202. Briefing Note for October 1 NSC Meeting1
MOBILIZATION BASE
Our first item, Mr. President, is a new mobilization base paragraph for the basic national security policy. When the Council wound up its basic policy discussions in July, this was one of the two paragraphs left in their old form for further work by the agencies. The other one concerned stockpiling, and the PB hopes to be able to present a revision of that paragraph to the Council soon.
In reading this revision of the mobilization base paragraph, you may have noticed that it has been changed considerably in form. It is now divided into two sections, one on what is called the “military logistics base” and one on what is called the “civilian readiness base.” This change in form reflects, I believe, the fact that the term “mobilization base” no longer means what it used to. Before the Korean War, the term referred to a foundation on which expansion could take place after general war began. Accordingly, “mobilization base” still suggests all kind of World War II thinking. The PB considered this semantic problem, but decided not to propose a new term at this time.
Turning to the substance of the paper, I should first like to highlight for you the changes in subparagraph a, the military section. The first one is the abandonment of the M-plus-6-months concept. This is the second time in the last 2½ years that mobilization base thinking has undergone a drastic change, with all that such a change means for procurement, reserves, industrial planning and so forth. In early 1957 we went from a concept of M-plus-36-months to one of M-plus-6. This substantial step was reflected in our 1957 Basic National Security Policy statement. Defense now feels that [Facsimile Page 2] planning should not envisage a 6-month mobilization, but rather one of smaller proportions. For that reason, the old M-plus-6 language has been dropped, and the more flexible language in 3(c) at the top of page 3 substituted. Paragraph 64–f also has been appropriately revised. The second change in the military section involved the insertion of the sentence on nuclear damage just above the middle of page 3. Although this represents a change in the basic policy paragraph, it is not new policy since it reflects the President’s decision made last December (Action 2019–b). A third change does not clearly come through in the text. It consists of Defense’s intention to make separate analyses of general war needs and local war needs. You may know that it has always been assumed in the past that preparation [Typeset Page 841] for general war would serve also to meet the needs of local war. Now this assumption will no longer be made, and a separate analysis of local war needs will be conducted.
Before we turn to subparagraph–b, I want to mention the JCS proposal to add three words to the last sentence on page 2. They would have it read: “Planning for cold war and opposition to local aggression will include . . .” Is there any objection?
Are there any other comments on this military logistics base section?
In subparagraph–b, the only substantial change proposed is that of going beyond survival to plan for recovery. Here we have a split, which is shown on page 4. OCDM, State, and Commerce would like to speak of “national survival and recovery,” whereas Budget and Treasury would like to retain the language in the old paper, which uses the phrase “survival as a nation.” The JCS have made a comment to this effect:
Consideration of this split will require a decision as to what proportion of its national resources the United States will allocate to Civil Defense. The [Facsimile Page 3] present-language difference appears to be largely a question of semantics. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are interested in the protection and recovery of the nation should it be subjected to an attack, and therefore any wording which would indicate a policy of at least minimum protection of the civilian population and the eventual recovery of the country is satisfactory to them.
Dr. Saulnier is unable to be here today, but he has sent me the following comment:
“I prefer the State-OCDM-Commerce language because it makes quite explicit the need for readiness measures essential to recovery, as well as to survival during the attack. We should take the measures that are truly needed to effect recovery from an attack. Actually, recovery would seem to be implied by the word “survival,” so that either alternative could be employed, but I would prefer the more explicit form.”
In the absence of Mr. McCone, who is overseas, the AEC informs me that it has no comment on this or any other part of the paper.
CALL ON: Mr. Patterson
Mr. Staats
Secretary Herter
Mr. Scribner
Secretary Mueller
General Twining
In connection with this question of survival and recovery, you will recall that the President recently asked for an informal study by staff officers in Defense and OCDM on the wartime situation which would probably exist following a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the USSR. (Action 2110–c)
- Source: Mobilization base paragraph of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.↩