268. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- NSC Meeting on Limited War, 6 October 1960
Mr. Irwin gave the prepared presentation commencing at 0915 and continued through for approximately 28 minutes without interruption.
Mr. Dillon stated he considered only two of the studies realistic, i.e., Offshore Islands and Korea. He considered it significant that we do not have the capability to defend these two areas without resorting to some form of nuclear weapons. He wonders how a war game or realistic examination of the [text not declassified] in these two areas would actually come out. In the next 4 or 5 years, the CHICOMS will have a nuclear capability of their own and may be willing to use it, while the U.S. and USSR may be unwilling to use these weapons. He believes it is in our interest to war game such a situation and get the results quickly.
Mr. Dillon continued that if a two-sided atomic war came out even or ended in a stalemate, this would not be to our advantage. He felt that loss of allies and bases in the Far East would certainly result. He thought we ought to strengthen our conventional forces to meet the Chinese on a conventional basis and wants some sort of answer to a war game of two-sided nuclear war before the new Administration is installed.
Mr. Gates questioned that we would have the ability to fight the Chinese in a conventional sense due to their tremendous advantage in manpower.
Mr. Dillon again pressed for follow-on studies and both Mr. Gates and General Lemnitzer emphasized that the conclusions of such additional studies were entirely dependent upon the assumptions. General Lemnitzer emphasized the terrible vulnerability of the Pusan port complex under the threat of Communist atomic attack in any conventional war in Korea. He stated that in the last Korean conflict, we had alternate plans in case [text not declassified] was hit which were never used but that unquestionably that [text not declassified] was the best atomic target in Korea.
Mr. Gates, on Mr. Dillon’s further request, agreed to do some follow-on studies on the Offshore Islands and Korea but questioned that they would help resolve current problem. General Lemnitzer observed [Typeset Page 1118] that in a real situation, we would have intelligence on which to base actual decisions.
[Facsimile Page 2]Mr. Dillon observed that such studies would be of great assistance to State, even though hypothetical.
Mr. Gray recommended that Defense and the Joint Staff prepare follow-on studies of the Offshore Islands and Korea on a two-sided nuclear war basis, with participation by other agencies when necessary.
General Lemnitzer stated that it would be essential to get inter-agency agreement on the basic assumptions, in which case the studies could be undertaken.
Mr. Gordon Gray will prepare a record of action.
Brigadier General, USA
Director, Office of Planning
Info copies:
Mr. Williams, ISA
Lt Gen Wheeler, JCS
RAdm Ferrall, JCS
- Source: Record of October 6 NSC meeting on limited war. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: Lot 64 A 2710. Drafted on October 10.↩