Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

186. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, July 28, 1959

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5906
• B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 19 and July 6 and 7, 1959
• C. NSC Action Nos. 2103, 2105, 2108 and 2110

The enclosed paragraphs 10, 12–a, 15, 16 and 62 for NSC 5906 are transmitted herewith as the basis for Council consideration of the subject at its meeting on July 30 in lieu of the corresponding paragraphs of NSC 5906. These paragraphs have been studied further by the NSC Planning Board as directed by the Council in NSC Action Nos. 2105–c and 2110–a (6) and the Planning Board has revised paragraphs 12–a, 16 and 62 in the light of the Council discussion.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Secretary of Commerce

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

Enclosure

Revised Paragraphs for NSC 5906

Washington, undated

10. [Par. 8 of NSC 5810/1, amended.]² A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war, should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, a danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interest: that it will not pay.

12–a. [Par. 10–a of NSC 5810/1, amended.] It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. Designated commanders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.³

15. [Par. 13 of NSC 5810/1, unchanged.] In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

16. [Par. 14 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war. Local aggression as the term is used in this paragraph refers to conflicts occurring outside the NATO area in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The possibility of local aggression involving sizable forces of the United States and the USSR is ruled out. Incidents in the NATO area such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the United States and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept.

62. [New] Outer Space. The United States should continue actively [and with a sense of urgency]⁴ to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military and political purposes.

Objectives should include: (1) a broad-based scientific and technological program in space flight and planetary-interplanetary exploration which will extend human knowledge and understanding; (2) a military space program designed to extend U.S. military capabilities through application of advancing space technology, [only in fields where such applications show promise of offering advantages over other possible means for achieving required capabilities];⁵ (3) a civil space program designed to promote the peaceful uses of outer space; and (4) as consistent with U.S. security, achievement of international cooperation in the uses of and activities related to outer space—for peaceful purposes, and with selected allies for military purposes.

1. Source: Transmits revised paragraphs of NSC 5906. Top Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
2. All brackets, except those that indicate footnotes in the original, are in the original.
3. Paragraph 12–a of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Treasury-Budget propose deletion. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. Budget-Treasury proposal. [Footnote is in the original.]