Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

232. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 100–60

Washington, January 19, 1960

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION²

FOREWORD

Although we have tried in this estimate to take as long a view as possible, we have necessarily left out of account some elements that could drastically alter the course of events. Thus, we have not attempted to assess the likelihood or consequences of revolutionary scientific advances of either military or civilian application. Moreover, we have assessed the East-West struggle on the assumption that no major war takes place, and on the other hand, that there is no agreement for large-scale reduction of military capabilities by the major powers.

SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATE

1. Over the next decade, we believe that the stature of the USSR and of Communist China in the world will continue to increase markedly, thus posing increasingly serious challenges and a growing menace to the US and the West.³ (Para. 18)

2. In the world in general, recent Soviet behavior contributed to a spreading popular impression that the East-West struggle, or cold war, was entering a period of greater movement and fluidity, and that the direction of this movement was toward a diminution of cold war tensions. Viewed objectively and realistically, however, the East-West relationship remains fundamentally hostile. The emerging Soviet ICBM capability, dramatized in the eyes of the world by the Lunik shots, is altering military power relationships. Confidence that the trend of events is in their favor remains a keynote of the behavior of the Soviet leaders, and they assert that the overall growth of their relative power position has now reached the point where major consequences will be manifest on the world scene within the foreseeable future. (Paras. 13–14)

3. Our views of Soviet power and policy are fully stated in our forthcoming estimate on this subject. In brief, we believe that:

a. Soviet economic and scientific strength will continue to grow at a rapid rate.

b. The Soviets, despite some force reductions, will maintain a high level of conventional military forces and will greatly increase their long range attack capabilities, above all through a substantial ICBM buildup.

c. In the Soviet view, the emerging standoff of intercontinental striking forces marks a stalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement would entail either serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

d. Soviet foreign policy will remain devoted to the same objectives as heretofore. At least over a five-year period, elements of both a policy of pressure and one of reducing tensions will probably be adopted at one time or another. The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now in view. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long range missiles have brought them into a period when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than it is at present. (Para. 19)

4. Although the assets of the USSR are formidable, and for the foreseeable future will cause it to gravely threaten US security and that of the Free World generally, some of these assets also contain problems. Chief among these are the Satellite situation, Soviet relations with the underdeveloped areas, and Sino-Soviet relations. In the course of time, it is possible that these problems, coupled with long term evolution within the USSR itself, would limit the effectiveness and even alter the content of Soviet foreign policy. At present, however, we see no basis for estimating that such problems would either diminish Soviet internal power or change the basic objectives of the Soviet leadership. (Paras. 22–29)

5. On the Communist Chinese front, tensions have increased in the past year. The Chinese Communists will probably seek to achieve their objectives by political and subversive means with a broad range of tactics, but there are likely to be frequent manifestations of truculence and more, rather than less, of the range of pressures recently exemplified in the Indian border dispute, in Laos, and in Indonesia. (Paras. 15, 32)

6. Non-Communist Asia has become somewhat alarmed over Chinese Communist intentions. However, there exists no non-Communist power or grouping of local powers comparable in strength to Communist China. Several individual countries remain particularly vulnerable to Communist influence, and over the next five years there is a fair chance that a Communist regime will come to power in one or another of the countries in the area. US action, however, could in most cases reduce the chance of such a development and in any event could probably prevent any chain reaction if an individual country did go Communist. It is hard to see the situation in the area as a whole improving markedly over this period, and a bellicose Chinese Communist policy could produce widespread turmoil and even major hostilities. (Paras. 31–40)

7. Western Europe’s economic growth and internal political stability are likely to continue satisfactory, although France’s political future is somewhat uncertain. The movement towards economic integration continues to have great momentum, despite current difficulties. NATO confronts serious problems, notably France’s pressure for increased status, French development of an independent nuclear capability, and sentiment among the continental countries for some form of European continental military grouping, possibly related to NATO. Over the next few years, we believe that basic military dependence on the US will keep the alliance together. Nevertheless, its effectiveness will probably be somewhat reduced, and this reduction could attain serious proportions if European confidence in the will and ability of the US to protect Europe from the Communist threat should decline markedly. In any event, unless there is a renewed sense of urgency, Western Europe’s increased strength will probably not be applied as fully and cohesively as it might be to the key problems now confronting the West, of maintaining an effective military posture and of providing large-scale aid to the underdeveloped countries. (Paras. 41, 44–45, 49, 54, 59)

8. In countries of the underdeveloped world, the complex force of nationalism and growing desires for a better life will be powerful factors shaping the course of events. These countries will continue to expect help from the richer countries, and they will be inclined to accept such help regardless of whether it comes from the East or the West. Inasmuch as these countries generally lack the experienced leadership, the stable political and social institutions, and the material resources to cope with their many problems in orderly ways, there will remain the possibility of violent upheavals and local conflicts. While these outbreaks may not stem from the East-West struggle, they can be expected often to involve the interests of the two sides and to afford opportunities for exploitation. Thus, the underdeveloped world will continue to be a principal area of the contest between the Bloc and the West. (Para. 80)

9. The outlook in the various underdeveloped areas (apart from non-Communist Asia, covered in Conclusion 6 above) is mixed. The Middle East will remain very unstable. In South Asia, the future of Afghanistan, in particular, is uncertain. While trade and other economic relations with the Bloc will increase in Africa, and there will be many opportunities for the spread of Communist influence, we do not believe that local Communist-controlled groups will become strongly entrenched in power in any country at least over the next few years, given a reasonable degree of effective attention from the West.⁴ (Paras. 73–76)

10. In Latin America as a whole, we do look for some expansion in Communist influence over the next few years, although such an expansion will probably not be widespread, especially in view of the possibilities for US action. However, there is a possibility that one or another country, notably Cuba, could fall under Communist control. Moreover, the Communists or other extremists may achieve such influence that they can put through programs seriously threatening US interests or even security. In any event, the US will be under increasing pressure, and Latin American support for the US, for example in the UN, will almost certainly continue to decline. (Para. 79)

11. US policy remains crucial both in itself and for its effect on the rest of the Free World. Indications that the US was not maintaining a firm and effective military and political posture would lead to weakening of the resolve of other free nations. The growth of Soviet ICBM capabilities is creating a serious problem for the US in maintaining among other Free World nations confidence in US willingness to bring its nuclear capabilities to bear as a protection for such nations. A second crucial area affecting US prestige and influence will be that of US economic policy. However much the capacity of other Western nations grows, the Free World will still look to the US for leadership in the problem of channeling Western aid to the “have-not” nations and in the freeing and encouraging of international trade, and will be intensely concerned with the economic policies, both domestic and foreign, adopted by the US. (Paras. 82, 84, 86)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

12. The year 1959 saw many events so dramatic and significant as to appear as landmarks in the course of contemporary history. The Lunik shots dramatized the emerging Soviet attainment of an operational ICBM capability and reinforced apprehension in the Free World that the USSR was out-stripping the US. Khrushchev’s visit to the US highlighted a series of top level contacts and negotiations involving the US and the USSR.⁵ Also during the year, publicly aired differences between the USSR and Communist China marred the appearance of unanimity in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. On the Western side, France asserted itself, and the economic resurgence of Western Europe and Japan was manifested most conspicuously by the continuance of a major deficit in the balance of payments of the US. In the underdeveloped areas, events in Cuba, Laos, and Iraq during this year highlighted the continuing East-West conflict for influence, and the danger that some Free World territory may fall under Communist control.

13. In the world in general, recent Soviet behavior contributed to a spreading popular impression that the East-West struggle, or cold war, was entering a phase of greater movement and fluidity, and that the direction of this movement was towards a diminution of cold war tensions. Moreover, the USSR has gained new outward respectability as shown in the rapid growth of Soviet international contacts and the acceptance and furthering of such contacts by the US and other major Western nations. The rivalry between the US and USSR is increasingly regarded in many quarters as a long drawn-out competition between two super-powers rather than as a currently acute conflict likely to produce a large-scale military clash.

14. Viewed objectively and realistically, however, the East-West relationship remains fundamentally hostile. The Soviet ICBM capability is altering military power relationships and in Soviet eyes operates to enlarge Soviet freedom of action and to widen Soviet influence. The economic growth and scientific progress of the USSR greatly enhance the prestige of communism as a system of social and economic organization. Confidence that the trend of events is in their favor remains a keynote of the behavior of the Soviet leaders, and they assert that the growth of their relative power position has now reached the point where major consequences will be manifest on the world scene within the foreseeable future. Even in the present phase of Soviet conduct, politeness is matched by assertiveness and the appearance of conciliation by an unyielding position on most key issues.

15. On the Communist Chinese front moreover, there is not only no relaxation in the atmosphere of the cold war, but on the contrary an increase of tension. Peiping’s thrusting policy and expanding economic and military power, against the background of a troubled internal situation have already excited apprehension throughout Asia and may create recurrent acute pressures and dangers over the next few years.

16. In the world at large competition between the West and the Sino-Soviet Bloc is taking place on a wider stage than in the past, with the secondary actors playing greater parts. The increased economic strength of Japan and of the major nations of Western Europe has altered their relationship to the US and freed them for a greater degree of independent action. In the underdeveloped areas, the Bloc is increasingly involved in Latin America, and both the US and the Bloc are increasing their interest in Africa. The smaller nations in all Free World areas are developing roles of their own. These nations find in the UN in particular a sounding board for their grievances and a forum in which they can band together and assert against the great powers a weight disproportionate to their individual or even collective power status.

17. Finally, there is throughout the underdeveloped world increasing awareness of the enormous problems of creating national stability and improved conditions of life, and of the impact of basic underlying trends—technological advance, changes in the international trade pattern, and population growth. These problems and trends would of course exist and be a central feature of the world situation if there were no East-West struggle. So far as that struggle is concerned, the underdeveloped countries remain generally uncommitted to one side or the other, and are being more and more influenced by their need for aid and their desire to get as much help as possible whether from the West or the Bloc. However these countries may stand ideologically, such pragmatic neutralism seems certain to find new adherents in Africa and Latin America and to remain firmly entrenched in most of Asia and the Middle East, with the possible exception of countries directly threatened by the USSR or Communist China.

18. In the sections that follow, we are generally far more confident of the description of forces at work than we are of our judgments of outcomes, and we have not elaborated all the repercussions of possible developments mentioned. We do believe, however, that the trends presented in this estimate point with assurance to one overall conclusion, that the stature of the USSR and of Communist China in the world will continue to increase markedly over the next decade, thus posing increasingly serious challenges and a growing menace to the US and the West.

II. POWER TRENDS AND POLICY PROBLEMS OF THE USSR

19. We estimate that:⁶

a. Soviet economic and scientific strength will continue to grow at a rapid rate.

b. The Soviets, despite some force reductions, will maintain a high level of conventional military forces and will greatly increase their long range attack capabilities, above all through a substantial ICBM buildup. However, the Soviet leaders probably do not count upon acquiring, by any particular date, a military advantage so decisive as to permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that they could win a general war without themselves incurring unacceptable damage.⁷

c. In the Soviet view, the emerging standoff of intercontinental striking forces marks a stalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement would entail either serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

d. Soviet foreign policy will remain devoted to the same objectives as heretofore. At least over a five-year period, elements of both a policy of pressure and one of reducing tensions will probably be adopted at one time or another. The immediate outlook is that the Soviets will continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now in view. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long range missiles have brought them into a period when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than it is at present.

e. On Berlin, we believe that, as long as the Soviets are confident that they can make progress towards their aims in Germany by negotiation and propaganda, they will probably abstain from any major interference with Western access and from making a separate peace treaty with East Germany. If they decide that further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make the separate peace treaty, though they would not necessarily try at the same time to obstruct Western access to Berlin. On disarmament, the Soviets may actually wish to see a freeze or even a cutback in some armaments in order to improve their potentialities for long-run political and economic competition. However, the Soviets consider great military strength as an essential ingredient in the challenge they pose to the non-Communist world. Moreover, the Soviet aversion to extensive foreign controls and inspection in the USSR persists, and will almost certainly exclude anything more than limited agreements.

20. In the pursuit of their objectives the Soviets clearly consider that their military progress is a major direct factor in their growing power position. Moreover, Soviet achievements in the missile and space fields have already gone far to create an image of Soviet superiority in the eyes of much of the world. During the next decade Soviet space efforts will be considerable, favoring those space systems having the greatest military potential, but designed also to yield the maximum in scientific gains and in propaganda value.

21. Coupled with this power aspect, Soviet economic growth causes communism to appear to much of the underdeveloped world as a successful model for the handling of massive economic problems. Moreover, the Soviets have had considerable success in identifying themselves, through propaganda and diplomatic proposals, with worldwide desires for a lessening of tensions, most notably on the issue of nuclear testing, and to a lesser degree on the disarmament question generally.

22. With such assets, the USSR will for the foreseeable future continue to gravely threaten US security and that of the Free World generally. Yet as the Soviets seek to expand their influence in the world they confront both external and internal problems, which we believe will arise chiefly with respect to the Satellite situation, Soviet relations with the underdeveloped areas, long-term evolution within the USSR itself, and Sino-Soviet relations. While, at present, we see no basis for estimating that such problems would diminish Soviet internal power or change the basic objectives of the Soviet leadership, they could in the course of time limit the effectiveness or even alter the content of Soviet foreign policy.

23. The Satellite Situation. The present tendency in Eastern Europe generally is toward a stabilization and consolidation of Communist rule, with Soviet authority in political and ideological questions more firm than at any time since 1956. An increase in the degree of international acceptance of the East German Regime, or any apparent weakening in the position of West Berlin, could further strengthen the Soviet position in the Satellites. In the long run, however, the Satellites will remain one of the critical problems with which the Soviets will have to cope, given the likely continuation of deep-seated antipathy to Soviet domination. During a period of rising popular expectations and greater contacts with the outside world, the Soviets must endeavor to maintain political structures that can, on the one hand, ensure the required degree of Soviet control and, on the other, be operated without excessive friction, and appear to the world as an attractive image of communism in practice.

24. Soviet Relations with the Underdeveloped Areas. The total Soviet presence and the Soviet trade and aid programs in these areas will undoubtedly increase in coming years and will offer opportunities for expanding Soviet influence as well as for assisting local Communist elements. Furthermore, the desire of many of the newly created nations for development of military forces offers fertile ground for a form of Communist influence which could lead to serious consequences. On the other hand, the experience of the last two years suggests that in some areas the honeymoon period that began in 1954 is drawing to a close and that the USSR will encounter problems as its contacts with the underdeveloped world expand. Developments in Burma, for example, have shown that an initial favorable impact may be vitiated by subsequent frictions, while the effect of Communist policy toward Iraq on Soviet-UAR relations has shown the difficulty of supporting regional rivals. Another sign is the disillusionment of some non-Communist students and trainees visiting Russia, both with ideological communism and with the physical and personal aspects of Soviet life.

25. More broadly, the extension of Soviet Bloc trade and aid programs throughout the world increasingly builds up the impression that the USSR can help any nation it wishes—an impression fortified by the Soviets’ own boasting of their economic progress. In effect, the USSR now appears to be a “have” nation, and underdeveloped countries will come more and more to consider that the Soviet Union has an obligation to help them. Hence, Soviet efforts to continue their aid program on a highly selective basis will increasingly encounter the political penalties of aid denied or cut down in the face of hopes built up.

26. Long-term Evolution within the USSR. Over the next five years we see no prospect of a change in the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project its rapidly growing power externally. But popular hopes for a better life are on the rise in the USSR. Some groups seek a greater degree of personal freedom from restrictions and there is a far more universal desire to enjoy more of the economic fruits of Soviet growth. Khrushchev so far has tended to take these sentiments into account and has thus somewhat strengthened the regime. However, looking beyond the next five years, conflicts are likely to arise between the desires of an increasingly significant popular opinion and the ideological impetus and allocation of resources required under a thrusting foreign policy. We do not predict that these conflicts will alter basic Soviet objectives, but their long-run influence could be in the direction of reducing the outward pressure of Soviet policy, particularly if that policy should appear unprofitable.

27. Sino-Soviet Relations. Insofar as we can now foresee, the USSR and Communist China will continue to be firmly allied against the West. However, frictions have already arisen over extremist tendencies in Chinese internal policy, over Chinese ideological pretensions, over foreign policy tactics, and probably over whether the USSR should supply nuclear weapons to China. These or other frictions may be magnified in the future. As Communist China progresses and Soviet levers of authority become less effective, Peiping will tend to exercise more independent judgment on doctrinal and tactical issues, both in domestic and external affairs.

28. Thus, each party to the alliance may come to act more in terms of its view of its own national need and interest. In most cases, the respective views are likely to remain parallel, and on many occasions a forceful Communist Chinese policy may be favorable to Soviet aims. However, if there should be increasing differences over international tactics and policy, as over the Sino-Indian border issue, the Soviets could be considerably embarrassed and their policy impeded.

29. The possibility of tactical or doctrinal differences does not mean that an open Sino-Soviet rupture is in sight. The long range question is not so much one of outright rupture as of growing independence which could produce discord tending to reduce the effectiveness of the alliance in furthering the objectives of both the USSR and Communist China. There will probably be some evidences of such independence over the next five years, although at least for this period both parties will regard the maintenance of the alliance as vital.

III. THE COMMUNIST CHINESE THREAT TO ASIA

30. Under the stress of greatly accelerated domestic efforts, including the recently reaffirmed commune program, Communist China clearly faces rough years indeed.⁸ Economic strains and the bitterness generated by vast social changes cannot help but produce an internal climate of great tension, although the regime can probably maintain basic order and prevent major disruptions by a combination of forceful measures and tactical adjustments. Economically, although rapid population growth will absorb much of the increase in agricultural production industrial, growth from the present generally low level will probably continue at rates higher than those of the USSR or any major Western power, or India.

31. Communist China’s military capabilities, relative to the rest of Asia, will continue to grow. Over the next five years, Communist China will be producing an increasing portion of its need for conventional military equipment, but will still be heavily dependent on the USSR. Within this same period the USSR may provide limited missile and nuclear weapons support to Communist China, retaining custody of the nuclear components. We have no information indicating that the Chinese Communists have a plutonium production facility presently in operation or under construction, although they are developing a raw materials capability and have had considerable basic technical assistance and training from the Soviets. However, assuming that the Chinese Communists have a modest but high priority plutonium production effort underway, they could be in a position as early as 1964 to test a crude nuclear device chiefly of their own development. Even the initial testing of a nuclear device by Communist China would have an important psychological impact, particularly in Asia.

32. The Chinese Communists will probably seek to achieve their objectives by political and subversive means, while not precluding the use of force to exploit targets of opportunity or to respond to situations which they might interpret as a threat to their position in Asia. They will continue to employ a broad range of tactics. Along with occasional manifestations of “Bandung reasonableness,” however, the foreign policy of a restive, increasingly powerful, and ideologically extreme Communist China is virtually certain, as recent events have foreshadowed, to include frequent manifestations of truculence and of impatience to emerge as an acknowledged world power. The Offshore Islands situation will not lie quiescent indefinitely, and we shall probably see more, rather than less, of the range of pressures now exemplified on the Indian border, in Laos, and in Indonesia.

33. Over the next several years a number of additional nations, particularly those newly constituted, will probably recognize Communist China. Moreover, if disarmament negotiations are continued or limited agreements are reached, there will be a strong desire among other nations to include Communist China under such agreements. In light of these factors Communist China’s admission to the UN will be extremely difficult to prevent.

34. Non-Communist Asia. The ruthlessness and aggressiveness of recent Communist Chinese domestic and foreign policies, such as the commune program, Tibet, and the Sino Indian border crisis, have substantially increased apprehensions throughout Asia of Communist Chinese strength and intentions. This increased alarm has produced some strengthening of border security measures and some decrease in regional frictions, and has led some neutralist countries to be more sympathetic to the US.

35. Several individual countries—most notably Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Singapore—remain unstable and particularly vulnerable to Communist influence. Elsewhere the outlook is more hopeful. The succession problems of South Vietnam and Nationalist China can probably be met, although that of the ROK is more doubtful. In Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines, there are indigenous forces that will tend to maintain fair stability.

36. Of the non-Communist countries in the area, Japan alone combines large and growing economic power with a good prospect of continuing political stability. Having brought its population growth under substantial control, Japan can prosper if it can retain access to US and other Free World markets, and will be in a position to take an increasing role as entrepreneur to the rest of non-Communist Asia. Moreover, given such prosperity, Japan will probably be able to keep local leftists under control. Thus Japan will probably offer to the rest of Asia an example of economic growth and political stability achieved through means other than communism, and will probably continue to identify its interests in international political affairs with those of the West. On the other hand, there is strong domestic pressure in Japan for increased trade and official relations with Communist China; while some expansion in these relations is likely over the next few years, trade levels will probably be limited so long as Japan’s Western ties remain strong, and Japan is not likely to take steps that would seriously impair its relations with the US. Japan will probably evidence an increased independence of action in foreign policy. In any event we do not foresee that Japan will develop major military capabilities of its own nor that it would associate itself with any regional military alliance.

37. India, the other potential major power of non-Communist Asia, is now subjected to Chinese Communist pressures such that, even if the present issues were to be resolved, there would be a lasting residue of anti-Chinese and to a lesser extent anti-Communist feeling. India’s relations with Pakistan will probably continue to improve, and India will seek to strengthen its northern border defenses and ties. It might also step up efforts to expand its influence in Southeast Asia so as to support non-Communist regimes far more than to date. Although India is not likely to alter its basic neutralist policy or to enter regional alliances, it may look more benevolently on Western policies.

38. Internally India faces many political difficulties, and its economic progress will be slower than that of Communist China. However, if India achieves steady economic growth, it could provide an example in Asia of an underdeveloped country adhering to humane policies and to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in social values. Such growth could only be attained by an effective and sustained effort within India, and would depend heavily also upon foreign aid.

39. Prospects for the Growth or Containment of Communist Influence. In general the non-Communist nations of Asia are subject to the same attraction toward pragmatic neutralism as other underdeveloped areas. Communist Chinese pressure could operate to increase neutralist sentiment, but in some circumstances it might have the opposite effect of strengthening orientation toward the West and increasing sympathy with the US.

40. In light of the number of precarious situations cited above, there is a fair chance that a Communist regime will come to power in one or another of the countries in the area within the next five years. US action, however, could in most cases reduce this chance and in any event could probably prevent any chain reaction if an individual country did go Communist. It is hard to see the situation in the area as a whole improving markedly over this period, and a bellicose Chinese Communist policy could produce widespread turmoil and even major hostilities.

IV. THE ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPE

41. Western Europe as a whole is likely to prosper over the next few years, and the economies of most countries, especially the major continental states, are likely to grow at rates only slightly below those of the last five years. Economic efficiency is generally increasing rapidly, and the basic terms of trade with underdeveloped areas are likely to continue favorable to Europe for some time to come. Even the availability of oil is far less uncertain than it was a few years back.

42. The movement toward economic integration will continue to have great momentum. However, the current differences between the Common Market (Six) and the European Free Trade Association (Seven) will be difficult to resolve. If, as seems likely, the Six move ahead rapidly—with increasing political consultation among themselves—then the UK and the rest of the Seven will feel increasing compulsion to reach some sort of accommodation embracing the 13 and perhaps others. However, British viewpoints in particular must undergo marked changes before any type of association becomes possible. Moreover, the strong, though declining, protectionist attitudes of the French and their aspirations to lead the continent will have to be modified. Association could also be prevented by serious French domestic difficulties. A continued split between the groups, with rigid economic divisions forming between them, would have serious consequences for the political cohesiveness of the West.

43. International Economic Policy and Economic Aid. The prospect of continued sound economic growth carries with it a substantial Western European capacity to reduce trade barriers and to assist in aid to the underdeveloped areas. A great part of the capacity to render assistance will continue to be exerted, particularly by France, in colonial or recently colonial areas, so long as some form of political tie remains. For more general aid and private investment efforts, West Germany has by far the greatest potential, while the UK effort probably can rise only modestly.

44. NATO. NATO faces a serious problem in maintaining firmness and cohesion. One factor creating this problem is a difference of view on policy toward the USSR. Substantial official and public opinion, particularly in the UK, tends to see little likelihood of Soviet military action in Europe, and the regard the present prospects of reducing tensions through negotiations as favorable. On the other hand, the Governments of France and West Germany stress the continuing seriousness of the Soviet threat to Europe, and are generally opposed to concessions as a price for reduced tensions. The problem is compounded by anti-German sentiment in the UK.⁹

45. The second potentially divisive factor is the desire on the continent, notably in France, for a greater role and voice in decisions. De Gaulle seeks increased status for France and national control of French forces within NATO. Furthermore, there is some support in France, and to a lesser degree among other continental WEU countries, for the creation in the next few years of some form of European continental military grouping, possibly related to NATO.

46. Basic underlying factors are the impact of Soviet military progress and, in some quarters, growing doubts about the adequacy of the US military posture and the future course of US policy. The Soviet ICBM buildup is in itself almost certain to increase doubt as to whether in fact the US would exert its full weight against Soviet pressures in Europe. The level of trust in US support of NATO is not yet seriously reduced. However, West Germany and Turkey in particular, and to a lesser degree other European NATO members are highly sensitive to any apparent US lack of firmness in East-West negotiations or to any suggestion of a substantial reduction in US forces committed to NATO, as possible indications of gradual US withdrawal.

47. The prosperity of the major NATO countries makes them capable of bearing a larger share of the military load. However, the trend of popular feeling is generally against any increase in defense budgets. Arguments over the soundness of NATO military strategy add to the popular reluctance to support defense spending.

48. In this complex situation, current Soviet emphasis on reducing tensions creates a special problem. To the extent that an impression of detente persists, it will be difficult to prevent cuts in defense budgets, to avoid further serious strains within NATO, and to preserve present NATO force goals or to devise a new strategy commanding broad assent and support. If the pressure motif again becomes dominant in Soviet policy, this would probably tend to strengthen NATO ties and stimulate defense efforts.

49. The course of events in key individual countries could, of course, greatly affect the outcome. In France an Algerian solution is difficult to foresee except through de Gaulle. His early overthrow or death would probably be followed shortly by a rightist authoritarian regime based on military support. Such a French Government would be likely to pursue policies in Algeria that could seriously injure the West’s position in underdeveloped areas. Moreover, the policies of such a regime in this and other respects could well produce critical divisions within France, impede European economic integration, and induce severe strains within NATO and in Franco-US relations. The realities of France’s political, economic and military situation would, however, tend to restrain extremist tendencies.

50. If, on the other hand, de Gaulle continues in power and brings off some workable Algerian solution, France would be much strengthened and stabilized. De Gaulle would be likely to press the harder his present efforts to enlarge French influence and, if unsuccessful, would probably act with increasing independence.

51. There are also uncertainties in the prospects for West Germany. Recent events have highlighted the importance of Adenauer’s role and the problem of his succession. It appears likely that the CDU will win the 1961 election, and be able to maintain internal stability and economic growth. Adenauer’s successors will almost certainly continue the main lines of his foreign policies, although there might be some decline in their devotion to European integration and to close Franco-German rapport.

52. However, West Germany will in any event remain highly sensitive to US policy. Moreover, West Germany’s stature within Europe is steadily increasing; militarily, its forces will within a year or so be by far the largest European contribution to the NATO shield in Germany, and its capacity for military production is growing rapidly. If West Germany should come seriously to doubt that the US can and will defend Europe and uphold basic West German national interests, it would be increasingly attracted to schemes for some form of continental military grouping and might hope to become the eventual leader in such a grouping.

53. In any case, some increase in West Germany’s assertiveness and independence in foreign policy is probable over the next few years. A West German attempt to resolve the German reunification problem by force is highly unlikely, and only in the event of a serious weakening of the Western alliance might the Federal Republic be likely to seek an accommodation with the USSR. However, if West German policy and opinion were to take on an increasingly nationalistic tone, this might lead to growing distrust both among NATO countries and in the Soviet Bloc, particularly when West German forces have access to nuclear weapons. Thus, NATO relationships could be disturbed, and tensions with the East increased.

54. Outlook. Over the next few years, despite these uncertainties, we believe that basic military dependence on the US will hold the NATO alliance together. Nevertheless its effectiveness will probably be somewhat reduced, and this reduction could attain serious proportions if European confidence in the will and ability of the US to protect Europe from the Communist threat should decline markedly.

55. De Gaulle will probably continue to seek to minimize the degree of integration of NATO forces and to develop France’s own nuclear capabilities. However, the achievement of a substantial independent nuclear capability would present enormous economic and technological difficulties for France and would in any event require a period of not less than five years and probably considerably more.

56. In part for this reason, France may at some point solicit the collaboration of West Germany and perhaps of other European NATO countries, in the development of advanced delivery systems and perhaps in the production of nuclear weapons. Adenauer would almost certainly not enter into extensive collaboration under present circumstances. He and his successors would probably adhere to the same position in the future, so long as they were assured of US aid and support and provided also that West German forces could obtain nuclear weapons from the US on acceptable terms. In the latter connection, West Germany and other NATO members are likely in the near future to press for changes in stockpiling arrangements that would provide NATO, WEU, or national participation in control.

57. Apart from the case of France, the independent development of nuclear weapons by West European countries will be inhibited by world opposition to nuclear testing, demonstrated strikingly in the recent UN vote on the French tests, and likely to become increasingly strong whether or not the major powers reach an agreement on the subject. In the face of this opposition, and the costs involved, we now believe that it is an open question whether such countries as Sweden and Switzerland will develop their own weapons. West Germany is unlikely to do so unless denied weapons on acceptable terms by the US, the UK, and France.

58. Over a period of 5–10 years, the emergence of a continental bloc that controlled a substantial nuclear capability and sizable conventional forces, is a possibility. However, any such European turn away from primary dependence on the US would be likely only if European confidence in the US had markedly declined. Moreover, such a union based primarily on West German and French military potential could attain major proportions only under optimum conditions, including at a minimum continued rapid economic progress and internal political stability among the participants.

59. The progress of Western Europe in the past decade, including the stability of West Germany and gradual consolidation of its ties with the West, remains a major gain in the overall Western power position. However, this new strength will probably not be applied as fully and cohesively as it might be to the key problems now confronting the West, unless there is some return to the sense of urgency that existed when the alliance was formed. Improvements in the present structure of organizations and relationships could be of assistance. In general, however, the Western European public has settled down into a pattern of prosperity in which it will be difficult to arouse great support either for increased defense measures or for large-scale aid to underdeveloped countries.

V. STABILITY IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

A. General Problems

Nationalism and Attitudes Toward The Major Powers

60. Generally speaking, the force of nationalist feeling will remain undiminished in the underdeveloped areas. The nations that came into being soon after World War II, now entering their second decade of existence, are becoming somewhat less strident. On the other hand, the newer nations, and those due to emerge in Africa in the future, will have continuing spasms of extreme nationalism, especially where the break with the colonial power is accompanied by bitterness.

61. It is worth noting that the next decade will see not only the throwing off of almost all remaining colonial ties, but probably some additional adjustments of national units. Many new states have been built on uncertain foundations of national identity (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan, the individual Arab countries). In Africa, where the bulk of the new nations of the 1960’s will be, political boundaries bear little relation to tribal or other natural divisions. Moreover, cultural ties, political objectives, and in many cases economic factors often point to wider regional groupings, such as the UAR, Black African federations, and a possible Maghreb grouping in North Africa. The result could be a number of changes in political boundaries, involving partition, some type of federation or both. Such changes would not, however, necessarily reduce the effect of nationalist feeling: at least in the Arab World they could intensify it.

62. The onetime colonial powers are, of course, now largely “ex,” save in Africa. Elsewhere in the underdeveloped areas anticolonialism, in its narrow sense of resentment at present or past political domination, is declining and will decline further. The same feelings, however, can be and are applied equally strongly against real or apparent domination in the economic sphere, as illustrated in Latin America. Old-style anticolonialism is being replaced by “have-not vs. have” feelings no less serious and potentially harmful, compounded by regional and color consciousness. For all of these antagonisms, the US is a prime target; if there is any comfort it is that the USSR is becoming more and more tarred with the same brush.

Economic Growth and Aspirations

63. The extent and force of “have-not” feelings are almost certain to be strengthened by the economic course of the underdeveloped areas in the next few years. Even for those nations (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) where something like an economic “take-off” is occurring, the gap between their standards of living and those of the advanced West and the USSR will remain wide. Rapid population growth will greatly contribute to this result, and in other countries that might otherwise appear to be approaching the point of “take-off”—most importantly India—it will probably siphon off a high proportion of potential investment resources into meeting consumption needs. Thus industrial progress could be slowed down and have little effect on popular welfare. With death rates likely to decline more rapidly than birth rates over the next decade, the population problem and its economic impact are likely to become more serious except in a few sparsely settled areas.

64. Moreover, the tremendous dependence of the underdeveloped areas on raw material markets in the West will continue essentially unchanged, and will be an increasingly sore point to local leaders. The best current forecast is that the terms of trade for exporters of agricultural products, and to a lesser extent of industrial raw materials, are likely to remain unfavorable over the next decade in the face of technological substitution and other factors. If so, this will increase pressures on the economic and foreign trade policies of the US and the West, and create both opportunities and pitfalls for the USSR and the Bloc.

65. As to their own hopes for growth, some of the extravagant early expectations of underdeveloped nations with regard to industrialization have by now been dampened by harsh experience and growing realization of the depth and complexity of their problems, and of the need for major social changes before these problems can be effectively tackled. But if the governments of “have-not” nations expect less in the way of visible progress, it does not follow that they will be any less vigorous in their demands upon the “have” nations for capital investment and support. Nor will the pressure on the US and the West be eased much by the fact that the USSR will also be subject to such pressures. The game of balancing economic demands on East and West is one that almost all can play, and most of them will.

Political Stability

66. The problems of developing leadership and effective political systems remain acute throughout the underdeveloped areas. The new nations of Africa appear to be adopting thinly veiled forms of dictatorial control from the outset; in the absence of any military or other trained class, an adequate supply of future leadership is hard to foresee. The longer established nations of Latin America have generally thrown off military dictatorship in favor of regimes based on middle class support or, in a few cases such as Cuba, on “the street.” Between these two, a number of nations in the Far East, South Asia, and Middle East continue to depend heavily on military leadership and influence.

67. Basically, the test of political organization in the eyes of the newer nations is more and more the pragmatic one of whether it appears able to meet their problems of modernization, economic growth, and attaining national power. While democracy as a political theory has wide appeal in terms of its satisfaction of individual aspirations, its appeal is also wrapped up with the image of power and material progress provided by the major Western democracies. On the other side the appeal of communism rests increasingly, at least among leadership groups, on the appearance it presents of a form of organization able to produce rapid progress under conditions similar to those of the underdeveloped countries, as demonstrated in practice by the USSR and Communist China. In general, the traditions of underdeveloped countries and the scope of the problems they confront incline these nations toward the use of state action. The most frequent result in practice will probably continue to be a mixture of native traditions with elements of both systems.

68. Communism has succeeded in some cases in identifying itself with nationalist and anticolonial movements and thus gained strength, particularly in the early stages of new regimes. Local Communists and the international Communist movement will in many areas continue to be able to attract adherents among the frustrated and dissatisfied. However, as Communist strength grows, it tends to arouse resistance among leaders who fear the threat to their own power. The chances of Communist or Communist-dominated governments coming to power will be greatest where strong local Communist groups operate in conditions of serious political, economic, and social instability and dislocation. Such conditions are likely to be widespread in the underdeveloped areas for the foreseeable future.

Local Conflicts

69. There are a great many friction points scattered throughout the world that could produce local conflicts, international or internal, precipitated only secondarily, if at all, by the East-West struggle. The Arab-Israel situation appears the most deep-seated and serious of these; the situation in the Caribbean and Iraq may be even more explosive in the short term. Other possibilities in coming years are Cyprus, Ethiopia-Somalia, Indonesia-West New Guinea, the Pakistan-Afghan tribal areas, and many local situations in Africa and the Arab States.

70. Yet there are factors tending to keep local conflicts from expanding beyond manageable bounds. In most of these cases the forces locally available will be limited, in light of the difficulties encountered in many underdeveloped nations in developing major military forces, and particularly in becoming proficient with advanced military equipment. Another and more important factor is the growing use and flexibility of UN and other international machinery. The UN seems likely to be increasingly effective in calming situations and facilitating settlements. Moreover, world opinion as experienced in the UN will have to be taken more and more into account by major powers considering intervention in local conflicts.

71. Any spread of nuclear weapons to the underdeveloped areas could, of course, have incalculable consequences for the likelihood and scope of local conflicts. However, we do not believe any of the underdeveloped countries could or would produce its own weapons, even on an initial basis, if for no other reason than expense and prevailing world opposition to nuclear testing. Nor do we believe Western Europe would be a source; the sole possible exception, France supplying Israel, would involve the risk of triggering Soviet nuclear support to the Arab States. Except possibly in such a case, we believe that the Soviets for a variety of reasons would not make nuclear weapons available to underdeveloped countries.

B. Prospects for Particular Areas

72. From these general points, we turn to an appraisal of the prospects for particular areas, taking into account local stages of development and other factors that could operate to affect stability and the chances of Communist success. As noted in Section III, the Far East and Southeast Asia present special cases because of the Chinese Communist threat.

73. Middle East. For the short-run, the outlook for Western influence in the Arab World has improved, in large part because Nasser and other Arab nationalist leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the Communist threat.¹⁰ Basic Western interests—access to oil and the maintenance of reasonably stable non-Communist governments—are not incompatible with those of the Arab States themselves. Yet the Arab nations will almost certainly continue to seek economic aid from both sides, and there will remain the possibility of chaotic developments in any one country (Iraq at present) or of conflict between countries. Such developments or a resurgence of the deeply rooted Arab-Israeli conflict would present serious dangers of further Communist inroads. Beyond the Arab World, the situation in Iran is precarious and could turn chaotic. Moreover, continued political instability coupled with Soviet threats or inducements could cause Iran to withdraw from CENTO. All in all, the Middle East will remain very unstable.

74. South Asia. In India, moderate political elements will probably be able to maintain control for at least the next few years. However, the departure of Nehru would probably intensify political divisions and might contribute to a decline in the effectiveness of government. Particularly if economic progress diminishes, there is a possibility that Nehru’s departure would be followed by such political dislocations as to produce a temporary abandonment of democratic methods, perhaps associated with army participation in the government.

75. Elsewhere in the area, Afghanistan has become deeply involved with the USSR in trade and economic and military aid programs. So long as Western support continues it can probably retain its independence, but even granted such support there is a possibility that it will come under effective Soviet domination within five years or so. Pakistan’s military regime can probably keep control and a reasonable degree of stability for some time. Ceylon may emerge under conservative control from its present precarious state, but in any event the outlook is for unstable conditions.

76. Africa. Former French North Africa is a special case, with the possibilities ranging from chaos to fairly constructive relationships with France; the economic outlook is generally dim. Those areas of East, Central, and southern Africa which have an acute white settler problem face a grave and increasingly urgent problem of terminating or modifying white control and of forming workable governments. Even if these are solved, the long-term outlook for stability and orderly development is unpromising. Both in these areas and in West Africa, most new nations will turn for aid first to the West and, if unsatisfied, to the Bloc, often with highly unrealistic aspirations and expectations. While trade and other economic relations with the Bloc will increase in Africa and there will be many opportunities for the spread of Communist influence, we do not believe that local Communist-controlled groups will become entrenched in power in any country at least over the next few years, given a reasonable degree of effective attention from the west.¹¹

77. Latin America. Latin America’s importance in world affairs will grow substantially in coming years. However, even the economic growth of the more advanced countries, much less that of the more backward, will have difficulty in keeping pace with rising popular expectations, and in most countries prospects for any substantial improvement are not bright.

78. Communist prospects in Latin America are improving as a result of the area-wide reaction against autocratic or oligarchic rule, the more open political atmosphere, and economic adversity. The major threat of communism lies, as in Cuba at present, in its infiltration of nationalist and revolutionary movements. Soviet Bloc trade and aid programs, and contacts with Communist China, are likely to increase moderately, but will be essentially secondary elements in the Communist threat.

79. In Latin America as a whole we look for some expansion in Communist influence over the next few years, although such an expansion will probably not be widespread, especially in view of the possibilities for US action. However, there is a possibility that one or another country, notably Cuba, could fall under Communist control. Moreover, the Communists or other extremists may achieve such influence that they can put through programs seriously threatening US interests or even security. In any event, the US will be under increasing pressure, and Latin American support for the US, for example in the UN, will almost certainly continue to decline.

80. Summary. The complex force of nationalism and growing desires for a better life will be powerful forces shaping the course of events in countries of the underdeveloped world. These countries will continue to expect help from the richer countries, and will be inclined to accept such help, regardless of whether it comes from East or West. Inasmuch as these countries generally lack the experienced leadership, the stable political and social institutions, and the material resources to cope with their many problems in orderly ways, there will remain the possibility of violent upheavals and local conflicts. While these outbreaks may not stem from the East-West struggle, they can be expected often to involve the interests of the two sides and to afford opportunities for exploitation. Thus, the underdeveloped world will continue to be a principal area of the contest between the Bloc and the West.

VI. US INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE

81. Recent Soviet scientific and economic achievements, viewed against a background of steady growth of the relative power position of the USSR, have erased the picture of unique US power that prevailed between World War II and 1957. The immediate consequences, however, have been mitigated by other events. The course of the Lebanon and Quemoy crises, and to a lesser extent of the Berlin issue, has demonstrated to the world that the US remains able and willing to take firm action; the US entry into high-level contacts and negotiations with the USSR, while viewed in part as the result of Soviet power gains, has generally been welcomed. The President’s visits abroad have done much to evidence US concern for peace and for the welfare of both its major allies and underdeveloped nations. On the Bloc side, the external programs of the USSR have met with checks, and the behavior of Communist China has led to wider recognition, especially in Asia, of the value of the US’s countervailing power.

82. Yet the future of US prestige is by no means assured. Since the US will still appear as the principal guarantor of the Free World against the power of the USSR and Communist China, indications that the US was not maintaining a firm and effective military and political posture would lead to a weakening of the resolve of other free nations and encourage them to seek various forms of accommodation.

83. The present period of high-level negotiations confronts the US both with opportunities and with problems, in maintaining the firmness and cohesion of its major alliances and in keeping before the world a picture of the US as a nation genuinely seeking honorable adjustments through peaceful means. Though the tendency to judge the US by more exacting standards than the USSR is less widespread than in the past, it remains true that our allies and other major free nations expect from the US a combination of flexibility and firmness that is often not realistically attainable.

84. Problems of the US Strategic Posture. The future relationship between the nuclear striking power of the US and that of the USSR is difficult to predict at present, depending as it does on a wide range of technological and policy factors on both sides. In general, however, the growth of Soviet ICBM capabilities is creating a serious problem for the US in maintaining among other Free World nations confidence in US willingness to bring its strategic nuclear capabilities to bear as a protection for such nations. Particularly in Western Europe, there are signs that this confidence has already been shaken.

85. At the same time, despite the acceptance of reliance on nuclear weapons for basic deterrent purposes, there is strong worldwide sentiment against the use of such weapons, particularly in limited conflicts. We believe that our major allies, at least, will probably continue to support the use of Western (essentially US) nuclear weapons in situations of clearly major consequence, such as Bloc invasion of the NATO area. But in situations of apparently lesser consequence, any US use or threat of nuclear weapons will encounter strong opposition from a world opinion that will increasingly include major US allies in spite of the advantages such opposition might confer on a Bloc aggressor.¹²,¹³

86. US Economic Policy. Finally, US economic policy should be singled out as a second crucial area affecting US prestige and influence. In international trade and aid, US response to its balance of payments problem will be closely watched. Any drastic US reduction of aid without some compensating action would weaken US influence in the underdeveloped areas, while extensive US protectionist measures would certainly set off a wave of countermeasures. Basically, however much the capacity of other Western nations grows, the Free World will still look to the US for leadership in the problem of channeling Western aid to the “have-not” nations and in the freeing and encouraging of international trade, and will be intensely concerned with the economic policies, both domestic and foreign, adopted by the US.

1. Source: “Estimate of the World Situation.” Secret; Noforn. 20 pp. DOS, INR–NIE Files.
2. While this estimate summarizes our views on the USSR, a fuller treatment of Soviet trends and developments will be contained in NIE 11–4–59, “MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1959–1964.” Soviet strategic capabilities, including ICBM buildup, will be covered in NIE 11–8–59, “SOVIET CAPABILTES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH MID-1964.” Both these estimates will be published in the near future. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the importance of the ICBM requires that the third sentence of paragraph 2 be inserted in this initial paragraph to read: “In particular, the emerging Soviet ICBM capability, dramatized in the eyes of the world by the Lunik shots, is altering military power relationships.” [Footnote is in the original.]
4. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the prospects for Communist groups should be limited further by substituting after “Communist-controlled groups” in the last sentence the words: “will become a major political force in any country. . . .” [Footnote is in the original.]
5. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, would further bring out the significance of the second and third sentences by adding at this point: “The Lunik shots emphasized the continuing Soviet armament effort and the basic aggressiveness of Soviet policy, while Khrushchev’s visit indicated that for the short term, at least, the USSR would carry on the present tactics of detente; as between the two approaches, it may be expected that before long the element of pressure and threat will become more pronounced, perhaps much more so than it is at present.” [Footnote is in the original.]
6. This paragraph is based on the longer discussion of these matters in the forthcoming NIE 11–4–59, “MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES.” [Footnote is in the original.]
7. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would revise sentence two as follows: “While the Soviet leaders probably do not count upon acquiring it by any particular date, they are vigorously attempting to acquire a military advantage so decisive as to permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that they could win a general war without themselves incurring unacceptable damage.” [Footnote is in the original.]
8. As to developments in Communist China over the next five years, this section relies principally on NIE 13–59, “COMMMUNIST CHINA,” dated 28 July 1959. Since the date of that estimate, however, events have pointed even more strongly in the direction of internal stress and external toughness. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, considers that the last sentence of this paragraph should be eliminated: he believes that anti-German sentiment in the UK is not a significant factor in the differences of view on policy toward the USSR. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. For a more complete discussion, see the recent NIE 30–59, “MAIN CURRENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD,” dated 25 August 1959. [Footnote is in the original.]
11. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the prospects for Communist groups should be limited further by substituting after “Communist-controlled groups” in the last sentence the words: “will become a major political force in any country. . . .” [Footnote is in the original.]
12. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in the judgments voiced in the latter portions of this paragraph. He would end the paragraph at the word “consequence” in the second sentence and delete all that follows. Such deletion would eliminate several broad judgments which do not lend themselves to precise interpretation. In particular, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with the judgment that “world opinion” would necessarily be against the use, or threat of use, of US nuclear weapons. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, holds the view that our major allies, at least, will formulate their opinions and make their decisions at the time of aggression and on the basis of the issues then involved. Moreover, there appears to be no present evidence to support the implication that the Free World in general, or the major US allies in particular, would capitulate to the Bloc rather than indorse the use of nuclear weapons. [Footnote is in the original.]

13. The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, does not concur with this paragraph as written. He believes the paragraph should be rewritten as follows:

    “At the same time, despite the acceptance of reliance on nuclear weapons for basic deterrent purposes, the world is generally in ignorance of the spectrum of weapon yields and delivery accuracies available. As a result, no mental image other than that of a high-yield bomb detonating over a city is commonly evoked by the word ‘nuclear.’ This factor, intensified by Communist propaganda, has created worldwide sentiment against the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in limited conflicts. We believe that our major allies will almost certainly continue to support the use of Western (essentially US) nuclear weapons in situations of clearly major consequence. But in situations not clearly of major consequence, US use or threat of nuclear weapons would probably result in a wide variation of public and official reactions among the non-Communist nations. Thus there would probably be:

    a. Strong protests from peoples and governments with no significant issues at stake.

    b. Considerable and vociferous unofficial public opposition from those nations with significant issues at stake.

    c. Some opposition and only reluctant acceptance by the governments—including major US allies—of those nations with significant issues at stake. The degree of concern of these governments would depend or the seriousness of the issue to them, their understanding of the military requirement for use of nuclear weapons, their confidence in US ability for discrete usage of nuclear weapons, and their view of the feasibility of alternate solutions.” [Footnote is in the original.]