Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

269. Report by IIC–ICIS¹

Washington, October 11, 1960

REPORT BY IIC–ICIS ON STATUS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. AS OF [illegible in the original]

Introduction

1. This year’s status report on Internal Security deals with the 50-old programs which make up the total Internal Security Program of the United States. The over-all program is coordinated by the IIC and the ICIS in their respective areas of responsibility, either pursuant to specific policies and directives or under the broad terms of the charters of the two NSC Committees.

2. Two programs which have a direct bearing on internal security are not reported on because they fall outside the primary responsibility of the Committees. These are the Port Security Program (for which Treasury has primary responsibility,) and the Government Employee Security Program (for which the Civil Service Commission has a coordinating responsibility).

Highlights of Report

3. These are the highlights of the report which were considered by the Planning Board:

a. The over-all objective of the Internal Security Program is to maintain the highest practicable state of internal security consistent with our form of government.

b. The primary threat to the internal security of the United States is Communist activity, espionage and sabotage, including the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons for use against selected U.S. targets in wartime.

c. A summary appraisal of our internal security program leads the Committees to these conclusions:

(1) While total internal security defenses are unobtainable, improvements are considered possible in the areas of Entry and Exit, Physical and Industrial Security, the Security of Vital Data, and in defenses against Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons.

(2) The Committees find no basis for [illegible in the original] that the completion of over-all program objectives will be achieved in the next year, in the absence of improved measures to meet the internal security provisions of [illegible in the original] National Security Policy.

d. The Investigative Program of the FBI and the other IIC agencies is highlighted by the following:

(1) The identification, penetration and coverage, of the ranks of Communist Party members and supporters requires a full-time, major investigative effort. The FBI continues to develop evidence for use in legal action against subversive individuals and organizations, and the outcome of cases now pending in the Supreme Court will materially affect the prosecutive program.

(2) The FBI is also expending full-time investigative effort to maintain an up-to-date listing of individuals that will be considered for detention as potentially dangerous in a war emergency. (12,000 persons are currently listed, of whom all are aliens).

(3) Intensified coverage of Soviet bloc diplomats and official representatives and the penetration of foreign intelligence operations in the United States also requires a major investigative effort. The number of Soviet bloc official nationals stationed here has steadily increased over the past five years. Of the 557 bloc officials assigned in this country 160 are known or suspected to engage in intelligence operations. The Soviet intelligence potential is doubled by the availability of the other Bloc officials in the United States whose intelligence operations are supervised by the Soviets. [text not declassified].

(4) Comparison studies by the IIC disclose that United States attache personnel stationed in Soviet bloc countries are subjected to harassment, denials and restrictions which have no counterpart in our treatment of Bloc attache personnel in this country. Meanwhile, Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat remain exempt from travel restrictions which are applied to Soviet nationals in reciprocity for Soviet travel restrictions on U.S. nationals.

(5) [text not declassified]

e. Turning to the investigative aspects of the Internal Security Program—which will [illegible in the original] the policy recommending and coordinating responsibility of the ICIS—a number of specific programs are treated in the report. Security measures have been established in such areas as:

[text not declassified]

Internal Security controls on seamen coming off Soviet bloc ships.

The screening of Bloc escapees and refugees.

The screening of visa applicants from Communist countries.

Border control measures and standby emergency border controls.

There is also a Watch List program under which selected agencies furnish the State Department a list of their employees who possess information so sensitive that their departure from the U.S. could present a danger to the internal security. Then if a listed employee applies for a passport, State consults with the agency involved.

And (jointly with IIC) a countermeasures program to detect and defend against clandestine introduction and use of nuclear weapons.

Continued improvements in our internal security databases are considered possible and [illegible in the original] in making the internal security problems posed by the following:

The admission of Soviet bloc visitors to the United States under our policy on East-West Exchanges.

The absence of legislation to permit the denial of U.S. passports to Communists.

The lack of legal authority by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to exercise closer controls over the subversive activities of aliens who are in the U.S. prior to their departure under deportation orders.

The absence of an adequate program, under the auspices of OCDM, to provide the necessary physical security protection for key Government and industrial facilities against clandestine attack by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, on the order of protection which is afforded to facilities which are under the cognizance of NSC and Defense.

Another area in which present measures do not provide a solution to the internal security problem involved has to do with the acquisition of Unclassified strategic data by Soviet Bloc diplomats and official personnel. Present U.S. policy provides that we are to place restrictions “on the basis of strict reciprocity” upon travel, photographing, sketching, and such activities of Bloc representatives, as a means of deterring their acquisition of such information. The imposition of these reciprocal restrictions is coordinated by an inter-agency group chaired by State. In the Planning Board discussion, State referred to the difficulty in applying strict reciprocity in our dealings with the Bloc countries. The Status Report also reflects the view of Commerce Department (which has a responsibility for seeking equitable exchanges in return for Soviet bloc acquisition of publications) that any restrictions on Soviet access to Government Printing Office materials might seriously interfere with the operations of U.S. publication procurement officers in Russia.

There are also limitations on the program for the development and use of devices to detect the presence of nuclear materials coming into the U.S. at selected ports of entry. Present devices, while improved, cannot positively identify nuclear materials as such—and the prototype of such a discriminating device will not be ready for testing until early in 1961. Steps to improve the operational use of present devices await completion of the review of Continental Defense policy. Meanwhile, under present policy when the devices indicate the presence of a radioactive source in an accompanied Soviet bloc diplomatic pouch, the pouch is not challenged unless the device registers the presence of uranium, plutonium or other neutron source. In any event, the devices cannot be used on baggage which is put on airplane flights which are pre-cleared by U.S. Customs in Canada and at Bermuda, Searches of unaccompanied Soviet bloc diplomatic baggage, effects and [illegible in the original] to be made by Customs under present policy.

4. This concludes a summary of the highlights of the Status Report.

1. Source: Status of the internal security programs. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.