Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

216. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Augusta, Georgia, November 18, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Twining, General White, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, General Pate, General Goodpaster

The President said he had wanted to talk with the Chiefs on the problems of the coming year and specifically on the military program. What he had in mind was an exchange of ideas with them. He commented that he was deeply disappointed in General Taylor’s action in putting out a book, but was not going to let that keep him from speaking frankly and meeting both formally and informally with the Chiefs whenever there seemed to be reason to do so.

General Twining said Secretary McElroy had had the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries in to meet with him on his return to Washington the previous Monday. He said the main concern in the Chiefs is that expenditures are increasing for many things that do not give a return in combat capability today. The President said he realized this but felt that our military leaders must from time to time take a new look at things that have become simply a matter of habit. He had two or three specific items in mind. The first of these is the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Admiral Burke said that there would be some advantage to putting the 6th Fleet under SACLANT and deploying it in the Atlantic. There is need, however, to stabilize the situation in Greece, Italy and Turkey, and the 6th Fleet makes a great contribution in this regard. He felt that the fleet units had to be kept fairly well forward so that, when needed for an emergency, we could move them fairly fast into the troubled area. He cited the wholly unsatisfactory British experience and performance at the time of the Suez operation. He added that the fleet does not involve much drain on our dollar reserves.

The President said he is getting extremely annoyed with the Europeans who are tending to lean much too heavily on us. In fact, everyone is relying on us around the world. The British, for example, want us to maintain their interest in Kuwait. He said he saw the use for carriers in peacetime but thought they had no real value in an all-out war. They would be hit in port. Admiral Burke commented that the carriers are moved at odd times, on no fixed schedule, so that an enemy could never be sure where they were. The President said it would be a simple matter to reconnoiter them.

He went on to say that when we put our forces in Europe in 1951 we said they were being put there temporarily. Since that time, however, our government has taken the stand that we must not pull anything back, that the shock to the Europeans would be too great. Admiral Burke commented that the 6th Fleet also has amphibious lift, which is very expensive to maintain. No one else has it. The British capability is nothing short of pitiful when one considers that this is a type of force they particularly need. The President said the French, Germans and British are all steadily increasing their gold reserves. Their budgets are not being overstrained. In 1951 and 1952 we made sacrifices. It is hard for him to see why they do not now pick up a fair share of the burden. He thought there is no reason we could not cut down the number of our carriers on station. What troubled the President is that, in America’s anxiety to make the free world safe, we make ourselves vulnerable to our allies taking advantage of us. There is, of course, no possibility of doing anything suddenly. The Europeans have told their people too long that their safety depends on the U.S. He recalled that de Gaulle said he was unhappy with regard to command arrangements and thought these should be more on a national basis than at present. The President told him that there would then be no reason for U.S. forces to be in Europe. Admiral Burke said he had been meeting with Admiral Lambe of Britain and Admiral Nomy of France. Nomy is in an extremely embarrassing position because he recognizes the logic of collective defense as against the de Gaulle proposals. The President said he had told Admiral Lambe when he saw him that he was asking our people to restudy our naval position in the Mediterranean. Admiral Burke commented that the French naval people want to work closely with us. The President said he is trying to save something in annual costs and simply wanted to know if we had to pull down somewhere what we would then do with the 6th Fleet. He wants the other countries to pick up responsibilities. Admiral Burke mentioned that in this budget the Navy is reducing its strength by fifty destroyers. The President said we tend more and more to get other people into the habit of expecting us to pick up the responsibilities and the costs. We should maintain the reserves for the whole free world, and rely on local people to provide the localized elements of defense, especially on the ground. We should provide air, naval and mobile land forces. In that way we would be putting our strength into the types of forces that give greatest over-all strength. He asked Admiral Burke to make a further study of this matter.

The President next raised with General Lemnitzer the question of the strength of the National Guard and Reserve forces. General Lemnitzer said that these have been greatly reorganized and tightened up. Paid drill strength has been cut down from 1,254,000 in 1954 to 700,000 at the present time. We have cut down manning levels, knocked out ten divisions, and cut down the number of battle groups in sixteen divisions. We have reduced from 11,000 to 8,800 units. We are giving the National Guard and Reserves more of a civil defense mission. We have just completed this reorganization, and an attempt to make a further change coming at this time would inflame the whole National Guard and Reserve structure. He said that with the six months’ training program now in effect, and the elimination of excess units, we now have six good divisions. To attempt to decrease to 630,000 would explode the situation, he felt.

The President said he had recommended a strength of 630,000 for the last several budgets. If we are not careful, we will get into the position of making recommendations simply to fight politicians rather than to solve military problems. He recalled that he had called for State Guards to be established, with the rest of the structure brought under Federal control. This had been bitterly opposed. The biggest mission of the Reserves today is rehabilitation in case disaster should occur through nuclear war. He thought it is wrong to keep the National Guard and the Reserves in an antiquated concept. He realized that he had been defeated by the National Guard and Reserves on this issue, and realized that he would probably be defeated again. General Lemnitzer said it had taken tremendous effort, but he had gotten agreement from the National Guard and Reserves on a 700,000 man force. He said he has resisted pressures for an increase in the strength of units. He has had a restudy of the pentomic division made, under a guideline that he would not approve an increase of even one man in total strength.

The President said he was going to stick with his 630,000 man recommendation. He wants to tailor the force to the real need. He commented that defense will never be as sound on an unstable economy as it will be on a sound one. The Chiefs to him are the hinge between the professional forces and the supporting nation. He referred briefly to the so-called new look concepts, and commented that the old relations between military forces and the nation in time of war are changing. General Lemnitzer said that the National Guard and Reserve units are undoubtedly the best nucleus on which to carry out rehabilitation in case of nuclear attack. He must sell and develop this concept gradually, however. The President commented that we have got to keep our economy expanding through private initiative by three to four percent a year. To do this we must keep our dollar sound. In addition, it is the currency base throughout the world. We must not permit a run on the dollar to develop. Our people must support their military program by current taxes and not by deficit financing. The result is that we must cut off every unnecessary excrescence. He said he is fighting to get the budget below $80 billion, which is an enormous figure in his judgment, and he is the first President to have stressed economy in recent years. He said he knows that every man in Defense is concerned regarding our security and safety. Someone must however look at the Defense establishment afresh and restudy its needs, since changes in technology change the needs of defense. He felt we are putting too much money in certain things—particularly the traditional things—and are not giving tough enough restudy aimed at eliminating everything not needed. Some increases are inevitable. For example, there is an increase of $70 million this year in retired pay. A number of these things add up very quickly. Now the question is how we do what needs to be done within a pattern that will keep our economy healthy and expanding.

The President reiterated that he felt we should go to the 630,000 man National Guard and Reserve force. We should get what we need for the job these forces do. He recognized that the Congress might override him, and recalled that they had overridden him as Chief of Staff in providing retired pay for National Guard and Reserve inactive service. Admiral Burke asked if there is any way to get the states to pick up more of the cost of National Guard forces, and General Lemnitzer said he saw no hope of this. The President said he wanted to have whatever meetings are needed to find a program in which all would believe. Then he thought all should stand and present this to the people, to the Congress, etc. with unity. Each staff must accept this as the view of its own Chief. As to General Taylor’s opposition to his policies, he was confident that Taylor would not get enough support to override him. He reiterated that he thinks that the Chiefs must look for every excrescence. He said he is afraid of some of the things we are doing in science, devoting resources to many unnecessary things. He said that whenever the Chiefs want to see him they could do so, and that he had in mind to see them at least once a month. He asked them to continue to work on what they think is right, taking account of the fact that a sound economy and a sound defense are inseparable.

He repeated that he did not favor the 700,000 man program for the National Guard and the Reserves. General Lemnitzer said that one problem in the reduction is that it looks like an arbitrary 10% cut. The President commented that the other services are cutting personnel through a wringer process and that this reflects the results of advances in technology that come from our outlays on science. General Lemnitzer said he has taken a hard look at personnel, which is now stretched to the breaking point, with 40% of the people overseas. The President commented that he has not pressed the Army for cuts this year. He added that other nations are profiting from the presence of our forces and building up their reserves while we serve as the world’s banker.

The President said he realized the problem of the individual Chiefs before Congress. They demand the “personal views” of the Chiefs. General Lemnitzer said they frequently ask what was the original recommendation made by the Chiefs.

The President then turned to the question of the B–70. General White showed charts showing the declining trends in major aspects of the Air Force program. He said the Air Force is cutting personnel and units in order to maintain modernization. The President said that he had approved the B–58 program going ahead at a reduced level as part of our interim defense measures. He said the B–70 left him cold in terms of making military sense. General White conceded that there are great questions involved, but thought we would be going too fast and too far to eliminate it at this time. He said it is the only aircraft left in the Air Force under development. He had dropped the F–108 a short while ago. Both of these were intended to be mach 3, 2,100 mile per hour aircraft. He weighed carefully which one to drop. The primary deterrent to date has been the manned bomber and he did not feel we could rely wholly on missiles, none of which have ever been used in combat, at this time. Unless nuclear testing is resumed, we would find ourselves in the position of never having fired the one weapon we are completely dependent upon. The President said he would have no objection to testing a missile with a live warhead less the nuclear core—the TNT could be fired. General White said that the missiles give the President no options. Bombers could be gotten aloft to await orders, but missiles cannot be called back. Bombers give the enemy a difficult defense problem since he must defend against several kinds of attack. There is also the psychological effect of manning static weapons like the Coast Artillery of olden days, where training was done with the blitz cloth. He said that bombers can be seen by friend and foe alike and that they have a powerful psychological impact. If the Soviets were to produce an aircraft of this kind it would create great problems for us. He said he would beg that the B–70 be carried as a bare minimum research and development program at the level of $200 million this year. He said this is a very different aircraft from anything that has gone before. It must pass through the heat barrier and the shape of wing and fuselage must be studied out. The President said he understood the Hounddog missile is very successful and that it can be fired from a B–52 several hundred miles away from the target. The B–70 will not be in production before a date eight to ten years from now. He thought that was getting too far into a period in which the major destruction would come from missiles. He thought we were greatly overinsuring our ability to hit an enemy. There is no uncertainty that we would be able to hit his cities. He asked whether the Soviets would not be able to hit the B–70 with rockets. General White said that they would, but the B–70 would cross radarscopes so fast as to be a difficult target. The President said he was convinced that the age of aircraft for actual use over enemy territory is fast coming to a close. General White thought it would be worth the money to carry on development of this aircraft for a short while, agreeing that it might be dropped later. The President said he finds the missile a cheaper, more effective way of doing the same thing. General White reverted to the premium we gain from having different systems for attack. The President said that in ten years the missile capacity of both countries will be such as to be able to destroy each other many times over. He thought we are going overboard in different ways to do the same thing. General White commented that this is the last aircraft under development in the world and that he would, if it were left in the program, find money somewhere to hang on to it.

The President said that he questions the bomber having a place after we have produced the kind of destructive power that we have. He saw no need for it. General White said he simply wanted to keep it alive for one more year. The President commented that defensive rocketry would be much more effective against the B–70 than against the Titan and Atlas. He commented that the X–15 is under development, and even it could be used to knock out the B–70. He said that we retired the battleship finally long after the contest was over and asked whether we are not trying to hang onto the old forms of warfare too long in a similar way as regards the bomber. General White thought we were looking too far into the future if we did this and the President said he feels he can look that far in recommending it. General White said if the President would allow him to keep it in the program even on a research and development basis, he would put it into the budget and would not accept an increase even if the Congress tried to force it on him. General Lemnitzer said he was appalled at the estimate of $200 million just to carry on a research and development program. The President asked the other Chiefs for their views. General White, General Pate and General Twining favored continuation of the project. Admiral Burke opposed it. General Lemnitzer favored it as a research and development project which he thought could be a small fraction of $200 million.

The President reviewed past examples of weapons that had outlived their era and said he thought we were talking about bows and arrows at the time of gunpowder when we spoke of bombers in the missile age.

The big question to him was that we have got to find a defense program now and in the future within a reasonable budget, i.e., within feasible tax levels such that our people will not start evading the taxes and will be able and willing to support on the basis of the present kind of prosperity and present tax rates. He thought the B–70 is a duplication of something we will have otherwise. He said he would take another look at the B–70 proposition. However, in ten years he saw missiles carrying the burden of warfare. He thought that each Chief must look for every possible saving, even driblets. We must make every effort to stay within a reasonable level defense program.

General White said he thought that perhaps Air Force management has been discredited. Many of the programs approved last year have now been cancelled and are no longer being continued. The President said the question is simply one of success in rocketry. This success has made possible and necessary reductions in aircraft programs. It is a change in our thinking. General White said there is the question of what is the future of the Air Force and of flying. This shift has a great impingement on morale. There is no follow on to the fighter, and no new opportunity for Air Force personnel. A natural extension of Air Force activity would be into space as flying drops off. He wanted the predominant role in space for the Air Force.

The President said he did not know what our needs were going to be in space. He thought that would be going ahead of current plans and problems. At the time these questions arose, we probably will not have air, navy and ground forces. He commented that he is going to make a change in NASA, cutting back military operations in space to strictly defense activities.

General White said he thought the Department of Defense should establish force objectives extending some three years or so into the future as was done in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. The President said that each Service Chief had come down to the meeting with a firm service program. He would like to see the Chiefs come to some basis of principles, give those to the Joint Staff with no other instructions and see what the Joint Staff would develop as to needs. General White thought if this were sent to the Secretary of Defense he should then have the task of making a three-year program and budget.

The President commented that he believes we should have one National War College. He thought that service staff colleges are all right but at war college level we should be talking about the needs of the U.S. and not orienting our thoughts toward services.

In concluding the meeting, the President invited the Chiefs to come in to see him whenever they wished to.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: General discussion of the U.S. military program: force levels, B–70, budget. Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.