Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

264. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, September 28, 1960

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962

REFERENCES

• A. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations”, dated June 18, 1958
• B. NSC Action No. 1934

The enclosed study on the subject, prepared by an Interdepartmental Study Group consisting of representatives from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to agreement between the heads of these agencies and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 6, 1960.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Memorandum for Gray

Washington, September 28, 1960

SUBJECT

• Study of “Capabilities for Limited Military Operations”

Transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council is the interagency study, “United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962,” prepared in accordance with the agreements reached between our respective offices. This paper is the product of a special study group composed of representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. While it has not been given formal Departmental or Agency clearance, it has been presented before the Armed Forces Policy Council and discussed by the undersigned.

This work differs from the limited war study of 1958 in several important respects. It takes into account new developments and capabilities to 1 July 1962 and revises certain assumptions made in 1958, particularly with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons by the opposing sides in limited military operations. Also, greater attention is given to logistic capabilities and implications, and thus its scope is considerably broadened.

The study examines the capabilities for the next two years of U.S. and Allied forces to conduct limited military operations in certain hypothetical situations, employing only those weapons systems now in the armed forces inventory or rapidly approaching that status.

Since the situations considered have not been wargamed and are admittedly based on hypothetical but possible circumstances, the conclusions should not be considered as definitive or restrictive either with respect to future policy actions or in determining the size and nature of United States forces required for limited military operations. Nevertheless, the conclusions are important because they indicate certain strengths and weaknesses in U.S. and Allied capabilities and highlight certain issues of a policy nature which affect those capabilities.

In this context it is a useful and meaningful document.

• /s/ Livingston T. Merchant
  For The Secretary of State
• /s/ Thomas S. Gates
  Secretary of Defense
• /s/ Allen Dulles
  Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment

Interdepartmental Study Group Paper

Washington, July 14, 1959

TABLE OF CONTENTS

UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962

• I. INTRODUCTION
  • AUTHORITY FOR STUDY
  • PROCEDURES OF STUDY
  • SCOPE OF STUDY
• II. OVER-ALL CONCLUSIONS
• III. BERLIN
  • SITUATION
  • CONCLUSIONS
• IV. LAOS, VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA
  • SITUATION
  • CONCLUSIONS
    • ANNEX “A” (Military Considerations Pertaining to the Use of BW and CW Weapons During the Insurgency)
    • ANNEX “B” (Military Considerations Pertaining to the Use of Nuclear, BW, CW Weapons During the Intervention)
• V. IRAN
  • SITUATION
  • CONCLUSIONS
    • ANNEX (Airlift Analysis)
• VI. OFFSHORE ISLANDS
  • SITUATION
  • CONCLUSIONS
• VII. KOREA
  • SITUATION
  • CONCLUSIONS
    • ANNEX (Military Considerations Pertaining to the Use of CW/BW Weapons in Limited War Operations)
• ENCLOSURE—Terms of Reference

UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962

I—INTRODUCTION

A. AUTHORITY FOR STUDY

1. An interagency study of U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations was conducted in 1958 pursuant to NSC actions 1842g(4), 1844, 1881, and 1934. Subsequently, it was agreed between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that this study should be periodically reviewed and evaluated. In conversations and exchanges of correspondence during 1959 among the principals concerned, it was agreed that a complete revision should be made, both to account for new developments and to adjust certain assumptions made in the first study, particularly as to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons by the opposing sides in limited military operations. Greater attention was given to logistic implications in the present study, and thus its scope was considerably broadened.

2. Of the 12 geographic areas considered in the 1958 study, the State and Defense Departments agreed on five (Korea, Quemoy/Matsu/Taiwan, Iran, Berlin and Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam) as suitable for more extensive study. Draft terms of reference for the study were then drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Later, the terms of reference were agreed to by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The terms of reference, including the assumptions and scope of the study, are appended as Enclosure “A”.

B. PROCEDURES OF STUDY

1. An interdepartmental study group, was established with representation from State, Defense (JCS, ISA and DR&E) and CIA. Although the principal from each participating agency drew upon the full resources of his agency, and although meetings were attended by experts on various functional topics and geographic areas, this report represents the views of the interdepartmental study group and does not constitute the official position of any of the participating agencies.

2. The following procedures were used in developing the scenarios, or scripts, for each of the five geographic areas considered in the study: the study group met as a whole to develop general outlines from which the State Department drafted a script on the political situation giving rise to the limited military operations. This was then examined by the group as a whole and when approved in draft, formed the basis for the script on military actions prepared by the Joint Staff. Following these two steps, the study group made necessary revisions and adjustments and then further developed the political and military situation in the light of such factors as enemy intentions, international (including Communist Bloc) reactions and allied support. CIA drafted that portion of the study dealing with international reactions. Once the basic script had been prepared and approved by the study group, the conclusions were written by the group as a whole.

3. An effort was made by all members of the committee to reflect insofar as possible the views of their agencies. Although the widest possible coordination was achieved, no effort was made to obtain formal agency clearances for the study prior to its completion. Where there were divergencies of views, the matter was resolved in the light of the consensus of the study group.

C. SCOPE OF STUDY

1. The basic assumptions of the study are set forth in the terms of reference appended as Enclosure “A”. However, it should be noted that the study had to be conducted within certain artificial limits. For example, each situation had to provide the occasion for U.S. limited military operations. On the other hand, situations likely to lead immediately to general war had to be avoided. Consequently, there was often a conflict between the need to develop a scenario which would permit an examination of U.S. and allied capabilities for conducting limited military operations, and the actual facts of the particular situation, based upon the best current estimates and intelligence. In almost all cases some compromise was necessary, but on the whole, the scenarios developed do reflect both the current situation and the best available judgment of enemy intentions and capabilities and of the probable responses by the United States in the light of existing national security policy. However, since judgments about enemy intentions were specifically designed to support the study, they should not be construed as intelligence estimates for application to actual situations.

2. In several of the studies it was necessary to recognize that when hostilities had reached a certain point it was likely that one side or the other would take steps to terminate it. At the same time it was necessary to continue the development of the situation to permit a more extensive examination of our capabilities. In these cases the device was adopted of noting that the situation might well terminate at a particular “threshold” or level of intensity; but that for the purposes of the study certain assumptions were made to permit the military operations to continue. Where necessary, the military actions were divided into phases in order to take into account alternative assumptions about the most probable ensuing developments.

3. On the matter of weapon systems, the study was based upon those known or expected to be in enemy or U.S. and allied inventories by the terminal date of the study, 1 July 1962. Therefore, the scenarios could be developed only up to a point to permit examination of particular systems, available and appropriate to the situation.

4. By agreement of the participating agencies, U.S. and allied capabilities for covert military operations and psychological warfare were excluded from the study. The study group recognizes, however, that such capabilities would be relevant to a number of the situations studied.

5. In contrast to the 1958 study in which capabilities for limited military operations were discussed on a general basis and supported by shorter studies of twelve geographical areas, the present study examined five situations (Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Berlin and Laos) which are considered adequately representative of the types of areas and situations in which the United States might conduct limited military operations. Each of the five has been prepared in sufficient detail to stand independently. Together they cover a sufficient range of problems to permit over-all conclusions to be drawn on U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations.

II—OVER-ALL CONCLUSIONS

1. U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our allies are generally adequate to conduct any one of the limited military operations studied but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each case, to:

a. Initiate partial mobilization.

b. Augment existing military lift capabilities.

c. Expand the war production base.

d. Waive financial limitations.

2. The U.S. overall capability for general war would be degraded initially by any one of the five limited military operations studied, except Berlin, although not to an unacceptable degree. The capability of the U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces for general war would in no case studied, be seriously affected.

3. Although U.S. capabilities might, in some circumstances, be adequate to conduct two of these limited military operations simultaneously, the U.S. over-all capability for general war would, in such circumstances, be degraded to an unacceptable degree.

4. On the basis of the assumptions utilized, the five studies did not indicate a need for change in existing deployments of U.S. forces.

5. Substantial conventional forces—ground, sea and air—were required in all cases studied whether or not nuclear weapons were employed.

6. From the U.S. military point of view, the desirability of initiating the use of nuclear weapons varied in the five cases studied. In Berlin, Iran, and Laos, their use would not provide a clear military advantage. However, use of [text not declassified].

7. Anticipation of the need to initiate a limited military operation along with the earliest possible decisions on its character and objectives, including possible restrictions on weapons systems to be employed, will substantially enhance U.S. and allied capabilities to respond rapidly to the threat.

8. Limited military operations to achieve national objectives are based on a careful balance of political and military considerations which may require restraints on the use of military force. Such restraints may seriously handicap the conduct of military operations and must be kept under continuous review for the purpose of considering their possible revision, where necessary, to achieve established national objectives. The closest possible coordination of political and military decisions and actions will enhance our capability to conduct limited military operations effectively.

9. From a military point of view, it would not be advantageous for U.S. and allied forces to initiate the use of lethal CW/BW agents, principally because current programs provide only a limited capability and because our allies lack protective equipment and training.

10. U.S. employment of non-lethal CW/BW agents would, under certain circumstances, enhance the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces.

11. The United States and its allies presently do not have an adequate capability for counter-guerrilla type limited military operations.

12. If fully committed and used in optimum fashion, the U.S. military airlift, including reserve and national guard, is adequate when augmented from civilian sources for effective support of the individual operations studied in Iran, Laos or Korea, but is not adequate to support two such operations simultaneously.

13. An augmentation of existing sea-lift capabilities would be required in all cases except Berlin. This would vary from a rather small augmentation of existing cargo lift in the Pacific for the Offshore Islands to an extensive augmentation of cargo and passenger lift for Korea—including a transfer from the Atlantic to the Pacific of passenger transports.

14. World-wide strategic communications are adequate to support all operations studied except in Southeast Asia, where they would require considerable U.S. augmentation.

15. Pre-stockage of supplies in the European and Far East areas substantially enhances our capabilities to respond promptly and effectively. Although present pre-stocks in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia are minimal and add little to our capabilities to respond, programmed pre-stocks will partially correct this deficiency by 1962.

16. Transit rights and bases in Italy and Turkey are essential to U.S. limited military operations in Iran. Additional over flight, staging and operational rights in advance of U.S. deployment would enhance our ability to deploy forces rapidly.

17. Transit rights and logistic bases are essential in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines for the timely and sustained support of operations in the Western Pacific. In addition, similar rights are essential in Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam for successful operations in Southeast Asia.

18. Existing logistic support facilities and air bases in Southeast Asia are inadequate to support sustained operations of U.S. and allied forces. The timing and extent of operations in this area are almost entirely dependent upon the effectiveness of corrective measures to rectify deficiencies.

19. In all cases studied, some degree of mobilization was required, ranging from a modest mobilization of selected reserve units in the Berlin case to a total mobilization of the 1,000,000 man Ready Reserve for Korea.

20. An expansion of the war production base would be required in the event of hostilities in Korea, the Offshore Islands or Laos in order to prevent a dangerous degradation of war reserves in PACOM and CONUS. In the case of Korea and Laos, six months would be required to re-establish these reserves to required levels. In the case of Berlin and Iran, it would be desirable to make preparations for the rapid expansion of the war production base.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the study.]

Enclosure A

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR STUDY OF CAPABILITIES OF FORCES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS (C)

1. To review and update the joint study of United States and Allied capabilities for limited military operations from the present to 1 July 1962.

THE PROBLEM

2. Limited military operations could be in progress in more than one area of the world simultaneously.

ASSUMPTIONS

3. The U.S. military posture will remain substantially unchanged through 1 July 1962.

SCOPE OF STUDY

4. National policy, as set forth in NSC policy papers, will be used as guidance in the consideration of probable U.S. political and military response to the situations examined by the study. These studies should not be inconsistent with national policy.

5. Because they are the most likely situations which might develop and which could involve the United States in limited military operations, the study will consider the following areas: (a) Korea; (b) Quemoy/Matsu/Taiwan; (c) Iran; (d) Berlin; (e) Laos/Cambodia/Vietnam.

6. However, the situations examined pursuant to NSC Action 1842g(4) may be re-examined and updated as appropriate in light of existing conditions and the National Intelligence Estimates.

7. Examination of each situation will include consideration of:

a. U.S. national objectives, to include deterring Communist limited military aggression or, if necessary, to defeat such aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to keep hostilities from broadening into general war,

b. U.S. and foreign political backgrounds and implications,

c. Enemy objectives and capabilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear,

d. U.S. and Allied capabilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to include logistic capabilities,

e. Effect on U.S. and Allied posture for general war, and,

f. Special political and military problems involved in the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.

8. The study shall be prepared in sufficient detail so as to supersede, rather than augment, the previous study.

9. The study will not extend to the preparation of detailed plans to deal with each situation.

10. Should a situation reach the point of general war, further examination of that situation will be beyond the scope of the study, except that the considerations under paragraph 7 e shall be assessed.

11. Conclusions will be drawn for:

a. Each situation relating to:

(1) Adequacy of U.S. and Allied military capabilities to deal with that situation.

(2) Foreign policy implications.

(3) Other national security implications revealed by the examination.

b. The over-all study relating to:

(1) Adequacy of U.S. and Allied Military capabilities for limited military operations.

(2) Foreign policy implications.

(3) Other national security implications revealed by the examination.

1. Source: Transmits a study by interdepartmental study group on “U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962.” Top Secret. Extracts—11 pp. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to President for National Security Affairs, Limited Military Operations.