231. Memorandum of Conference with the President1
Washington, January 14,
1960
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OTHERS PRESENT
- Dr. Kistiakowsky, General
Goodpaster
Dr. Kistiakowsky met with the
President to take up a number of matters bearing on his function as
scientific advisor. These are set forth, together with his discussion
thereof, in the attached memorandum.
During the discussion the President expressed general agreement with the
views presented by Dr. Kistiakowsky.
With regard to the proposal for a satellite telescope for astronomical
research, the President said he did not feel this should be a crash program
but one to be conducted in a rapid, orderly manner.
In discussion of ballistic missiles, the President stated that he remained of
the opinion that careful consideration should be given to putting the
Polaris missile on the Navy’s ships. f this is not to be done, he has a
large question in his mind whether Khrushchev is not right, and whether the day of the surface
combattant ship is not, in general, past.
With respect to the GAO report concerning
the missile program, the President said it is very important that the Air
Force get their answers together and have them immediately available for
release when the GAO report is made
public.
A.J.
Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA
Attachment
Briefing Memorandum Prepared by Kistiakowsky
Washington, January 14,
1960
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Notes for Meeting with the President, January 14,
1960
[Omitted here is page 1.]
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The remaining items in my report, Mr. President, have to do with military
matters.
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4. One of the panels of the PSAC made this fall a very thorough study of
the Nike-Zeus AICBM
problem. It confirmed the findings of two independent recent
technical studies in DOD and extended
the conclusions further. Specifically, they are that the presently
conceived Nike-Zeus system, even if it performs according to
expectations, is not a worthwhile investment. If it is considered as a
defense of missile sites, it turns out to be cheaper to
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increase our
deterrent strength by adding more such sites than by buying Nike-Zeus,
the cost factor being very substantial in this case, of the order of 10
to 1. On the other hand, if one thinks of Nike-Zeus as a defense of
population, it turns out to be useless because the enemy can kill people
by exploding warheads upwind, of the cities out of the range of
Nike-Zeus. Hence, only a comprehensive fallout shelter program in
conjunction with the Nike-Zeus could achieve this objective. Because of
these very thoroughly documented arguments, our Panel recommended
against going into production with Nike-Zeus—a recommendation which was
accepted by the Secretary of Defense. We urged further research effort
on Nike-Zeus in the hope that this weapons system could be dramatically
improved. In the Army there seems to be a sharp split on the issue of
our recommendations; people lower in the echelons, who have had an
opportunity to look into the technical factors involved, agree with our
recommendations, but top echelons are most unhappy about them.
5. I should like to tell you now, Mr. President, about the present status
of the so-called Project Corona. So far it has
not functioned, but every successive launch has resulted in some
progress, one difficulty after another being eliminated. All of them are
of comparatively trivial engineering nature, and there is a substantial
degree of optimism that the next launch, which is scheduled for early
February, will see a complete technical success of the entire
system.
6. You are already aware in a general way, Mr. President, of the
difficulties of the Titan Project. I have made a
considerable effort to analyze these difficulties and have reached the
conclusion that the Air Force is completely correct in its evaluation.
This is that the missile is soundly engineered and should show the
planned performance. On the other hand, the managerial situation at the
Martin Company is very bad and the failures of the last eight months can
all be traced to human factors: lack of staff training, low competence,
lack of adequate instructions. The Air Force, with a little help from
me, has put a heavy pressure on the Martin Company to remedy these
weaknesses; changes have been made and we have hopes that the program
will shortly get going. If this is the case, Titan could still be
operational by mid-’61 as planned, but there is little doubt that in
Congress a great deal will be made of the present situation by the
critics of the Administration.
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7. In this connection, I should like to call to your attention a report by GAO on
the supposed failings of the Air Force in the over-all management of the
missile program. This report appears to be an
extreme and unwise invasion of the Executive Branch of the Government.
GAO, under the guise of managerial
criticism, condemns the Air Force and the Defense Department for failure
to take certain technical decisions and for use of inadequate
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scientific
talent on the program. The report contends that objectives of the
program have not been met. The Air Force is taking vigorous actions to
counter the report, urging its revision and also preparing a rebuttal,
but I am very much afraid that when and if this report is made public,
it will provide ammunition to those who choose to attack your
Administration irresponsibly.
