Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

201. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to Herter¹

Washington, September 29, 1959

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy; Revision of Paragraph 59 (Mobilization Base)

Discussion:

On October 1 the NSC will consider this subject which was deferred during the basic policy review to allow Defense and OCDM additional time to work out an agreed draft revision. The proposed new mobilization base policy would replace a policy in existence since 1957. The main purpose of the changes is to carry out the instructions of the President, who last December asked Defense and OCDM to inject more realism into mobilization planning. He suggested that in view of the likely character of general nuclear war, it is unrealistic to expect, and to plan for, (1) the availability of a six-month period for civilian and military buildup between the beginning of mobilization and the outbreak of hostilities, and (2) a World War II type buildup of forces.

The new policy contains three important changes:

1. The M + 6 months concept is abandoned. The new policy does away with the M + 6 months concept and calls for planning for a military logistics and civilian readiness base flexible enough to meet any foreseeable military contingencies, placing the emphasis upon optimum readiness and capability for active forces. The new policy is expected to result in planning involving (a) a somewhat shorter time period than six months for achieving military readiness, and (b) force levels of lesser magnitude, particularly for non-active forces. The exact details of time periods and planned force structures are not yet known and will depend upon the planning experiences of the next few months. It would be unfortunate, however, if Council approval of the new concept were to be interpreted as agreement to further reductions in present U.S. ground force strength.

2. Planning for general war will now take into account estimates of damage from nuclear attack both on the U.S. and on U.S. forces abroad. Previously, this problem had been ignored in mobilization base planning because of the difficulty of making such estimates and of factoring them into plans.

3. The new policy distinguishes between requirements for general war, and those for limited war. The previous concept was that readiness for general war would automatically satisfy the requirements for limited war because the latter would require only a small portion of the general war resources. The new policy recognizes that there must be separate readiness planning for limited war because different weapons, combinations of forces, etc., will be involved.

The new policy states the purpose of civilian readiness to be to support the essential military and civilian requirements in an emergency. Subparagraph b. (3) is of particular importance to the Department. It is intended to point up the relationship between U.S. trade and economic policies and the civilian readiness base, and to emphasize that such matters as the strength of our alliances and the wartime readiness of our allies’ industries, as well as our own, are affected by U.S. tariff policies, import quotes, etc.

The difference of view on page 4 concerns the degree to which planning should include measures essential to recovery of the nation after general war, in addition to measures essential for survival. Budget and Treasury believe the explicit mention of recovery will result in greater expenditures (e.g. for stockpiling of industrial and other items) then would be the case under a policy such as the existing one where only survival is named as an objective. OCDM, supported by State and Commerce, considers it appropriate to include recovery because that objective is part of OCDM’s responsibility, and because recovery must be an integral part of the U.S. objective of survival in general war.

The proposed change in paragraph 64 f is to be consistent with new paragraph 59.

Conclusion:

While the Department has no direct responsibility for mobilization planning, the degree of U.S. military and civilian readiness for an international emergency possibly leading to hostilities would exercise considerable influence upon foreign policy alternatives which might be available to the U.S. The new concept appears to be more realistic and workable than the old and should result in more effective measures to improve the readiness posture of the U.S. It also takes account of the importance of planning for a limited war readiness and capability.

Recommendation:

That you concur in the revised paragraph, supporting OCDM in its split with Budget-Treasury.

Concurrence:

E—Mr. Fuqua (in draft)

1. Source: Recommends State Department position on paragraph 59 of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.