Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

204. Memorandum of Meeting Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, October 12, 1959, 10 a.m.

1. I first discussed the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of 1 October. I reported to the President that Secretary of State Herter presided in the absence of the Vice President. I discussed the action on the new mobilization base paragraph which had been agreed upon in the Council and recommended for his approval. I pointed out to him that the new paragraph is divided into two sections: one is what is called “Military Logistics Base” and one on what is called the “Civilian Readiness Base.” As far as the Military Logistics Base was concerned, the M-6 months concept has been abandoned and the period will be something shorter. Also, the military section involves the addition of a directive on nuclear damage. Finally, the new language, although not explicit, reflects the fact that Defense and JCS have accepted a new approach and will make separate analyses of general war needs and local war needs. I reminded the President that in the past the JCS had taken the position that preparation for general war would serve also to meet the needs of local war.

With respect to Civilian Readiness, I pointed out to the President that the policy now would require a high state of readiness of measures for survival, specifically including minimum civilian needs and continuity of Government. With respect to recovery in the event of general war, the policy would direct planning towards this end. I pointed out to the President that no one at the moment was quite sure about the extent and nature of recovery measures and the Council had not felt it prudent to direct that these be maintained in a high state of readiness. I also pointed out to the President that the action called for a report from OCDM as to what the planning would involve so that the President could then have a judgment as to what measures should be directed. The President said he thoroughly agreed with this approach.

With respect to the request that OCDM make this report, I indicated to the President that the Draft Record also requested Defense to report on the general effect of the changes in the military section. I indicated that I was encountering considerable resistance from Defense and JCS to the inclusion of this request in the Record of Actions largely at least on the ground that it was not specifically agreed upon in the Council meeting although I had indicated an intention to call for a report. I said that the JCS particularly felt that too many requests for studies were being levied upon them by the NSC. I told the President that I was in negotiation with respect to the inclusion of this request for a study, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with General Twining, and that I would include it if I could get their agreement; otherwise, we would approach the problem in a different way.

In this connection I told the President that we were having considerable difficulty in getting ahead with some of the studies which had been requested. For example, I reported that the Maritime Study had come back without the factoring-in of nuclear damage and that I had declined to accept the report for the Council.

The President then said that with respect to our problems for the future, perhaps he would get Secretary McElroy and the Chiefs to go again to some point removed from Washington and their staffs, to discuss the question of where we were really going with respect to our military establishment. He wonders whether we’re facing up realistically to the problems ahead and said that he was not too impressed with the continuation of our thinking on the basis of roles and missions for particular services. I indicated to the President that I thought the Chiefs were working very hard at their problems despite their fundamental differences and the President agreed, saying that he thought that this was about the best set of Chiefs of Staff that he had had in his administration.

We discussed then some of the fundamental differences such as those deriving from the question of “how much is enough” of retaliatory capability.

2. I then reported to the President on the new policy for Finland.

3. I reported to the President that I had done nothing with respect to recruiting members or staff for the new committee to review the report of the old President’s Committee on International Information Activities because Mr. Sigurd Larman had been out of the country and was due back only that day. However, I had arranged for quarters and financing. The President said he continued to think well of having Mr. Larman as the Chairman and authorized me to explore the matter with Mr. Larman, agreeing, if necessary, to write him a letter.

4. I then again discussed with the President the proposal of the Institute for Defense Analysis to broaden its interests and capabilities to include economic, social and political fields so that it might be in a position to make studies for the government in non-military fields just as it had done on weapons systems. I reported to the President that except for OCDM the departments represented on the Council took a rather negative view of the IDA proposal. I said to the President that I was reopening the question because I was still convinced that in some way we should try to do long-range planning, or at least thinking, in economic and political fields as well as in the military field and, I did not think we had adequately faced up to the problem. Furthermore, I reported that there was developing in many quarters an interest in such a thing and described to him as an example, the proposed University of Chicago group under the leadership of Dr. Bothwell and I said that something similar was going on at Ohio State University and other places.

The President then said that this was the kind of thing that he was now thinking about for his National Goals Commission for which, of course, he had been unable to get financing. I suggested to the President that there might be a possibility of combining the National Goals Commission with the kind of proposal that was coming out of IDA and the University of Chicago with the purpose of obtaining financing. For example, Dr. Bothwell had indicated that the Foundations would look favorably upon his proposal if they were satisfied with respect to leadership and also with respect to some sort of sponsorship or interest on the part of the Federal Government. The President seemed interested in this approach and I offered to discuss it with General Persons.

5. I then reported to the President on my discussions with Secretary Herter and with Mr. George Allen with respect to the objectivity of the Voice of America broadcasting in relation to the President’s discussion with Premier Khrushchev about jamming. I said that Mr. Allen agreed with the prescription but felt he still had some problems which he would like discussed with the President. As an example, he did not know quite what to do with a situation as was involved in Mr. Walter Robertson’s speech to the United Nations concerning Communist China, which was made of course as an official representative of the U.S. This was not propaganda cooked up by USIA but simply the reporting of an event. However, Premier Khrushchev would probably take offense at it. The President observed that he could see some of the difficulties but wondered whether the Voice of America could not simply forego broadcasting this particular item to the Soviet Union but proceed with broadcasts to the Far East and Asia, for example.

6. I reported to the President that I detected mounting unrest not only in Government but out of Government, about our organization for space activities. I said that there was not only an inherent friction between the military establishment and the space agency which would always derive from jurisdictional problems but there was beginning to be thoughtful concern from outside of Government. As an example, I described the visit of Mr. Ralph Davies from the Management Consultant firm of Klein and Saks, who offered the services of his firm in developing a most effective organization within government. I acknowledged to the President that this matter was not precisely within my charter. However, I said it seemed to me that this was becoming a very important problem and one which would get increasing visibility.

The President said that he had always felt that the emphasis on space should be on peaceful uses and that the Defense interest should develop only when a specific military application was clearly discernible. I said that there was a question of whether the Army Ballistics Missile Agency should stay under the Army or be transferred to the Space Agency. The President indicated that his personal view was that it should be so transferred and that Mr. McElroy had demonstrated an interest in this matter by memorandum just before he left on his current trip.

I asked the President if he had anything specifically before him on the general problem and he indicated that he did not. I then agreed to discuss it with General Goodpaster.

7. I then said to the President that I would like to talk to him for a few minutes about the posture, character and activities of the National Security Council in the next 15 months. I said that perhaps the problem might be stated in an over-simplified way: as to whether the Council should be an active or a passive body. I said to the President that I wished to take the liberty of observing that for my own part I was eager to serve him in any way he found my services useful; that I was not interested in being a custodian or a caretaker. I said that with respect to what is now being called “The Thaw” might require many revisions of many papers if the thaw was really meaningful or if it was not, in the nature of the things we may have very little paper work to do in the next 15 months. In the last months of the Administration there would probably be little in the way of development of new policies and we would probably find ourselves running out of backlog. At this point the President interrupted to say that he did not think that the thaw really was a thaw and that he immediately saw no basis for contemplating serious changes in our overall policies.

I then said to the President that he many times had indicated his impatience with too many papers and too much fussing with language. He replied that General Cutler had never been able to bring himself to present matters to the Council for discussion but preferred the academic approach of wrestling with language. He said that what he would like to do in the next 15 months would be to spend the time of the Council in discussing the major problems facing the Government. I then said that I would like to make three points: First, there would continue to be some policy papers, which the President acknowledged. Second, that it was important that the discussion topics be dealt with in some sort of framework or the meetings would be incoherent and range over too wide a variety of problems without being productive. I reminded the President of the meeting following his stag dinner on September 10 in which the discussion was disorganized and diffuse. He agreed, saying that unless there were some guidelines the Council would find itself discussing the World Series. Finally, I pointed out to him that in some important matters there had been what I called “exclusions” that is to say, that he had expressly not wished the Council to deal with certain matters.

I referred first to disarmament and said that I acknowledged that the Council should probably not discuss disarmament until the Coolidge Report is completed but at that time I thought the Council should get into this field. Second, I pointed to discussions for preparation for Summit meetings which had not really been discussed in the Council. I reminded him of the old Summit Committee which had not really ever been active. Third, I pointed out that the Council had really never gotten into serious consideration of all the problems relating to NATO. With respect to the latter the President said that this would be a very real problem for us in the months ahead because of the necessity of U.S. troop reduction.

At this point the President said that he was still thinking about the Berlin and German situation. He said that if we make the assumption that East and West Germany are not to be reunited in a decade, which appeared to him to be the only assumption that can be made, then what is our solution for Berlin? He felt that we might get something which Chancellor Adenauer could live with. The President felt that we should continue to maintain such forces in Berlin as an indication that our position has not changed at all. In any event, he felt that this might be a topic of fruitful discussion.

The President then said he did not wish to think in terms of any exclusions in the months ahead and that the Council should discuss every problem of consequence which was in its field of interest.

The President then said that he looked upon the Council and its machinery for the next few months as follows: First, he would like to keep the OCB and the Planning Board active in their respective roles. As for the OCB he wanted it to continue to study and review progress under our policies and to make a decision whether to recommend any change in the policies. On the other hand, he wished to keep OCB paper work at a minimum and OCB reports at a minimum, consistent with the guidelines he had previously established.

As far as the Council itself, and the Planning Board are concerned he would like to devote a major portion of the time to an identification on what is going on and what we should be doing about it and a discussion of these problems.

He felt that we should spend more time in discussion, and with respect to many topics discussed there need not necessarily be a Record of Actions.

For example, he cited the changing face of war and what that means to us now and in the future.

He said we were not adequately thinking of the great problem of the U.S. in sustaining itself in the free world which must grow in morale and economic strength.

He said that we must address ourselves to those countries on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass which the USSR can destroy without war.

He said that with respect to whether the Council should be active or passive he had never allowed any of the members of the Council an excuse to be away from the meetings. This was one reason why he attended meetings regularly himself. If we were to drift toward attendance by deputies and under secretaries there would be no point in his participating. He therefore continued to think of the Council as an active vigorous body and not as a passive one.

I then summed up to the President, saying that on the basis of this discussion, it seemed to me that we would be dealing in the Council for the next few months with three main types of items: First, of course, would be the necessary new policy papers or revised policy papers. Second, the Council would devote itself more to the discussion of major problems and policies which might or might not result in a Record of Actions. Third, out of the Council meetings in the next 15 months would come some policy decisions but that there would also come, what the President has frequently referred to as “legacies of thought” for the next Administration.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

1. Source: Mobilization base, Service roles and missions, international information activities report, long-range planning, VOA broadcasting, organization for space activities, future NSC activities, and Berlin. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings With the President. Drafted October 14.