces of all Services for general war, with sufficient strength to deter general war or to prevail if it should occur.

To develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and to keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise.

To develop and maintain an adequate military capability for defense of the United States and other vital areas of the western hemisphere.

To provide within the total U.S. military forces, highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces which, in concert with other forces, are adequate to deter or defeat local aggression or fight a limited war in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war, using all weapons (including nuclear weapons) as required.

To reinforce and support, in appropriate ways, overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological, and cultural measures in order to achieve national objectives.

II. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN NSC 5906/1.

Overall Evaluation. Between June 1959 and June 1960, there was little change in either the magnitude or character of major U.S. combat forces. Newer weapon systems will be more evident during FY 1961. All Services find it necessary to maintain adequate forces equipped with weapon systems of proven capability to satisfy security requirements and, at the same time, to provide for the development of new systems of yet unproven operational capability. There are two main aspects of this problem.

The complexity of modern weapon systems has resulted in extraordinarily long procurement lead times, and greatly lengthened technical training programs.

Development and procurement of these new weapon systems become more costly each year, and so it has become increasingly difficult to accomplish modernization within available resources.

General War. In evaluating our general war capabilities, the JCS note the requirement for forces capable of both nuclear and conventional operations. While these forces now have a greater capability for delivery of nuclear weapons than ever before, this may not in itself represent a net gain in relative military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Our deployed forces are subject, with little or no warning, to attack by significant communist forces. Within the near future, the Soviet Union may bring into operational readiness intercontinental ballistic missiles with the capability of attacking our base complex in the United States. The security of our long-range, land-based nuclear retaliatory forces will be increasingly dependent upon such factors as adequate warning, airborne alert capability, hardening and mobility. During FY 1961, two of our ballistic missile early-warning installations (Thule, Greenland and Clear, Alaska) will be operational. One site has an initial operational capability today. Full coverage is not scheduled for completion until the U.K. Station becomes operational in FY 1963. The latter site is needed to cover missile launchings from sites in southwestern USSR against targets in the eastern U.S. To augment BMEWS, research and development effort increased in FY 1960 on the satellite-borne ICBM attack alarm system MIDAS. Good progress has been made in satellite programs which are essential to our reconnaissance and intelligence activities. We have no active defense against ballistic missiles but development effort on NIKE ZEUS continues at the highest priority. A coordinated Soviet attack against our long-range nuclear retaliatory forces, our deployed land-based forces, our logistical base, and our naval forces at sea would be extremely difficult to execute with complete surprise, and only a coordinated attack with almost complete surprise could endanger our effective retaliatory power.

Limited War. As the Soviet nuclear, ballistic missile and conventional capabilities grow, the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced in Communist dealings with the rest of the world. In their continual probing of the strength and determination of the West they will be more aggressive in their use of political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. Although the Communists probably would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor as to make clear that further involvement would incur serious risk of general war or political disadvantage, the chances of their miscalculating such risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing. Our military capacity to counter a single local aggression supported by the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to meet national security requirements. Dependent upon the location and size of force required, we would be hard pressed to execute limited military operations simultaneously in two or more areas of the world and maintain an acceptable general war posture. In the latter event, national measures providing for a degree of mobilization and augmentation of lift capabilities might well be required. If sizeable forces were involved in such situations, our capabilities for limited war are such that authorization to use nuclear weapons selectively would probably be required. Our capability to conduct non-nuclear war is very substantial and although it has not kept pace with our growing nuclear capability it has increased. Additionally, we must continue to rely, to a considerable extent, upon indigenous forces to cope with guerrilla and jungle warfare.

Cold War. Unified Commanders have formulated plans and are active in assuring increasingly effective utilization of their resources in the cold war. MAAGS, missions, attaches, rotational forces, pre-stockage of equipment, exchange officers on military staffs and in military schools, weapons demonstrations, show of force, official military visits and assistance in national disasters contribute to the over-all cold war effort. In order to limit the Sino-Soviet initiative in cold war, the United States must develop a broad range of capabilities whereby it may counter Sino-Soviet Bloc and communist activities in many parts of the world. Portions of South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are areas of particular vulnerability.

Mutual Security. In both limited and general war, a substantial contribution is expected from our allies. Military planning takes cognizance of the limitations and capabilities of indigenous forces. Although our national security is predicated upon the concept of collective security, the United States must continue to develop adequate strength and a strategy for its employment to deter or successfully wage war, survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny, and to maintain the leadership of the Free World.

Summary. Statements in previous annual reports and evaluations by the JCS recognized the probable diminishing relative military advantage of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. From the position we occupied with a great manned bomber fleet supported by a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons, at a time when the Soviet Union was very limited in long-range bombers and nuclear weapons, it was to be expected that our margin of advantage would certainly decrease. The statements referred to seem less appropriate today, as our over-all military power continues the greatest in the world.

Our task is to maintain our effective retaliatory capability and to improve our ability to defeat or contain local aggressions. The probable strength of the Soviet Union in ballistic missiles calls for major effort on our part to increase the survivability of our retaliatory strike forces. This need has given emphasis in our programs to increase warning, quick reaction, dispersal of bombers, and hardening, mobility and concealment of missiles.

In last year’s report it was stated that by the end of FY 1962, with a continuance of present U.S. and Soviet trends and programs, and with no major breakthrough, each side may be expected to possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions. It concluded that in such a situation an advantage, possibly conclusive, could accrue to the side taking the initiative. Although this is possible, the progress made in our programs referred to above, to make certain the survival and readiness of effective retaliatory power, gives reasonable assurance that in the period ahead no enemy can expect to launch an attack against us without inviting his own destruction.

With respect to limited and local aggression more adequate provision has been made for Army modernization and for airlift. Also, since the end of fiscal 1960 our readiness has been increased by the deployment of an additional attack carrier to the Mediterranean and the Far East, the deployment of the first POLARIS submarine in the Atlantic, and the achievement of a capability to mount a significant airborne alert.

On 2 December 1960 the JCS approved the National Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operations Plan to become effective on 1 April 1961. The Plan and the Target List were developed by a Joint Staff composed of members of all four Services and representatives of Unified Commanders contributing forces to the initial attack on targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Targets selected, assurance factors, and damage criteria used were consistent with NSC Study 2009. This action is very significant in that for the first time it integrates effectively and provides for mutual support of aircraft and missiles of all Unified Commands in one attack plan.

As of 7 December 1960 the following missiles were in an immediate response posture: 38 THOR in the United Kingdom; 12 JUPITER in Italy; 13 SNARK at Presque Isle, Maine; 5 ATLAS at Vandenberg AFB, California and Warren AFB, Wyoming; and 16 POLARIS missiles deployed aboard the U.S.S. GEORGE WASHINGTON.

The ICBM site activation program suffered some delay in construction and initial installation and checkout of equipment. Delay in operational readiness occurred at the first five (5) sites. Scheduled target dates will be met from March 1961.

The GAM–77 (HOUND-DOG) is a supersonic air-to-surface missile designed to be used as a primary target weapon or as a penetration aid at a maximum range of 650 n.m., thereby enhancing the striking power range and operational life of its carrier aircraft, the B–52. The first two B–52 squadrons were scheduled to be equipped with operational missiles by December of 1960. However, additional testing is required to improve reliability and some slippage is occurring. The first B–52 squadron with 18 operational missiles is participating in testing at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The present program involves 29 B–52 squadrons, all scheduled to become operational by September 1962.

A. PROGRAMS FOR NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCES. The first objective of the U.S. Military Program has dictated maintenance of strategic nuclear retaliatory striking forces, tactical nuclear delivery forces, and deployment of forces as appropriate, all acting in concert to deter general war or to prevail in the event general war occurs.

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) has the largest capacity for nuclear retaliation and is charged with primary responsibility for exploiting the U.S. current superiority in nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems against selected targets and target systems at the outbreak of general war. Total SAC force has been reduced from 43 (11 heavy, 28 medium and 4 reconn.) wings of bomber and reconnaissance aircraft at end FY 1959 to 40 (12 heavy, 25 medium, 2 reconn. and one strategic missile) wings at end of FY 1960, 2 reconnaissance wings and 3 B–47 medium bomber wings having been inactivated, and one each B–52 and strategic missile wings activated. Programmed changes in FY 1961 will result in inactivation of 4 more B–47 wings and activation of the first B–58 medium bomber wing. This trend of decreasing aircraft wings will continue for the next few years as missiles are introduced into the inventory.

Combat capability of SAC heavy bomber wings increased during FY 1960 as one more B–52 wing was activated, bringing the total to 12 B–52 wings with 34 squadrons equipped² and remaining 2 in process of being equipped. By end FY 1961, 13 wings will be fully converted to B–52s. While combat capability of SAC heavy bombers is improving through introduction of new equipment, the medium bomber fleet, with exception of newly activated B–58 units, is approaching obsolescence. (The first SAC unit became operational with 12 B–58s on 3 August 1960.) The B–47’s, which make up the bulk of the bomber force and have now been in service nearly 8 years, have undergone a major safety of flight structural reinforcement to extend their usefulness.

As the Soviet delivery capability increases, so does the vulnerability of SAC retaliatory forces within and outside the United States. To reduce vulnerability, SAC dispersal and alert programs have been enhanced as follows:

a. Heavy bomber dispersal. Although the present goal is to have no more than one heavy bomber squadron on any one base, 36 sqdns are presently located on 28 bases, i.e., 3 bases each with 3 sqdns, 2 bases each with 2 sqdns, and 23 bases each with one sqdn. Two of the 36 heavy bomber sqdns are in process of receiving B–52 aircraft. By end FY 1961, 37 sqdns are programmed to be dispersed on 29 bases, i.e., 3 bases each with 3 squadrons, 2 bases each with 2 squadrons, and 24 bases each with one squadron.

b. Medium bomber dispersal. At present there are 25 wings on 18 bases. Seven bases accommodate 2 wings each and 11 bases accommodate one wing each. At end FY 1961, 23 wings are programmed to be on 19 bases (4 bases each with 2 wings, and 15 bases each with one wing). In extension of this fixed dispersal, SAC has developed plans to reduce vulnerability of the medium bomber force by further dispersal to non-SAC military airfields and civil airfields during certain emergency situations.

c. Alert. On 20 May 1960, SAC reached the readiness posture of 1/3 of its force on continuous 15 minute ground alert. As of 30 June 1960, 448 bombers and 237 supporting aerial tankers are on a 15 minute ground alert status. Also one SM–65 (ATLAS) and four SM–62 (SNARK) missiles were in a war readiness alert posture.

Continued airborne alert training has been conducted throughout the year with the objective of developing the maximum feasible airborne alert capability. Among several specific actions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve the U.S. military posture were those to augment airborne alert capabilities.

During FY 1960 there was some slippage in the ATLAS ICBM operational site program for the first 4 squadrons. The first ATLAS complex, (1 of 3 launchers) of first squadron at Vandenburg AFB, became operational in September 1959. A second complex (3 launchers) of the Vandenburg squadron became operational primarily for crew training in FY 1960, but one launcher, temporarily down for retrofitting, will become operational again in August 1960. The second ATLAS squadron (programmed for Warren AFB) is now scheduled to have its 6 launchers fully operational prior to end CY 1960. Programs for deployment of the ICBM force have been revised to provide for increased levels of hardening of the force and increased numbers of missiles for later ATLAS squadrons which will result in a significant increase in over-all effectiveness of ATLAS forces. Research and development programs for TITAN and MINUTEMAN are progressing satisfactorily. The first 2 TITAN squadrons at Lowry AFB are programmed by Air Force to be operational by end CY 1961 and the first MINUTEMAN squadron during FY 1963.

Supplementing SAC retaliatory capabilities are USAF tactical nuclear strike forces. In the Pacific, these forces consist of 3 wings (9 squadrons) of tactical fighters, one wing (3 squadrons) of tactical bombers and two squadrons of MATADOR tactical missiles. These forces continue in the program during FY 1961. In the United Kingdom, Europe and the Middle East, tactical nuclear strike forces consist of 6 tactical fighter wings (18 squadrons) permanently deployed plus 4 squadrons on continuous rotation from the United States, one wing (3 squadrons) of tactical bombers, and 3 squadrons of tactical missiles, consisting of one MATADOR and 2 MACE squadrons. Except for conversion of the MATADOR squadron to MACE missiles the tactical nuclear strike units in these areas are programmed to remain unchanged during FY 1961. Nuclear capable tactical air forces in the United States, capable of augmenting forces overseas, consist of 6 tactical fighter wing equivalents (comprised of 24 sqdns, excluding the 4 on rotation to Europe) which continue in the program through FY 1961.

Certain major U.S. Naval forces possess a significant nuclear retaliatory strike capability. This capability rests primarily in the attack carrier striking forces and a growing capability in submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

There are 14 attack carriers and 16 associated carrier air groups in the fleet. Normally, 4 to 5 attack carriers, with their embarked air groups, are deployed in overseas areas in position to strike assigned targets. Technological advances in aircraft, carrier facilities, electronic equipments and improved operating techniques have materially increased Navy’s nuclear weapon delivery capability. The 4 CVA 59 (FORRESTAL) class carriers have increased nuclear striking power, improved operational flexibility and enhanced safety of operation. Action will be taken in FY 1961 to increase the U.S. nuclear retaliatory strike capability by deploying one additional FORRESTAL class carrier in each of the SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets, loaded with nuclear-capable attack aircraft. KITTY HAWK, another FORRESTAL class carrier, will join the fleet before end FY 1961 and will provide additional nuclear striking power to the U.S. retaliatory capacity and will replace one of the 7 World War II ESSEX class carriers still in the operating inventory.

Present operational capability for guided missile delivery of nuclear warheads from surface ships and submarines is represented by REGULUS system for which nuclear warheads are stockpiled. REGULUS is installed in 5 submarines (one of which is nuclear powered) and 2 heavy cruisers, all assigned to Pacific fleet. There are 9 more submarines equipped with REGULUS radar guidance system (TROUNCE) to provide terminal control of a REGULUS missile launched from either a submarine or cruiser. One launching submarine is continuously deployed on station in North Pacific waters with target assigned. The other 4 are available in times of tension.

The first 2 Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) POLARIS submarines have been commissioned and are conducting pre-deployment tests and will be operational with missiles on board prior to end CY 1960. Seven more FBM submarines are presently under various stages of construction. A total of 6 are scheduled to be operational in CY 1961. Congress authorized 5 additional FBM submarines for a total of 14 and long-lead items funding for 7 more in the FY 1961 Budget. POLARIS missile development has progressed rapidly and all major milestone dates have been met. The missile was successfully fired from a submerged submarine on 20 July 1960.

Included in naval forces are Fleet Marine Forces which contribute to the over-all nuclear retaliatory capability. This capability is contained primarily in 3 Marine Aircraft Wings, one of which is maintained in the Pacific. The 3 Marine Divisions, including the division in the Pacific as well as the Battalion Landing Team maintained afloat in the Mediterranean, also possess nuclear capabilities (8” howitzer and HONEST JOHN).

Nuclear delivery systems organic to deployed major U.S. Army forces contribute to the nuclear retaliatory capability. In Europe, Army currently maintains 2 REDSTONE missile groups, 8 CORPORAL missile battalions (2 bns in a medium missile command and 6 separate bns), 2 LACROSSE battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN rocket battalions, 5 HONEST JOHN batteries, four 280 mm gun battalions (to be reduced to 2 during FY 1961), nine 8-inch howitzer battalions and five 8-inch howitzer batteries. [text not declassified] New weapons design and missile check-out procedures have appreciably reduced reaction time. Nuclear delivery units in the United States capable of augmenting forces overseas include one medium missile command (2 HONEST JOHN and one CORPORAL bns), one air transportable missile command (HONEST JOHN bn), one REDSTONE missile group, 5 LACROSSE battalions, 3 CORPORAL battalions, 2 HONEST JOHN battalions and the nuclear delivery means organic to CONUS divisions. During FY 1961, 4 LITTLE JOHN battalions will be activated. Planned transition from the liquid-fueled REDSTONE and CORPORAL missiles to solid propellant and an all-inertial guidance system for the PERSHING and SERGEANT systems will greatly improve mobility and reaction time. Current developmental progress of the PERSHING missile indicates that it will have an operational capability in FY 1963.

The Soviet Bloc has the following general capabilities for defense against the foregoing U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces:

Present capabilities of the Soviet air defense system would be greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers in daylight and clear weather at altitudes between about 3,000 and about 45,000 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Fighters would retain some effectiveness at altitudes in excess of 50,000 feet, but capabilities of the fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor visibility. In the increasingly widespread areas defended by surface-to-air missiles, air defense capabilities would be unimpaired by weather conditions and would extend to at least 60,000 feet in altitude.

Despite improvements in the Soviet air defense system, it still has basic weaknesses in coping with a sophisticated air attack. At altitudes below about 3,000 feet, the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; below about 1,000 feet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. Against varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers, stand-off weapons, decoys and electronic countermeasures, air defense capabilities would be significantly diminished. In addition, the Soviet defense problem would be complicated by the variety of delivery systems which might be employed, including cruise-type missiles, fighter bombers, supersonic bombers and low altitude attack bombers.

The Soviets have no known operationally effective system for defense against ballistic missiles and artillery by purely defensive means.

B. PROGRAMS FOR HIGHLY MOBILE AND DEPLOYED READY FORCES.

General. United States ready forces deployed throughout the world, together with the highly mobile back-up forces in CONUS and augmentation provided by our allies are considered to be the most significant deterrents to local aggression or limited war. They also contribute to deterrence of general war. Equipped to conduct nuclear or non-nuclear war, these forces are designed to move quickly against local aggression or limited war, where timeliness of force is the key to maintenance of U.S. interests and prevention of general war. Their capabilities for nuclear war have been included, for the most part, in preceding paragraphs. Following paragraphs describe programs for these forces.

The new M–14 (7.62mm standard NATO round) rifle is now being made available to selected U.S. Army combat units on a limited scale. A new medium tank (M–60) and armored personnel carrier (M–113) entered the inventory in limited numbers in FY 1960. The new 7.62mm machine gun will be available to some units of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) in FY 1961. A high explosive warhead for the HONEST JOHN rocket is now available to overseas and CONUS units. The first dual capable DAVY CROCKETT will be issued to troop units during FY 1961. Army is also scheduled to receive the first models of the new AO–1 MOHAWK combat surveillance airplane and AC–1 CARIBOU 3-ton transport airplane during FY 1961.

U.S. Navy has continued the integration of guided missiles weapons systems into fleet operations. Atlantic Fleet has increased its capability in surface-to-air missiles for anti-air warfare with TERRIER equipped ships. The guided missile cruiser USS GALVESTON is now conducting evaluation of the TALOS shipboard system. In Pacific Fleet, there are 5 submarines and 2 cruisers with REGULUS guided missile capability which are deployed on a rotational basis. Two other cruisers in Pacific Fleet are TERRIER equipped. All carrier fighter aircraft carry either SIDEWINDER or SPARROW III air-to-air missiles for anti-air warfare employment. Some types carry a mixed load of these missiles allowing greater latitude in attack. Light attack aircraft are being configured as fast as procurement will allow, to use BULLPUP, a close-air-support guided missile. Deployed forces in both Atlantic and Pacific Fleets are now equipped with these missiles.

Included in naval forces are Fleet Marine Force ground and air units with the capability to employ tactical nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, either surface or air launched. Capabilities for conducting helicopter-borne vertical assault operations continue to improve. Three interim amphibious assault ships (LPH) now serve the fleets. One more antisubmarine warfare carrier (CVS) converted to an LPH will be added during FY 1961 while 2 further LPH, currently under construction, should be available by FY 1963.

In certain areas the capabilities of U.S. Air Force tactical forces have continued to improve during FY 1960. Compatibility tests between tactical fighters and KC–135 jet tankers have been successfully completed making it possible to deploy Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) units to overseas locations by use of these jet tankers, if desired. This will not only provide greater reliability for refueling operations, it will also permit more rapid deployment. Modernization of tactical forces with F–105 all-weather tactical fighters began in FY 1960. Tactical Air Command is now equipped with one wing of F–105 aircraft, to be increased to 3 wings by end FY 1964. Equippage of theater based forces will begin in early FY 1962 for Europe and early FY 1963 for Far East. About one wing equivalent of F–100 and all F–105 aircraft will be capable of delivering BULLPUP air-to-surface missiles, which will be coming into the operational inventory in FY 1961. Improved reaction time for MATADOR tactical missile units has resulted in an increased readiness posture for those forces and similar improvement is scheduled for MACE units during FY 1961.

[Omitted here are pages 10–23.]

III. PROGRAMS FOR CONTINENTAL DEFENSE.

ESTIMATED SOVIET THREAT AND CAPABILITIES. As of 30 June 1960, by employing their entire heavy bomber force, many of their medium bombers, their small submarine-launched missile capability, and available ICBMS, the Soviets could mount large-scale initial nuclear attacks against North American targets. Actual weight of attack launched against the United States would depend upon Soviet judgment as to optimum combination of surprise and weight of attack against all areas where U.S. and allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities and other essential targets were located. Soviet leaders probably regard their current long-range attack forces as adequate to deliver a devastating attack on concentrations of population and industry, but incapable of preventing, by military action, the nuclear devastation of the USSR. How long this latter consideration remains valid depends upon the progress made in maintaining an effective U.S. military posture vis-a-vis the Soviets.

Because the ICBM offers the Soviets the best prospects of being able to achieve destruction of a substantial portion of U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability prior to launch, future development of Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will be primarily a function of production and development of ICBMs. However, for some years to come, long-range striking capabilities of the USSR will include both manned bombers and ballistic missiles. The Soviets probably will consider that ballistic missiles can best be employed to neutralize U.S. based retaliatory and other capabilities in an initial blow, relying upon bombers for follow-up attacks. Soviet employment of long-range striking capabilities would continue to face great difficulties of timing and distribution of attack against widely deployed, mobile and ready Western strengths.

It is estimated that the USSR now has a limited capability to launch ballistic missiles from about 12 long range, conventionally-powered submarines, 4 of which probably can accommodate 2 ballistic missiles each. A new class of submarine has been in production since 1958. About 9 of these are now considered operational. Although only fragmentary information is available on this class, it is believed to be designed to accommodate about 6 ballistic missiles. It is believed that these submarines would be capable of a 350 n.m. missile range with a CEP of one to 2 n.m., launching from surface or sail awash condition.

Clandestine attack on the United States by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, could occur against specifically selected targets.

Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs—Comparative Evaluation. Communist China has an extremely limited CW capability and no BW capability. The capabilities of other Bloc countries (not including the USSR) are little better. However, the over-all USSR CW/BW capabilities may be superior to those of the United States and its allies but there is no firm intelligence information to support a precise comparison. The USSR may have more different types of CW agents, greater quantities of each agent and also more delivery means. USSR BW capabilities are not known, but it is certain that their efforts in this field have been most extensive and it is known that they have a very comprehensive R&D CW program.

U.S. BW and CW Programs. Increased funding provided in FY 1960 and projected for incremental increase during next 5 years should do much to reduce present USSR relative advantage. The possibility of qualitative improvement through research and development of both agents and munitions appears to be great. A comprehensive report on current status of Department of Defense biological and chemical weapons research and development programs is included in Section VI, Military Research & Development Program.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report, sections IV–IX.]

1. Source: Transmits Part 1 of NSC 6013, “Status of United States Military Programs as of June 30, 1960.” Top Secret; Restricted Data; Special Limited Distribution. Extracts—14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 6013.
2. Note: An “equipped” unit possesses 50% or more of authorized number of modern aircraft. [Footnote is in the original.]