Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

215. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Herter¹

Washington, November 18, 1959

SUBJECT

• Long-Range Security Policy

INTRODUCTION

I believe that an essential element of an effective foreign policy is a respected military force with appropriate strategy for its use.

I am concerned about the damage to our foreign policy to be expected from our likely military posture in years to come if current trends are not changed.

For several years, the Secretary of Defense has indicated in reports to the National Security Council that the US is losing its margin of military superiority over the Soviet Union.² During these same years, however, forward military programs have given no prospect of a change in these trends.

The Department of State for several years has believed that present military policy is wrong. During these years it has tried without success to modify our almost complete dependence on nuclear weapons.

The latest effort was on April 25, 1959, when you submitted to the Secretary of Defense the “Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing Upon US Strategy” [copy attached].³ This statement was later submitted to the NSC as the views of the Department of State. It is generally recognized that these requirements were not met in the military paragraphs of the basic policy paper, approved by the President on August 5, 1959. This basic paper expressly states that military policy was not thereby changed.

The purpose of this memorandum is to focus attention on the impending loss of American military superiority and to urge that a new long-range effort be made to halt present trends.

I. THE NEED

As the nuclear weapons balance between the US and the USSR evens off, it seems that the chances will become smaller that nuclear weapons can be used effectively by the US in wars in the Middle East, Far East and Southeast Asia. Since we did not use nuclear weapons in limited war when we had, in effect, a monopoly, it hardly seems likely that we would use them after losing the monopoly. It also seems quite unlikely that the USSR would initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a limited aggression. Under such circumstances, a tacit ban on the first use of nuclear weapons may well come about.

In order to retain military influence around the world at a time when both sides will probably be deterred from using nuclear weapons, we should develop a significant non-nuclear military force while retaining an adequate nuclear retaliatory force for insurance. The existence of a significant non-nuclear military force may also be a necessary condition precedent to getting on with safeguarded nuclear disarmament.

II. THE CAPABILITY

It is gradually being recognized that there is no inherent lack of conventional force capability in the free world. American example and strategy have been the key influence in free world military thinking. This example and strategy have not put a premium on conventional force build-up by industrialized countries.

Now, however, the strong economies and reviving peoples of Western Europe have the manpower and the industrial potential to support non-nuclear forces adequate to deter or to hold off a Soviet conventional attack in Europe. The missing element seems to be American leadership and incentive and determination here and abroad to make the necessary effort.

Non-nuclear deterrence of Chinese communist aggression in the Far East is obviously a tougher problem. However, it should be well within the bounds of possibility for the combined beefed-up conventional forces of the US, the UK, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and the free Southeast Asian countries, as well as the present forces of the Chinese Nationalists and the Republic of Korea, to deter or stand off Chinese communist conventional attack.

The Korean war occurred at a time when the US was the only free nation with any real military power. In the coming era, the situation could be far different. We have many allies with large non-nuclear force potential.

III. THE PROSPECT

It must be admitted that there would be great difficulty in moving away from our present policy of threatening to use nuclear weapons to deter any kind of aggression. There still may be substance to the argument that the continuing threat to employ nuclear force keeps down the risk of war. But with each passing month, this nuclear threat becomes less credible and the temptation to the communists to resort to limited force will increase if some supplementary deterrent is not developed.

Certainly it will require a great wrench to our post-war accustomed manner of thinking about the role and nature of forces in free world defense to face a future without leaning so heavily on the crutch of nuclear weapons.

Our great dependence on the nuclear deterrent has lulled Americans into forgetting that in the last analysis their security is no greater than their will to fight for their country. Nuclear weapons have obscured this responsibility. Nuclear weapons have also permitted budgetary rationalizations, which in turn only increased our nuclear dependence.

If we are to affect the trends which the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense find are decreasing our relative military power, we will have to find ways of breaking out of this blind circle. We will have to find the dynamism to support a different military policy. That same new dynamism will be essential if we are to keep freedom alive in the rugged peaceful competition with communism which lies ahead.

In view of our deep commitment to nuclear weapons, it will take a relatively long time to get away from excessive dependence on them. There will be many painful “withdrawal symptoms”. But the switch is within the bounds of possibility—and within a reasonable time span. A recent paper prepared at a high level in the Pentagon included the following statement: “. . . it would be at least five to ten years before the U.S. military establishment could be converted to a modem non-nuclear force capable of deterring or fighting a general war.”

President Eisenhower’s great dedication to the cause of peace and his expressed wish to leave a legacy of constructive thinking for the future may offer the combination necessary to start the turn away from our present military stance. A “respectable” military posture not based almost entirely on the total-war threat might in the long run be of even greater significance for peace than the major efforts which the President is now making in the international political field.

There is still time during the last year of his Administration for a start to be made in a new direction.

IV. CONCLUSION

I recommend that if these views commend themselves, you present them to the President and urge that the Secretary of Defense ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to start a study to estimate the possibilities and cost of developing over the next decade a free world military posture which would reduce present dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Administration could do this without calling into question the present military posture—by addressing its attention to the above-mentioned five to ten year period when new factors will cause and require radical changes in our military posture.

Attachment–

“Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing Upon US Strategy”, dated April 24, 1959 [S/P–59110–1 C]

Enclosure

Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Krebs

Washington, December 9, 1959

The attached memo of November 18 was returned today.

I would much appreciate knowing whether or not the recommendation on page 5 commended itself to the Secretary.

Encl.

Memo, re long-range security policy [S/P–59204–1A]

Enclosure

Memorandum From Krebs to Smith (S/P)

Washington, December 11, 1959

I inquired of the Secretary whether the recommendation at the conclusion of your memorandum of November 18th had commended itself to him. He replied that while he had read the memorandum carefully, he had not yet made up his mind definitely as to the merits of the proposal and would like to think about it a bit more before deciding definitely whether to speak to the President about it.

Max V. Krebs

Attachment:

S/P Memorandum of November 18

1. Source: Long-range security policy; includes two covering memoranda, December 9 and 11. Top Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548.
2. In the Department of Defense status report as of June 30, 1958, it was estimated that “. . . recent Soviet technological advances and the concurrent quantitative reductions in U.S. forces have combined to diminish that margin of U.S. military superiority. If these trends continue, it is estimated that this superiority will be lost in the foreseeable future.”
   The latest status report [June 30, 1959] is more specific. “By the end of FY 1962, with a continuance of present trends and programs on both sides, and with no major technological breakthroughs on either side in the intervening years, the most probable position will be that each side will possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions.” [Footnote and brackets are in the original.]
3. All brackets are in the original.