231. Memorandum of Conference with the President1
Washington, January 14,
1960
[Facsimile Page 1]
OTHERS PRESENT
- Dr. Kistiakowsky, General
Goodpaster
Dr. Kistiakowsky met with the
President to take up a number of matters bearing on his function as
scientific advisor. These are set forth, together with his discussion
thereof, in the attached memorandum.
During the discussion the President expressed general agreement with the
views presented by Dr. Kistiakowsky. With regard to the proposal for a
satellite telescope for astronomical research, the President said he did
not feel this should be a crash program but one to be conducted in a
rapid, orderly manner.
In discussion of ballistic missiles, the President stated that he
remained of the opinion that careful consideration should be given to
putting the Polaris missile on the Navy’s ships. f this is not to be
done, he has a large question in his mind whether Khrushchev is not right, and whether
the day of the surface combattant ship is not, in general, past.
With respect to the GAO report
concerning the missile program, the President said it is very important
that the Air Force get their answers together and have them immediately
available for release when the GAO
report is made public.
A.J.
Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA
Attachment
Briefing Memorandum Prepared by Kistiakowsky
Washington,
January 14,
1960
[Facsimile Page 2]
Notes for Meeting with the President, January 14,
1960
[Omitted here is page 1.]
[Facsimile Page 3]
The remaining items in my report, Mr. President, have to do with
military matters.
[Typeset Page 955]
4. One of the panels of the PSAC made this fall a very thorough study
of the Nike-Zeus AICBM problem. It confirmed the findings of
two independent recent technical studies in DOD and extended the conclusions further. Specifically,
they are that the presently conceived Nike-Zeus system, even if it
performs according to expectations, is not a worthwhile investment.
If it is considered as a defense of missile sites, it turns out to
be cheaper to
[Facsimile Page 4]
increase our deterrent strength by adding more
such sites than by buying Nike-Zeus, the cost factor being very
substantial in this case, of the order of 10 to 1. On the other
hand, if one thinks of Nike-Zeus as a defense of population, it
turns out to be useless because the enemy can kill people by
exploding warheads upwind, of the cities out of the range of
Nike-Zeus. Hence, only a comprehensive fallout shelter program in
conjunction with the Nike-Zeus could achieve this objective. Because
of these very thoroughly documented arguments, our Panel recommended
against going into production with Nike-Zeus—a recommendation which
was accepted by the Secretary of Defense. We urged further research
effort on Nike-Zeus in the hope that this weapons system could be
dramatically improved. In the Army there seems to be a sharp split
on the issue of our recommendations; people lower in the echelons,
who have had an opportunity to look into the technical factors
involved, agree with our recommendations, but top echelons are most
unhappy about them.
5. I should like to tell you now, Mr. President, about the present
status of the so-called Project Corona. So
far it has not functioned, but every successive launch has resulted
in some progress, one difficulty after another being eliminated. All
of them are of comparatively trivial engineering nature, and there
is a substantial degree of optimism that the next launch, which is
scheduled for early February, will see a complete technical success
of the entire system.
6. You are already aware in a general way, Mr. President, of the
difficulties of the Titan Project. I have
made a considerable effort to analyze these difficulties and have
reached the conclusion that the Air Force is completely correct in
its evaluation. This is that the missile is soundly engineered and
should show the planned performance. On the other hand, the
managerial situation at the Martin Company is very bad and the
failures of the last eight months can all be traced to human
factors: lack of staff training, low competence, lack of adequate
instructions. The Air Force, with a little help from me, has put a
heavy pressure on the Martin Company to remedy these weaknesses;
changes have been made and we have hopes that the program will
shortly get going. If this is the case, Titan could still be
operational by mid-’61 as planned, but there is little doubt that in
Congress a great deal will be made of the present situation by the
critics of the Administration.
[Typeset Page 956]
7. In this connection, I should like to call to your attention a report by GAO on the supposed failings of the Air Force in
the over-all management of the missile
program. This report appears to be an extreme and unwise
invasion of the Executive Branch of the Government. GAO, under the guise of managerial
criticism, condemns the Air Force and the Defense Department for
failure to take certain technical decisions and for use of
inadequate
[Facsimile Page 5]
scientific talent on the program. The report contends that
objectives of the program have not been met. The Air Force is taking
vigorous actions to counter the report, urging its revision and also
preparing a rebuttal, but I am very much afraid that when and if
this report is made public, it will provide ammunition to those who
choose to attack your Administration irresponsibly.
