Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

203. Memorandum of Discussion at the 420th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, October 1, 1959

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 420th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 1, 1959

Present at the 420th NSC Meeting were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Acting Secretary of Defense (Gates); and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary or the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget (Staats); the Attorney General (Item 1); and the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; from the Department of State—the Under Secretary of State (Dillon), Assistant Secretary Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary G. Lewis Jones, and Messrs. Armin Meyer and Howard Furnas; from the Department of Defense Assistant Secretary E. Perkins McGuire and Assistant Secretary John N. Irwin II; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

(NSC 5906/1; NSC Action No. 2114–c; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 21 and 29, 1959)

Mr. Gray said the first item on the agenda was a new mobilization base paragraph for Basic National Security Policy. Some members of the Council might form the impression that the divergence of view reflected in the draft paragraph was a matter of semantics only; actually hidden behind the language differences were policy differences involving billions of dollars. He hoped the Council would discuss the issues which he would point out, and would not devote much time to redrafting the language of the paragraph.

Mr. Gray then began reading his Briefing Note (a copy of which is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy of which is attached to this Memorandum). After Mr. Gray had referred to the sentence in the draft mobilization paragraph dealing with planning (“Planning for opposition to local aggression will include arrangements for the timely provision of personnel and combat essential materiel to insure the continued maintenance of an acceptable general war posture.”) and had indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed adding the words “cold war and” before “opposition”, Mr. Allen said he would like to find out more about the meaning of “cold war planning”, especially as it concerned the timely provision of personnel. Mr. Gray said one illustration of cold war planning was the use made of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets in the cold war. General Twining pointed out that the Lebanon operation was another example of cold war use of military force.

Mr. Gray then completed the reading of his Briefing Note and made some additional comments regarding the “split” between State, Commerce, and OCDM on the one hand and Budget and Treasury on the other. He said it would be possible for the US to develop a high state of readiness for (1) survival (2) survival and rehabilitation, (3) survival, rehabilitation and recovery, (4) survival, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction. Readiness for category (4) would permit stockpiling of anything anyone could think of. Perhaps the niceties of language did not sufficiently emphasize the “split”, which he hoped he had not characterized unfairly.

Secretary Herter felt the problem was largely a matter of semantics, involving the difficulty of finding the right language. Providing for recovery was a matter of degree; and the degree was a pragmatic question affected by budgetary and other considerations, including the question or who stockpiles recovery items. Secretary Herter then said his experience in State government led him to raise another question, i.e., the relation of the National Guard to mobilization. He was unable to see where the National Guard fitted into the mobilization policy except in connection with minimum civilian needs and recovery. The principal function of the National Guard as a disciplined group would be to help salvage civilian resources. He wondered how the present concept of the National Guard conformed to a national point of view under nuclear war conditions. State Governors had often suggested that the National Guard be organized in regional commands on the ground that nuclear war would not follow State lines. Of course, the Guard could be “federalized”, i.e., placed under Federal jurisdiction. The US was now spending large sums to provide the National Guard with modern war equipment which it might not need if it performed a recovery role. Secretary Herter confessed that he was thoroughly confused as to the National Guard’s function in survival and recovery.

Mr. Gates said the old mobilization base plan provided for forty to sixty National Guard divisions integrated with the Army. Some vestiges of this kind of thinking still remained in the military services. In a new mobilization policy it would be desirable to be specific about National Guard functions. However, the practical problem was a political one; neither the National Guard nor the Army would agree to the proposition that the Guard should become a militia to enforce martial law under conditions of nuclear attack on the US. Mr. Gates, on the contrary, was sure the National Guard would become just such a militia. Enforcement of martial law had been openly adopted as a mission for the National Guard in Canada. Our dilemma is that we know what the role of the National Guard will be in nuclear war, but we can’t put it down on paper.

Secretary Herter wondered whether the issue should not be met head on. Mr. Gates said that in any future war our mobilization base will be what we have in readiness on the day of the attack. Nevertheless, Congress continues to legislate for the National Guard on a different basis. It would be more realistic to assume that in the event of nuclear war, the National Guard will be federalized and will enforce martial law. Secretary Herter felt it was foolish for the Federal Government to provide the National Guard with expensive equipment which it might never use.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the draft mobilization paragraph, under the heading “general war,” referred to active forces, selected reserve forces having an initial general war mission, and additional forces. Mr. Gates said the issues raised by the language of the paragraph were not identical with National Guard issues. Mr. Gray suggested that the draft paragraph might perhaps make it clear that planning is under way and direct the responsible agencies to submit proposals which would be specific as to recovery stockpiles. Not much progress would be made by leaving fuzzy language in the paragraph.

The Attorney General thought that since the Government could not continue after a nuclear attack unless the country recovered from the attack, there was little difference between the alternative versions of the draft paragraph. Secretary Mueller said Mr. Gray’s suggestion would allow for greater flexibility. Mr. Gates agreed that the paragraph could be completely “open-ended.”

Mr. Scribner thought that if the language of present policy were changed, the change would indicate to those Government officials who desire an expansion of the mobilization base that expansion is possible. The Attorney General felt that if the purpose of the draft paragraph was to give a signal to the staffs of the various agencies, the signal should be given in more precise terms. Mr. Gray suggested the Council might regard the draft paragraph as a paragraph for planning purposes and ask Defense and OCDM to submit the programs contemplated.

Mr. Patterson said the draft paragraph, if adopted, would be authority to develop proposals for consideration through the budgetary process. He felt the mobilization pattern had been set in US Policy in the Event of War (NSC 5904/1) and in the Strategic Stockpiling question considered by the Cabinet. It was difficult to define the terms, but survival and recovery were recognized as essential objectives. Language which did not include both these terms could carry the implication that no measures for recovery would be included in the mobilization base. He felt the NSC would not wish to be put in the position of hamstringing recovery.

Mr. Staats said the Bureau of the Budget was concerned lest the language proposed by State, OCDM, and Commerce in the draft paragraph indicate to some that large recovery stockpiles would be established. If the mobilization base paragraph was being formulated for the first time Budget would not feel so strongly, but in contrast to existing policy the State-OCDM-Commerce proposal placed undue emphasis on recovery. Mobilization planning was covered by existing law and policy. Stockpiling had been considered by the Cabinet, which had directed a further study. He would prefer to postpone further consideration of this paragraph until the stockpiling study was completed, at which time the Council would be in a better position to judge the implications of the proposed policy language. The State-OCDM-Commerce proposal prejudged the stockpiling study and might also require a change in the law, since it went beyond the language of the OCDM statute.

Mr. Patterson felt it would be undesirable to postpone a policy decision on mobilization pending the outcome of a study of one phase of stockpiling, which would require nine months or a year. Such a postponement would put the brakes on progress and planning. He wondered what harm there would be in adopting a mobilization paragraph which would merely provide the opportunity for mobilization programs to be considered on their merits in the normal process of government.

Secretary Herter asked whether assumptions for the study called for by NSC Action 2110–c (the wartime situation which would probably exist following a nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR) had been worked out. Mr. Patterson answered in the affirmative. Secretary Herter said he seemed to recall that Dr. Kistiakowsky thought there were no agreed assumptions as to the extent of nuclear damage.

Mr. Gray believed the Net Evaluation study provided as satisfactory a crystal ball on damage as anyone was likely to find. He suggested amendment or the draft paragraph by striking the words “maintenance in a high state of readiness.”

Mr. Scribner said measures essential to survival as a nation ought to be kept in a high state of readiness. No one objected to recovery; the question was whether scarce resources could best be used for defense or for recovery. He suggested a subparagraph on survival and a separate subparagraph on recovery.

Mr. Gates suggested the word “plans” might be used instead of “measures.” Mr. Gray said this wording would enable OCDM to move ahead. The Attorney General confessed that all the drafting proposals so far advanced seemed to him to have exactly the same meaning.

Secretary Herter said the words “develop and maintain” were of key importance; these words meant that whatever plan is developed goes immediately into force.

At Mr. Gray’s suggestion, Mr. Scribner restated his proposal as follows: “(4) Development and maintenance in a high state of readiness of measures essential to survival as a nation, including minimum civilian needs and continuity of government (5) Development of plans essential to national recovery in the event of general war.”

Mr. Patterson asked what was meant by “minimum civilian needs.” Mr. Gray said OCDM had been operating under this phrase for several years. Mr. Patterson said that under the formula “minimum civilian needs” there was nothing to prevent the minimum being reduced. Mr. Gray wondered whether OCDM wanted to do anything it could not do under the Treasury proposal. He suggested that the Treasury language might be adopted while sympathy might be extended to OCDM.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the draft revision of paragraphs contained in NSC 5906/1, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 21, 1959; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 29, 1959:

(1) Paragraph 59 (Mobilization Base), prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of a draft submitted by the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization after review of current mobilization base policy pursuant to NSC Action No. 2114–c.

(2) Paragraph 64–f (Manpower), prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of its review of the Mobilization Base paragraph.

b. Adopted as a recommendation to the President the revisions of paragraphs 59 and 64–f of NSC 5906/1 enclosed with the reference memorandum of September 21, 1959, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 2, subparagraph 59–a–(2): In the last sentence of this subparagraph, insert the words “cold war and” between “Planning for” and “opposition”.

(2) Page 4, subparagraph 59–b–(4): Include the Budget-Treasury version in the right column, delete the State-OCDM-Commerce version in the left column, and add the following subparagraph (5):

“(5) Development of plans essential to national recovery in the event of general war.”

c. Agreed to recommend to the President that the following be presented to the Council at the earliest practicable date: A report by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization presenting a general description of the anticipated effect on the current mobilization base program of the policy on the “Civilian Readiness Base” contained in the above-mentioned paragraph 59–b of NSC 5906/1.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above subsequently submitted to the President for consideration.

The revisions of paragraphs 59 and 64–f of NSC 5906/1, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of that paper.

The recommendation in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Basic National Security Policy. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.