265. Letter From Smith to Irwin1
I thought your presentation to the Armed Forces Policy Council on Tuesday morning was of great interest and importance.
Having thought a good deal about this subject for some years, I would like to pass on a few personal observations in the hope that they may find reflection in any final version of your statement before the NSC.
I recall the conversation that Secretary McElroy, Secretary Herter, you and I had in Geneva in 1959 about the limited war study which was the predecessor of the present one. That study concluded generally that US limited war capabilities were adequate. I stressed that this conclusion was based on the very optimistic assumption that the US could employ nuclear weapons while the enemy would only use conventional weapons. This assumption is not supported by the pertinent national intelligence estimate.
Secretary McElroy then suggested that our limited war capabilities be restudied to determine their adequacy for use against an enemy using nuclear weapons. The present study, I believe, had its origin in those Geneva conversations.
However, it seems to me that this study still leaves largely unexplored the question of whether our limited war forces would be adequate to fight an enemy who also used nuclear weapons.
In the Off Shore islands case, there is some discussion about the possibility of ChiCom use of nuclear air to air weapons, but no conclusions are drawn as to the result [Facsimile Page 2] of such use on ChiNat/US ability to control the air over Formosa Strait.
I think it would be a service to direct the Council’s attention to a place in the report where the question of the possible military consequences of two-way use of nuclear weapons is considered. On pages 121 and 122, after pointing out that there might be some margin, of advantage to the UN forces from an initial exchange, the following language appears:
“In the event the communists expanded the nuclear exchange to include all of South Korea, the extreme vulnerability of the U.N. LOC would become a major consideration. A relatively few weapons [Typeset Page 1111] employed on key fixed logistical installations, such as Ascom City and Pusan, would seriously affect the US and Allied capability for sustained combat in Korea. Contrariwise, the communist forces are relatively primitive in nature and their supply requirements are substantially less.”
On page 122 and 131, it is concluded that under conditions of a continuing two-way nuclear exchange there would result either a military stalemate or an unpredictable expansion of the conflict. Query as to the significance of this conclusion for any judgment as to the present adequacy of our limited war forces?
I got the impression from listening to the discussion on Tuesday morning that your people continue to assume that there would be US monopoly use of nuclear weapons in limited operations. Is this a wrong impression?
In addition to the proposition “we can’t win unless we use nuclear force”, I would like to hear more discussion of the question, “Can we win if both sides use nuclear force as our intelligence estimates suggest would occur?”
[Facsimile Page 3]SNIE 100–7–58 of July 22, 1958, entitled “Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to US Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East” concluded, in part, that
“We believe that if the US used nuclear weapons in meeting Bloc local aggression in the Far East, there would be a grave risk that the Communists would retaliate in kind. . . . If, in the case of Communist aggression against South Korea . . . the US nuclear response were limited to Korea . . . the Communists would probably respond in kind in the same area.”
An informal check indicates that our intelligence people believe this SNIE is still valid.
I think it would be most helpful if some time in the future the NSC’s attention could be sharply focused on the effect of limited enemy nuclear attacks on our forces.
I am inclined to think that if this is ever done it will lead to a change in our policies and financial allocations to limited war forces.
Perhaps a Net Evaluation Committee study of an attack on the Off Shore islands, assuming both sides use nuclear weapons, would be desirable as a next step in exploring the question of whether it is to US advantage to use nuclear weapons in attempting to win a limited war. I would appreciate your reaction to this last suggestion.
Sincerely,
- Source: Questions some of the assumptions about non-use of nuclear weapons by Communist forces made in the limited war study. Secret; Personal. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Limited War.↩