Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

217. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Augusta, Georgia, November 21, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretaries Gates, Brucker, Francke, Douglas, Dr. York, General Brown, Mr. Logan, General Goodpaster

The President said he had met with the Chiefs of Staff to discuss the military program for fiscal 1961. One question in his mind related to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. He felt that its presence there was largely just a matter of habit. It is no longer the asset it once was to the right flank of the European defense position, because of the advent of long-range thermonuclear missiles. He said he had asked Admiral Burke to take an objective look at this question.

The next item that he had strongly questioned was the B–70. We have the B–58 coming into inventory and various missiles behind it. To put as much into the B–70 project as is proposed and have from it a vehicle nearly ten years from now seemed to him to be a very doubtful proposition. He wondered what the counter measures would be by that time. General White had previously expressed great concern over this, stating that if we drop this weapon we would be standing on our inventory and not going into a new field. The President thought that NACA is conducting forward research in this field, and indicated he did not share General White’s concern. Dr. York said he thought the general design of the B–70 aircraft is sound. Technically, it represents a big step forward. For example, there is a change in construction material from aluminum to stainless steel. If we are to go above mach 3, it will be necessary to use steel. For reasons of promoting technical progress, Dr. York said he was inclined to want to go forward with this. Even if there is no good military reason to carry it forward, there are technical reasons to continue with research and development. Secretary Douglas said he did not know whether, when we get down the road, we will want to drop this or not. He felt it was very important, however, to carry forward development work on advanced aircraft. The program as revised calls for two prototype aircraft. The first could fly in 1962. The President said he understood that research would be concentrated on metals, configuration and engines. Dr. York said Dr. Kistiakowsky had asked him to state as his view that it would be useful to continue the development of this aircraft, but not strictly necessary.

The President said he is not at all interested in building an aircraft for civilian transport purposes. The question remains somewhat unresolved in his mind.

The President then said that anything that weakens our economy weakens our defense. He believes every single individual in defense must weigh expenditures in terms of what they mean in weakening our defense through weakening our economy. He had told the Chiefs of Staff they must look for and weed out every expenditure of half a million dollars or a million dollars that is not strictly necessary. He recognized that it would be possible to ask for a tax increase if greater expenditures were needed. He pointed out, however, that even during the war, when motivation was high, there were gray markets and black markets and that higher taxes would begin a widening pattern of tax evasion.

He called on the Secretaries to formulate a national defense system that all could agree upon and support. Then he said he could insist on economy in every other field of government such as public health and public works.

Regarding the aircraft carrier, he said he would approve a conventional carrier. He thought the carriers had value in the cold war, but not much value in a general war. Dr. York and Mr. Franke said that everyone was agreed that there is no need for a nuclear carrier. The problem is that it is not possible to get a conventional carrier from the Congress.

The President said that the Administration has one more year to get the defense establishment in the best possible shape. He thought the best minds were assembled in the Joint Chiefs and the top leadership, that had ever been there. What he wanted was to get a decision that looked good to all, with all supporting it. There must be no undercover sniping at the program.

Mr. Gates said the Defense group had gone back from their meeting of a day or two earlier and had taken out everything possible, leaving questions on the carrier and the B–70. He is having studies started on continental air defense and on communications and intelligence activities to see if further cuts can be made.

Regarding space activities, the President said he had talked with Dr. Glennan. The significance of the space problem is that it affects the morale of our people. In the field of space there are a certain number of things that affect defense directly. Basically, however, the program is scientific. Dr. Glennan had asked for $930 million, and he has asked Dr. Glennan to cut this down substantially. While space is important to morale, he asks what would happen to the world’s morale if our dollar—the world’s banking currency—were to soften. He asked the group to look at every project with a jaundiced eye. He said he did not want to gouge Defense because it is the biggest but thought everyone should be tightening up. He added that if he were convinced of the necessity for additional funds for the nation’s security, he would instantly go out and get the additional taxes. Mr. Gates said that on some of these decisions the best that could be done was to make an intelligent guess or gamble. Mr. Douglas added that some people had wanted crash programs on the missile output. Referring again to the B–70, the President said he had asked what the other elements in the military situation would be at the time the B–70 became available. What counter-measures would the Soviets have, for example. On the proposal that the B–70 should be used for reconnaissance he commented that we have an excellent reconnaissance vehicle in work right now. He recognized the validity of General White’s statement that we must not put all our eggs in one basket and rely wholly on missiles. He thought we were far from doing so, however.

Mr. Gates mentioned a comparative study that is being made on use of missiles and aircraft. Dr. York pointed out that while there is no doubt about missiles from a technical standpoint, they will not be exercised like aircraft, and the parent units may lose their verve, somewhat as the Coast Artillery did in times past.

The President said that all we really have that is meaningful is a deterrent. If the Soviets think the B–70 is more effective than missiles, then it has value. If they do not, it is valueless. Dr. York said that the concentration the President had just suggested on deterrent value should be stated as basic national policy. The President said that beyond the deterrent we would provide for other things such as the cold war. He thought we would be cutting back our base system greatly in future years. He noted that armament is now in a transitional period and that if we are thinking of something that is not operational for eight years this is not a transitional item but is simply a supplement to the missile force.

The President said that, with regard to atomic weapons, if we use thousands of small weapons we would be in a general war situation, in which the hydrogen weapon would be used, making the smaller ones insignificant. He had no objection to a reasonable number for tactical use. He commented that he was told a year ago that SAC would not take Navy targeting into account. If we are going to fight a nuclear war, it was clear in his mind that we would attack cities and governmental concentrations. Invariably, the reasoning leads us back to perfecting the deterrent. Mr. Douglas said this emphasizes the importance of an invulnerable missile. The President commented that the capabilities of missiles for destruction are beyond human comprehension. It is very difficult to plan, because our plans are developed out of past experience. Dr. York commented that the total deliverable destructive power is the significant thing and the President agreed.

The President asked whether the Polaris program is progressing as rapidly as it should be to justify the preparations we are making. Are its technical problems solved? Dr. York said that perhaps the first or second submarine will not be operational on the exact date planned. However, by the time we reach the eighth or tenth we will be on schedule. The firing methods are sound, and its range is now being worked up to 1200 miles, employing a large nuclear weapon.

The President next referred to the National Guard and the Reserves and his discussion with General Lemnitzer. The latter had made two points—first that he had finally sold the States and the Guard on a force structure based on a strength of 700,000; he had sold them on the idea that their mission includes local defense and rehabilitation. The Guard units are better than ever before. It will be difficult to stick to the Administration figure of 630,000, but this will be done. General Lemnitzer was fearful that the Administration would be defeated on this and at the same time incur the enmity of Congress and the Guard. Governor Brucker reviewed the decrease in Guard numbers both as to personnel and as to units. Five years ago personnel was 1,100,000. It is now 700,000. Units were cut from 11,000 to 8,800. He said various members of Congress had insisted that they were going to put a floor under the strength of the Guard. The President said the big question is how much to fight for what is thought to be right, or how much to bow to expediency. He realized he would probably be defeated on this point and that Congress would take things out of the program that he wanted and put things in that he did not want. However, he felt that we should stick to what he thought was right.

Governor Brucker said he wanted to push as rapidly as possible the preparations for the Kwajalein tests for the anti-ICBM. Secretary Gates said it would be practical to withdraw seven squadrons of aircraft from NATO (really four, since three are troop carriers not fully committed). The President said there was not time left to put this reduction into the present budget. The State Department must have time to prepare the ground. He agrees that some of our strength could be withdrawn, but it will take time to turn European thinking around on this.

At the President’s request Mr. Douglas presented a brief explanation of the funding of the Atlas and Titan missile programs. The President commented that heavy expenditures are coming at the same time as expenditures on our most costly bombers.

As the meeting ended, the Secretary of the Army reported on the situation in Panama. He said he had met with Mr. Herter and that Mr. Merchant was currently in Panama. There is great bitterness there and the Communists are moving into the troublemaking organizations. The President had two comments. First, he said when the conciliatory approach was adopted, we should have announced it publicly. Second, we have always acknowledged Panama’s residual sovereignty and we should have flown Panamanian flags as part of a ceremony rather than opposing this. He said he thought some of our local officials had been too stiff-necked and too legalistic. This was a situation where politeness and courtesy would have been extremely effective.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: U.S. military program: B–70; national defense system; budget, space activities; missile programs; Panama. No classification marking. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.