266. Memorandum From Rathjens to Kistiakowsky1
SUBJECT
- Comments on Attached Study
1. The main conclusion of the study is that U.S. capabilities for the limited operations studied are adequate. The most serious criticism that can be leveled is that this conclusion is not supported by the analysis. Five case studies are discussed as indicated below:
a). Berlin: In this instance it is acknowledged that “the adequacy of U.S. and Allied capabilities for limited military operations in defense of Berlin is dependent upon demonstrated U.S. and Allied resolution to risk general war over this issue, and Soviet unwillingness to accept such risk over Berlin.” (p. 23, para. A) In other words, defense of Berlin is dependent on the credibility of the threat of general war, since our limited capabilities are otherwise inadequate!
b). Laos: The introduction of Chinese “volunteer forces” is assumed to be beyond the scope of the study (p. 50, para. G), though it is acknowledged that this would be the most probable consequence of the assumed U.S. attack against N. Viet Nam (p. 52, para. 6).
c). Iran: It is acknowledged that if the Soviets follow one of the three courses of action proposed—Course I (open intervention with Soviet forces),—the best we could hope for would be to hold the southern part of the country (p. 63, para. d(3)). It is further stated that such Soviet action is considered beyond the scope of the study (p. 81, para A).
d). Offshore Islands and e). Korea: In these cases, the judgment is reached that we should use nuclear weapons, but the consequences of enemy use are not explored. It is acknowledged that our logistic base is very vulnerable.
In view of the foregoing, I believe the first conclusion of the study might more accurately be rewritten along the following lines:
U.S. and Allied capabilities are adequate provided the Bloc does not take actions for which they are inadequate.
I think this a sad example of people coming up with a conclusion that they think their bosses want to hear, regardless of the facts and any analysis.
[Facsimile Page 2]2. In a number of places (e.g., page 20, para. E 1) there is a supposition that the Soviets will not expect, will be unpleasantly surprised by, and will therefore back down in the face of a moderately tough [Typeset Page 1113] U.S. response. It seems to me that in most of the contemplated circumstances, especially with reference to China, the aggressive actions by the Bloc will have been taken in the expectation, and in spite of the fact, that we will react as strongly as is indicated in each of the several examples.
3. In several instances in the scenarios (e.g., page 49, para. 5 a, page 77, para. F) it is stated that the guidance provided U.S. commanders is to the effect that “military action should be conventional—until it became clear that over-all national objectives could not be achieved in this way.” It seems to me that there is the clear implication that the way to get out of a jam is to start throwing nuclear weapons around. This might have been reasonable in 1950, but seems out of date now that the other guys have large numbers too. There seems to be a lingering idea that the use of nuclear weapons is advantageous for our side, an idea not supported by analysis.
4. Particularly as evidenced in the Berlin example, there is an important point that is developed in these studies, but which doesn’t seem to have been quite realized, though it is obvious; that is, that in almost all cases where there is a question of the conflict being expanded, it is the U.S. that must make the decision for a qualitative relaxation of limits, e.g., with respect to Berlin, it is we who must cause the first physical violence (knocking down barriers, detonating mines, etc.), and it would be we who would have to make the decision to introduce nuclear weapons, and eventually we who would have to make the decision to start an all-out nuclear exchange. Because we are quantitatively inferior (and in the case of Berlin, particularly, in such a vulnerable position), the Bloc can always increase the scale of fighting gradually and quantitatively, while we must then either back down or make a qualitative decision. I would submit that it is probably easier to make the decision to send in one more division (especially when you know the other guy doesn’t have any more) than it is to make the decision to introduce nuclear weapons or start an all-out TN exchange (when you know the other guy has like capabilities).
5. In summary, I think we are probably in a lot weaker position than the authors of this paper would like to have us believe.
Two detailed comments.
a). Apparently the use of improved types of conventional ordnance by the U.S. was not considered in the analysis on the grounds that the secrets here are too precious to risk in a limited war;
[Facsimile Page 3]b). The airlift analysis is worrisome. The CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) is assumed used though the Korean War was not deemed a sufficient emergency, I believe, to require its use. It is untested. The a/c cannot carry vehicles, guns, etc., because of openings and floor loadings. Resupply of forces by air is an operation that can consume a lot of air lift. In a place like Iran, it would require at least 30 days and more likely [Typeset Page 1114] 45 to get sea lift there. We might have enough airlift to get the forces postulated to Iran in the time assumed. I very much doubt we could support them by air once there. (Will look into this further.)
- Source: Comments on limited war study. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.↩