Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

233. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, January 19, 1960

SUBJECT

• The Role of the Military Air Transport Service in Peace and War

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5919
• B. NSC Action No. 2167

The enclosed draft recommendations on the subject, prepared by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, as a revision of the recommendations contained in the Department of Defense report on the subject, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 21, 1960. It is contemplated that the President’s decision following such NSC consideration will be subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and will not be circulated as an NSC paper.

The original recommendations contained in the Department of Defense report were read at the 430th NSC Meeting (January 7, 1960) at which NSC 5919 “U.S. Policy with Respect to the Development of Cargo Airlift,” was considered.

A copy of the Department of Defense report is being attached to this memorandum, for each of the officials who will be attending the NSC Meeting for this subject on Thursday, January 21, with the exception of those who have previously received a copy.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Secretary of Commerce

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency

The Chairman, Civil Aeronautics, Board

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Draft Recommendations Prepared for the NSC

Washington, undated

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ROLE OF MATS

1. That MATS be equipped and operated in peacetime to insure its capability to meet approved military hard-core² requirements in a general war and in situations short of general war, and such other military requirements as cannot be met adequately by commercial carriers³ on an effective and timely basis. (It is understood that our hard-core and other military requirements are currently under study in connection with the review of the mobilization base.)

2. That the modernization of MATS hard-core military airlift capability be undertaken in an orderly manner consistent with other military requirements and in keeping with the objectives of par. 1 above.

3. That MATS [routine channel traffic (regularly scheduled, fixed routes) operations]⁴ be reduced on an orderly basis, consistent with assured commercial airlift capability at reasonable cost,⁵ and consistent with economical⁶ and efficient⁷ use, including realistic training, of the MATS capacity resulting from the provisions of par. 1 above.

4. That as commercial carriers make available modern, economical long-range cargo aircraft and as further orientation of MATS to the hard-core function is effected, increased use should be made of the services of such commercial carriers. (It is understood that, for the present, types of aircraft such as the DC–7F and the L–1049H qualify under this paragraph.)

5. That, with respect to services overseas and to foreign countries, commercial augmentation airlift procurement policies and practices be better adapted to the long-range Department of Defense requirements, so as to encourage and assist in sound economic growth, development, and maintenance of an increased air cargo capability; that there be explored the feasibility of (1) (a) increasing the around of MATS cargo airlift moving on a common carriage basis with certificated carriers and supplemental carriers, [and (b) requiring that all cargo [illegible in the original] be so moved;]⁸ (2) entering into longer term contracts for MATS traffic; and (3) giving preference in the movement of MATS traffic to those commercial carriers (a) who are effectively committed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, (b) whose facilities and equipment are most advantageous to the emergency needs of the Department of Defense, or (c) who are demonstrating a willingness and ability to acquire uncompromised cargo aircraft; and that legislation be sought if necessary to permit accomplishment of any of the foregoing considered desirable. (It is understood that this recommendation will be reviewed after receipt of the report by the Air Force as to the feasibility of the steps outlined above.)

6. That since the development of long-range, economical turbine-powered cargo aircraft is essential to MATS modernization and to long-range evolution of a modern civil cargo fleet, suitable arrangements should be made for Defense and industry participation in the costs of such development.

7. That purchase loan guarantee legislation, if proposed, contain provisions to insure the immediate availability of cargo aircraft covered thereby to meet military and mobilization requirements.

8. That consideration be given to equipping certain Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units with transport aircraft that might be available from MATS excesses as augmentation forces for MATS in time of emergency. (It is understood that this recommendation will be reviewed after receipt of the above-mentioned report by the Air Force.)

9. That the role of CRAF be re-examined with the objective of insuring optimum effectiveness and responsiveness of commercial airlift services to the Department of Defense under all conditions.

1. Source: Transmits draft recommendations on the role of MATS. Official Use Only. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
2. Airlift requirements which must move in military aircraft, manned and operated by military crews because of special military considerations, security, or because of limiting physical characteristics such as size or dangerous properties. Included in this category are special military deployments involving nuclear retaliatory forces, the SAC post strike recovery mission, tactical deployments, movement of missiles, special munitions, etc. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. Wherever used in these recommendations, “commercial carriers” means U.S.-owned commercial carriers. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Budget, Commerce, FAA, and CAB propose deletion. [Brackets and footnote are in the original.]
5. The Department of Defense has stated that its criteria for determining comparative costs are on the basis of Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 60–2, September 21, 1959. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. Defense proposal. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. Budget, Commerce, FAA proposal. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. Defense proposes deletion. [Footnote and brackets not delineating illegible text are in the original.]