Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

267. Briefing Note for the October 6 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 5, 1960

UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962

1. The principal item this morning is the 135-page report on UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962, prepared by an interdepartmental study group from the Department of State and Defense, including representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. You will doubtless recall a similar study that was prepared in 1953 pursuant to NSC directive. Following the presentation of the 1958 study to the Council, it was agreed between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and myself, that the study would be periodically reviewed and evaluated. It was later agreed that a complete revision should be made, both to account for new developments and to adjust certain assumptions made in the earlier study. Mr. Irwin, in his presentation today, will tell you of three adjustments, perhaps the most important of which relates to the possible use of nuclear weapons by the enemy.

2. The earlier study considered twelve geographic areas; the present study addresses five: Berlin, Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam, Iran, The Off-Shore Islands, and Korea. These areas were considered suitable for the more extensive treatment that was called for in the new study. The terms of reference, I might add, were drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and agreed to by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and myself. Mr. Irwin will explain to you certain of the basic limitations of the study, but I should like to ask that you also bear in mind:

(1) That the study does not contemplate limited military operations against Soviet Armed Forces; because, under the current strategic concept, overt military engagement of USSR and US Armed Forces is deemed to be general war;

(2) That the study, by agreement, does not include US and allied capabilities for covert military operations and psychological warfare;

(3) That the study has not been given formal Departmental or Agency clearance.

3. At the last Planning Board meeting a number of questions were raised concerning the study, with considerable emphasis on the problem of the possible use of nuclear weapons by both sides in limited military operations. Mr. Irwin will touch upon this and other issues in his presentation. With your permission, however, following his presentation I may wish to return to certain of the Planning Board questions and suggestions.

Mr. Irwin.

(CALL ON MR. IRWIN)

(After Mr. Irwin’s presentation)

Thank you, Mr. Irwin.

4. Before asking for comments, I would like to suggest a sort of ground rule. I think it fair to say that the one clear point of agreement that emerged from the Planning Board discussion of this subject was agreement that the paper is a useful vehicle for raising problems concerning our posture for limited military operations but that decisions on those problems should await further and more detailed study of each. If you agree, Mr. President, I propose that we proceed on that basis: to identify major issues that require further study.

May I now ask the Secretary of State for comments and perhaps questions.

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE)

And now may I call on the Secretary of Defense for his views.

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

I understand that the Chiefs have certain reservations about the study. Perhaps the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would care to present them in greater detail.

(CALL ON THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

The importance of prompt action regarding mobilization and an expansion of the war production base has been sharply illustrated. May I ask the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization for his views, particularly on these two problems.

(CALL ON THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION)

I appreciate the problem for intelligence in a study of this nature. However, I would much appreciate the comments of the Director of Central Intelligence, and especially those relating to possible enemy reaction to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in a Korean or Off-Shore Island situation.

(CALL ON THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY)

And now may I seek the views of science and technology. Dr. Kistiakowsky.

(CALL ON THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)

Are there other comments?

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY)

(CALL ON THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET)

I believe that most of the Planning Board questions have been covered adequately during the course of the discussion,² so I will limit my own observations to two further suggestions:

First, the Off-Shore Islands script covers a most important area of possible conflict, involves the problem of possible use of nuclear weapons, and, at least to me, seem a less contrived situation than that depicted for Korea. For those reasons, I would think that the Off-Shore Islands problem might be usefully and realistically war-gamed. May I suggest, then that the Joint Chiefs be asked to war-game for the Council the Off-Shore Islands script, assuming that the U.S. initiates the use of nuclear weapons as described and that the ChiComs retaliate in kind.

Second, I suggest further that the Joint Chiefs be asked to prepare for the Council a more detailed study of any real deficiencies that are indicated by the paper before us.

1. Source: Limited war study. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
2. (Attached is a short listed of questions that you may wish to use if certain of the points are not adequately covered in the discussion). [Footnote is in the original.]