Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

263. Briefing Note for the September 15 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, September 14, 1960

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy on Continental Defense

1. The first item before the Council is a Discussion Paper submitted by the PB on the subject of Continental Defense. The purpose of the paper is to provide the basis for a discussion by the Council of factors which in the judgment of the PB require a reassessment of our Continental Defense Policy. To this end, there are presented in the Discussion Paper six questions, some of the answers to which will have an important bearing on recommendations which the PB will make at a later date for specific revisions of the statement of U.S. Policy on Continental Defense presently set forth in NSC 5802/1.

2. In laying the predicate for the questions subsequently dealt with in the Discussion Paper, the PB has presented in Parts II and III a resume of Soviet Capabilities (drawn from relevant NIE’s) and an analysis of U.S. Policies and Capabilities having a bearing on the subject. At the risk of doing an injustice to the PB’s assessment appearing on pages 2 through 8 of the Paper, it can be summarized in briefest fashion as follows:

a. Our present Continental Defense Policy was adopted during a period when the Soviet manned bomber force was the primary threat to the protection of our retaliatory capability based on the North American Continent, and that period is drawing to an end. (By the end of 1960 the Soviet ICBM threat will constitute a grave threat to U.S. metropolitan areas—by 1961 it will present an extremely dangerous threat to SAC bomber bases, ICBM sites and command installations—and in a few years the principal threat will be Soviet ICBM’s, supplemented by a mix of heavy and medium bombers, increased numbers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and possibly cruise type missiles.)

b. The advent of major Soviet ICBM capability, and a consequent reduction in the reliability of our early warning capability, raise a question as to the continuing validity of those provisions of present policy which are geared to the concept that attack warning would permit the launching of a significant portion of our SAC force before its destruction on the ground; would provide the lead time required for alerting key military forces; would permit the making of decisions by key officials and the communication of those decisions; and would allow time for evacuation and relocation of the civilian population.

c. Moreover, the present policy places predominant emphasis on active defenses as compared with passive defenses for the protection of our retaliatory capability and our population. The PB’s paper suggests that continued predominant emphasis on active over passive defenses is questionable. It is reflected in the Discussion Paper that the improvements visualized in 1958 for our active defense against nuclear attack have not materialized—quite to the contrary, it is reported that our major active defense system against ballistic missiles now under research and development (NIKE-ZEUS) would not produce an operational system within the next 10 years, barring unforeseen break-throughs.

d. Therefore, the PB has taken a preliminary look at our present Continental Defense Policy in the light of present-day estimates of an imminent Soviet ICBM capability, and in the light of our actual and potential capabilities and vulnerabilities, and as a result the PB has blocked out the six questions which appear on page 1 of the Discussion Paper and are subsequently discussed at some length in the Paper. I will read the questions as background to a presentation which will be made by the Department of Defense. The Defense presentation will address itself to Questions 1, 2, and 6, and reference will be made to Question 3. After the presentation, I will come back to Questions 4 and 5.

3. CALL ON the Secretary of Defense to introduce the Defense presentation.

4. (After the Defense presentation.) I would like now to refer briefly to Questions 4 and 5 of the Discussion Paper which were not dealt with in the Defense Presentation:

Question No. 4. The background of this question is set forth in paragraphs 49 through 65 of the Discussion Paper, beginning on page 15. The basic consideration is that our “low key” shelter policy was adopted on the premise that improved active defense was attainable—an expectation which is apparently not to be realized for at least 10 years insofar as an anti-ICBM system is concerned. The question posed is whether there should be a substantial increase of emphasis on providing fall-out shelters for the civilian population, or whether there should be a continuation of the present “low key” approach called for in current national policy on “Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter” (NSC 5807/2).

Question No. 5. The background of this question is presented in paragraphs 66 through 69 of the Discussion Paper, beginning on page 20. Involved in this question are the concepts in present policy which call for continuity of wartime Government functions through relocation to hardened sites by those who survive an initial missile attack, and their continued functioning under circumstances characterized by possible loss of communications and command personnel. Unless someone wishes to express views on this subject, the Council will note that OCDM is studying this question.

5. Perhaps the Council would now like to address itself to the questions posed on page 1 of the Discussion Paper, and to related provisions of the proposed Record of Action which is before you.

Question No. 1. Is there discussion on this question?

Question No. 2. Is there discussion on Question No. 2? The Council will note that paragraph c of the proposed Record of Action contemplates a study by the Department of Defense on this subject; and the submission of a report which would be included in the annual report on the status of the military program.

Question No. 3. This question was alluded to in the presentation by the Defense Department. This subject is treated in paragraph d of the proposed Record of Action, which provides that I would confer with the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding the proposal for a study relating to the matter.

Question No. 4. Is there discussion on this question? The Council will note that paragraph a of the proposed Record of Action contemplates that OCDM is to review the full-out shelter policy and will report on progress of the program in an early report to the Council.

Question No. 5. Is there discussion on this question? It will be noted that paragraph f of the proposed Record of Action refers to the current re-examination of the subject by OCDM for use in the review of Continental Defense policy.

Question No. 6. Is there discussion on this question? This subject is covered in paragraph g of the proposed Record of Action. In this connection, I propose that paragraph g of the Record of Action be revised to read: “Noted that any test which involves destroying a satellite or space vehicle should not proceed without specific Presidential approval.”

6. It will be noted that the Discussion Paper does not include the Internal Security provisions of Continental Defense Policy (which are being separately considered in the PB), nor the provisions dealing with Port Security (which have already been revised following separate consideration by the Council).

1. Source: U.S. policy on continental defense. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.